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4Foreword
This book is the result of a CEA research funded by the Local Government and Public Service Reform
Initiative of the Open Society Institute (LGI/OSI) and managed by Marjan Nikolov, President of CEA.
CEA approached LGI/OSI with an unsolicited proposal for a cross country study on LGU borrowing with
an expectation to set out lessons that can be learned by Macedonia. The overall objective of the study on
local government borrowing is to accomplish an all-encompassing review that systematically captures the
entirety of the fiscal decentralization processes with an emphasis on local government borrowing in each
of the three transition countries: Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia.
Macedonia is in a position to develop the legal and policy framework now, in anticipation of future devel-
opment of a municipality credit market. Macedonia can learn from the Romanian and Bulgarian experience
but also can learn from problems that have become clear in other countries as well.  Excessive borrowing
by sub-national government or debt issuance in the absence of an adequate legal framework (one that clar-
ifies critical issues like the status of guarantees or the remedies available to lenders in the event of a munic-
ipality's non-payment) has exacerbated any national economic crisis. Also, premature borrowing, prior to
a municipality establishing its creditworthiness or having identified clear investment priorities, is likely to
drain local budget resources and add risk to the fiscal system. The benefit of soundly based local borrow-
ing is large, but the risks involved with poorly prepared borrowing can be great.  Stakeholders-LGU, nation-
al government, banks, and potential investors in municipal debt share an interest in ensuring that the poli-
cy issues surrounding credit market development are well understood and that an appropriate legal frame-
work is in place before the market actually opens.
CEA wishes to express the highest gratitude to OSI/LGI Budapest for the financial and other support
without which the project: LGU Borrowing in Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia could not have been con-
ducted, with particular thanks to Mr. George Guess, Mr. Adrian Ionescu and Ms. Marietta Kleineisel.  
The Center for Economic Analyses (CEA) is a think tank of economists who share a common vision for
the Republic of Macedonia as an emerging new European economy integrated into the regional and world-
wide markets. 
The Mission of CEA is to continuously research economic development and economic policy in the
Republic of Macedonia and to offer recommendations, suggestions and measures where it is deemed
appropriate. 
November 2006, Skopje                                                                        Marjan Nikolov, MSc 
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91. INTRODUCTION
The overall objective of this study on local government1 borrowing is to provide a review to capture
the entirety of the fiscal decentralization processes with an emphasis on local government borrowing in
each of the following three transition countries: Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia. As part of this larger
study, the main purpose of this country report is to provide an overview of the progress and issues
regarding local government borrowing in Romania and to draw important lessons for Macedonia.
This study does not present a credit rating analysis nor does it cover specific aspects in detail, but
rather it provides an overview of each of the building blocks of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
These building blocks are the structure of the government sector, delineation of expenditure responsi-
bilities, assignment of revenue sources, intergovernmental transfers, financial management issues,
sub-national borrowing, the impact of infrastructural development on the income side of sub-national
budgets and the characteristics of municipal debt. The study also considers the technical nature of the
strengths and weaknesses of the decentralization process, with special emphasis on the experience
gained in local government borrowing and makes recommendations for future developments. 
We base our opinions not only on what was presented during interviews but by examining the avail-
able reports on Romania and the existing laws that were shown to us. 
2. STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF THE GOVERNMENT
The economic problems of Romania led to unrest and eventually to the political revolution that was
a feature of Christmas 1989 (see more in Laure 2000). In March 1989, there was an open letter to the
President from six retired Romanian Communist party (RCP) officials accusing him of disregard for
the Constitution, economic mismanagement, and discrimination through the rural urbanization pro-
gram imposed on ethnic Hungarians. The unrest spread leading to other political events taking place
before Ceausescu was captured while attempting to flee. He was executed after a summary trial.
In October 1990, Prime Minister Petre Roman introduced laws to accelerate Romania's transition
to a market economy. After Ceausescu's overthrow, a complete restructuring of the economy was
planned, with emphasis on use of market forces and private ownership. In late 1991, a unified
exchange rate was introduced and the internal convertibility of the currency, the lei, was established.
In early 1993, the government announced a four-year economic reform program supported by the IMF.
This plan included progressive elimination of price subsidies for staple goods and services, removal
of controls on interest and exchange rates, liberalization of trade, accelerated privatization and reduc-
ing inflation.
The territorial organization of Romania was established by the Law on Local Public Administration
(no. 69/1991) as a two tiered system of local government, including both counties and municipalities
without a hierarchical relationship. This Law was replaced in 2001 by Law 215, which was further
amended in July 2006 by Law 286. The territorial units now consist of 41 Counties (judete), 262
Towns (orase) and 2,686 Communes (comune)2. A County structure consists of: Capital (municipiu
1) In this report we will use the term Local Government Unit-LGU, to designate the units of subnational government, local government, at coun-
ty level, communes, municipalities and cities interchangeably. When necessary for more clear text we will stress what is the tier we are talk-
ing about. 
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resedinta de judet), several Municipalities3 (municipii) and all the towns, communes and villages with-
in the county's territorial boundaries. Bucharest, the country's capital, provides a unique case as it is
divided into six sectors (districts), each with its own local council and mayor, with separate budgets,
under the authority of Bucharest General Council.
As for financial policies, in the beginning of the 90s the Law on the state budget4 was used to draft
and implement Local Government Unit's (LGU) financial policies and  included information about the
funds allocated to the LGU throughout Romania. There were also special funds for investment purpos-
es at local level.  These were earmarked and managed by the line ministries. Then in 1994, with the
Law on Local Taxes and Charges, fiscal decentralization in Romania was initiated and the own source
revenues of LGU were defined. The European Charter of Local Self-Government was ratified by the
Romanian Parliament in 1997. 
Each line ministry responsible for providing a certain public service maintains an office in each
county, headed by a director. Also, the Ministry of Public Finance has a number of tax directorates and
treasury offices in each county. A Prefect is appointed by the Ministry of Administration and Interior
for each county. A Prefect has the responsibility to "lead" the activities of the deconcentrated offices
of the line ministries and to ensure that decisions made by local councils are in accordance with the
law. Each county has an elected county council (the so called "judetean" council), presided over by
the President of the County, with an executive apparatus for the public activities within the county. The
central government is represented at each local council by a secretary who is appointed by the County
Prefect. The secretary must countersign all decisions of the municipal council. The secretary is
appointed by the Prefect following a proposal by the local council which is in turn based on the rec-
ommendation of the Mayor. The secretary has to undergo several tests before being appointed. The
process by which the secretary is appointed gives decentralization in Romania a greater flavor of
devolved decision making.(see figure 1) However it raises concerns about political interference in the
administrative decision-making process, as local autonomy is hindered by the roles of the prefect,
secretary and, in some instances, the role of  the deconcentrated offices of line ministries. 
Figure 1.
Government structure
in Romania (Author's drawing)
Such a government struc-
ture creates a short cut to polit-
Central level Central government
Prefect
Decentralization
Officies of line ministries
headed by Directors
Secretary of country
appointed by the Prefect
Deconcentration
Contry level
Local level
Country council
Local council
2) These numbers are in continuous change, new LGU being accepted.
3) Larger towns with a number of inhabitants of more than 100,000 and important economic activities
4) A list of all laws we were able to identify in relation to the process of decentralization in Romania is in the Annex 2.
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ical influence, replacement of office holders any time the government changes and to possible abuse
of power. The adverse influence of the politics in the actions of the prefect and the political migration
of staff it caused after the elections was stressed during interviews. See also Freedom House 2004:
"In turn, the local governments would prefer to maintain their political connections and a loose envi-
ronment, where there are no hard budgetary constraints and everything is negotiable on a case-by-
case basis".
We find the complex system of deconcentration mixed with decentralization to be confusing, at
least before the legislative changes planned for this year.  In our opinion the current system went
beyond the simple requirement for the central government to carry out central functions across coun-
try and reflected a struggle to keep power centrally. Even in the draft Amendment of the Law on local
public administration (215) from 2006 Article 68 still says: "In order to exercise his range of functions
appropriately, the mayor cooperates with the deconcentrated public services of ministries and of other
specialized bodies of the central government". Also Article 69: "In providing such cooperation, within
the law the mayor can request the prefect  to support the heads of deconcentrated public services of
ministries and of other specialized structures of the central public administration within the local
authorities, if the mayor cannot have some functions carried out by his  organisation". What "can
request" means is unclear. 
Also, in the amendment of the Law 215: 
"It is compulsory that the mayor's orders, the local council's decisions and the county council's
decisions be communicated to the prefect of the county; as well as .the decisions of the local and
county council"
"The decisions of the mayor, decisions of the local council, decisions of the county council, as well
as other documents issued or adopted by local government authorities shall be checked by the pre-
fect for compliance with the law regulating activity of the local council". 
With the Law on Modification and with completion of the Law on the Statute of Civil Servants, the
Prefect becomes a high level civil servant. It is expected that the Prefect will be a professional person
with a good education and with an appropriate length of service criteria and thus to break with the
adverse effects of the past. Filling any vacant high-ranked public position must be by a national con-
test held by a permanent independent commission, composed of seven members who are appointed
by decision of the Prime Minister. The members of the commission are appointed by rotation and have
a predetermined ten and a half year mandate. 
In addition a general performance appraisal of each high level civil servant must be carried out
every 2 years with a view to confirming their professional knowledge and ability to fulfill the require-
ments of  their position. Each high level civil servant also has the obligation to attend annual profes-
sional training courses on the law. 
Our conclusion regarding the scope and structure of the government in Romania is that the process
of decentralization was driven politically and that it tended to maintain central control. Given the two
tier system, the desire for central control created a complex system with mixture of deconcentration
and decentralization at same time. This mixture was particularly noticeable at the county level where
the Trojan Horse of political appointees to control the local government was provided. The situation
was further complicated by many new villages becoming communes with the resultant increase in the
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number of LGU. This in turn reduced the possibilities for efficient management and economies of scale
in the provision of services. 
3. EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS5
The assignment of responsibilities for expenditure to local governments has been included in a large
number of pieces of legislation. This  has made it difficult to obtain  clear information on this subject.
There is a lack of legislation regulating the organization and operation of local governments that pres-
ents in a clear, structured and transparent manner, the assignment of expenditure responsibilities for
delivering local public services at county, commune and town level.
The Ministry of Administration and Interior, within the framework of the public administration reform
process, has undertaken a general evaluation of the current legal framework applicable in this area.
As a result, two documents have been drafted: 
Annex 1, "Competences fulfilled by local governments at the county level in providing public serv-
ices" and 
Annex 2 "Competences fulfilled by local governments at the commune and town level in providing
public services," 
These two annexes describe in detail the current assignment of expenditure responsibilities to the
two local government tiers namely the county, and the commune and town. In case of competences
shared by local governments and the central government, the roles of each are described in detail, in
order to avoid any confusion. At the same time, the two documents are an important benchmark relat-
ed to administrative and fiscal decentralization conditionality within the PAL 2 Program of the World
Bank. 
All ministries and other central public government agencies responsible for regulating areas of local
public services included in the two annexes were requested to notify the Ministry of Administration
and Interior about any legislative initiative designed to amend the current assignment of expenditure
responsibilities to local governments. 
Under the Law on Local Public Utilities (326) "municipal services" include water, wastewater, solid
waste, district heating, local public transport, and maintenance of roads and parks. These services are
frequently provided by enterprises (regie autonomes), which are not budgetary units of the local gov-
ernment or by commercial companies. Other LGU services which fall outside the definition of "munic-
ipal services" are provided by budgetary units of the local government. 
In terms of sustainability, we categorize some municipal services in Table 1:
5) This section benefited from  the input of Gabriela Matei, Director of CSPD Romania.
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Table 1. Municipal Services in terms of Self Sustainability by User Fees
At the time of our study, Law 215 on Local Public Administration was about to be amended and
supplemented by the Framework Law on Decentralization 339 (CEA studied the draft version dated
February 2006). The new law is more precise in assigning competencies to the LGU as can be seen
from the following extract: 
"The local public administration authorities exercise, according to the law, exclusive, shared and
delegated competencies:
a) Competence - the right of a local government unit to make decisions in a certain field or regard-
ing  certain issues, as well as the responsibility associated with this right;
b) Delegated competences - competences assigned by the central government to local govern-
ments, by law or contract, together with adequate financial resources, in order to be exercised in the
name and within limits established by central government;
c) Exclusive competences - competences assigned by law to local governments and for which they
are fully responsible for implementing. Local governments have the decision-making rights and the
necessary resources and means to fulfill them, in compliance with the norms, criteria, and standards
established by the law;
d) Shared competences - the competences exercised by the local governments together with other
levels of  public administration (county or central) with a clear separation of the financing and deci-
sion making powers." 
Table 2. Framework Law on Decentralization. Competencies at Local and County Level
Self-sustaining basis from user fees Subsidized 100 % from the local budget
(no budget support)
! water, ! district heating ! local roads
! wastewater, ! local public transport ! parks
! solid waste receive
Exclusive Local Exclusive County
a) The management of public and private domain
belonging to the local government;
b) The management of the local road infrastructure;
c) The management of local interest cultural institutions;
d) The management of local interest public health
institutions;
e) Urban planning;
f) Water supply;
g) Sewage, waste and pluvial water treatment;
h) Public illumination;
i) Sanitation;
j) Primary social assistance services for child
protection and for the elderly; 
a) The management of local interest airports;
b) The management of public and private domain 
belonging to local government (county);
c) The management of county interest cultural 
institutions;
d) The management of county interest public health 
institutions;
e) Primary and specialized social assistance services 
for victims of domestic violence;
f) Specialized social assistance services for the elderly;
g) Other competences stipulated by law.
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What remains is that many small communes are not able to provide the services efficiently because
of the economies of scale (as pointed out during interviews). With such an assignment of expendi-
tures, one cannot be sure of true extent of unfunded mandates at the sub-national level in Romania. 
In the following tables the size and nature of LGU expenditure in Romania is illustrated. 
Table 3. Proportion of Local Public Expenditure from Total Public Expenditure
Source: Budget outlook of Romania provided by one of the interviewee. 
k) Primary and specialized social assistance services
for the victims of domestic violence;
l) Local public transportation;
m) Other competences stipulated by law.
Shared Local with Central
a) District heating supply; 
b) The building of social houses as well as houses
for the youth;
c) State pre-university education, excepting special
education;
d) Public order and safety; 
e) The payment of the social benefits for people in need;
f) The prevention and management of emergency
situations at local level;
g) Socio-medical assistance services for the persons
with social problems;
h) Primary social assistance services for disabled
persons;
i) Community public services for personal data records;
j) The maintenance of the local road infrastructure
of local interest at the level of communes;
k) Other competences stipulated by law.
The local governments at the level of communes and towns exercise shared competences with local government
at the county level regarding water supply if regional operators are set up, as well as other competences stipulat-
ed by law.
Local governments exercise delegated competences by the central government regarding the payment of financial
rights for disabled children and adults.
Source: Author's adoption from the Draft Framework Law from February 2006. 
Shared County with Central
a) The management of the county road infrastructure;
b) Special education;
c) Socio-medical assistance services for the persons 
with social problems;
d) Primary and specialized social assistance services 
for child protection;
e) Specialized social assistance services for disabled 
persons; 
f) Community public services for personal data 
records;
g) Other competences stipulated by law.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
10.4 11.0 11.7 18.1 18.4 19.2
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Table 4. Romanian County Expenditure as % of GDP
Source: Martinez 2005 
Table 5. Wages and Salaries as % of Total Expenditure
Source: Adapted by author. Original Martinez 2005.
Table 6. Capital Expenditures as % of Total Expenditure
Source: Adapted by author. Original  Martinez 2005.
The figures in the tables above, at the very least, add substance to the general claim in Romania
that the current level of fragmentation at local level has a cost in terms of the loss of economies of
scale (see Martinez 2005). The local public expenditures as a percentage of the total expenditures
increased from 10.4% in 1998 to 19.2% in 2003 but a large part goes in wages and salaries. The per-
centage of wages and salaries of total expenditures is higher in the lower the tier of the government.
This could be an indication of greater inefficiencies as the unit of government becomes smaller. In con-
trast, the following comments were also made by CSPD about the development of the expenditure
system at LGU level: 
! As a whole, LGU expenditures followed the trend of mandate transfer, also reflected by their evolu-
tion in the GDP throughout 1999 - 2004. New responsibilities were transferred to the LGU, thus
increasing the share of local budgets in relation to the GDP and total expenditure in the public sec-
tor. These new mandates were especially in the fields of education and social welfare. Unfortunate-
ly, the new mandates were not always transferred together with the relevant sources of funding;
! Analysis of LGU expenditures by category of councils (county, city, town, and commune) shows
a major difference between urban and rural communities. In the case of county and city councils
a larger proportion is expended on public service or capital improvement, whereas in the case of
town and rural councils a larger proportion is expended on operational and staff costs;
2001 2002 2003 2004
6.1 6.1 6.8 6.5
Of which: capital expenditures 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7
Of which: wages and salaries 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5
2001 2002 2003 2004
County council 21.5 19.1 17.2 16.5
Municipalities 40.9 39.2 34.8 38.2
Towns 53.4 50.1 46.5 50.1
Villages 64.4 57.1 51.7 54.2
2001 2002 2003 2004
County council 16.8 15.8 14.9 8.7
Municipalities 14.0 13.6 14.4 12.1
Towns 10.8 11.9 13.3 12.1
Villages 8.2 7.6 10.5 8.8
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! As the size of LGU decreases, there is a clear trend of higher staff and social welfare expendi-
ture, to the detriment of public services and capital improvement. This trend raises serious
doubts over the capacity of LGUs, especially in rural areas, to upgrade their infrastructure;
! Arrears are difficult to assess because of the cash accounting system used. Emergency
Ordinance 45/2003 introduced the first elements of accrual accounting, but this will really only
start to show up in the 2006 reports.
4. STRUCTURE OF THE REVENUES
The Law on Local Taxes and Charges has no limitations on the number or level of taxes and charges
that local authorities can establish. These can be set depending on the local needs and the local
authority's institutional capacity. 
Own source revenues
The most important own source revenues at LGU in Romania are the revenues from ownership of
property. For buildings owned by physical persons, the tax is determined on the basis of a uniform
nationwide schedule based on the floor area of the building. The tax is also partially based on the
approximate the value of the building which is estimated on the basis of several factors such as the age
of the building, location, type of construction, etc. Thus the LGU has no authority to set the rates of this
tax on any building owned by a physical person. In the case of a physical person, the uniform rate is
0.2 percent for buildings located in urban areas and 0.1 percent for those located in rural areas. The lo-
cal councils are entitled to grant exemptions to payment of this tax. The law provides for progressively
higher tax burdens to be placed on physical persons who own more than one building in the country.
For buildings owned by legal persons, the value of a building is its book value as determined from
the accounting records of the company. It is interesting that in this case a local council has the discre-
tion to set the rate between 0.5% and 1 % of the book value of the building. The tax on buildings is paid
in four installments but with an option of a single payment before March 15 which brings a discount.
Table 7. Evolution of Own Revenues as % of Total Revenues 1999-2003
Source: IPP 2005. 
The decrease in the share of own revenues as a percentage of total revenues happened because of
the transfer of new responsibilities and the allocation certain grants by the central government. 
Table 8. Percentage of Own Revenues
Source: Swianiewicz 2004 and Martinez 2006.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
County 37.1 26.5 20.3 18.3 8.5
Municipalities 52.9 44.2 25.6 26.8 28.6
Towns 44.6 41.4 21.4 22.7 25.0
Communes 41 36.7 16.4 16.1 16.6
2001 2002 2003 2004
% as of GDP 6.1 6.2 6.9 6.7
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Assessing the real value of property for purpose of local taxation is a demanding task. Romania is
no exception even though there is a system which tries to keep up with different types of existing build-
ings having regard to zones, year of construction and multiple ownership of buildings. Another chal-
lenge is the budgeting of the LGU envelope given the assumption of all property taxes will be collected
in the following fiscal year but this never happens. This creates a systematic error in the amount of the
budget revenues of the LGU in Romania actually collected. This could be interesting topic to explore in
greater depth especially in connection with efficient tax administration and credit rating of the LGU.
Shared revenues
Quotas from the Personal Income Tax (PIT) are distributed to LGU in accordance with the Law on
Local Public Finances-LPF but the percentages may change from year to year with the State Budget
Law. Because of the introduction of a flat rate tax, and an expected decrease in rate of collection, in
2005 the government increased the overall revenue sharing rate to 82 % of tax collected in compari-
son with 63 % in 2004. The 82 % PIT is distributed as:
! 47 % to the local level where the tax is collected;
! 13 % to the county level where the LGU is located;
! 22 % to the county authorities for equalizing the local budgets of the communes, towns, munici-
pal towns and county (county 25 % of those 22 % points) and for further distribution to local level
(75 % of those 22 % points).
The share of the PIT in the Bucharest Municipal City is distributed as follows: 23.5% to the local
budgets of the sectors of Bucharest, 47.5% to the own budget of Bucharest municipal city and 11%
to the General Council of Bucharest Municipal City in order to equalize the local budgets of the sec-
tors and Bucharest Municipal City
Table 9. Structure of Revenues
Source: Martinez 2005.
What is interesting is that the own revenues are low compared to the shared revenues thus illus-
trating the dependence of the LGU on the central level government. LGU also fail to show efficiency in
administering own revenues and any improvement the collection rate (see more in Martinez 2005).
Capital revenues
Capital transfers are generated by sale of assets belonging to LGU. These are of an exceptional
nature and provide only a small fraction of the total local revenues.
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
The PIT and VAT transfers, as prescribed in the Emergency Ordinance on the LPF 45 from 2003,
are earmarked to subsidise the price of heating, salaries of teachers and social welfare and a part
which is non-earmarked for the purpose of equalization. 
2001 2002 2003
Own revenues 21.7 22.0 20.9
Shared revenues PIT and VAT 71.5 76.1 71.7
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Earmarked transfers
A large part of the earmarked transfers goes for salaries of teachers (typically around 30 % of total
local revenues). The Central Government also contributes to international projects by financing of
activities and services representing medium and long term investments at local level. 
Equalization fund
In the LPF, financial equalization is defined as transfer of financial resources from some incomes in
the state budget to administrative-territorial units in order to ensure the necessary funds for the sup-
ply of public services, according to the law. The Law regulates the transfer between different levels of
government, the role of the equalization fund and LGU borrowing. It also prescribes a mathematical
formula to assess the financial capacity of the LGU so that the equalization fund can be distributed
more efficiently. 
The Equalization Fund is first allocated from the national to the county level and then from the coun-
ty to the local level. The first allocation to the county level is in accordance with a formula with vari-
ables including the county fiscal capacity and the county land area. The second allocation to the local
level is in accordance with a formula with variables again including  the fiscal capacity and the land
area but in this case also the population.
Our main conclusion from the interviews and the material presented to explain the equalizati-
on/transfer system is that the system is too complicated and that it has the spirit of "double counting"
even though the inclusion of all the formulas gives the first impression of a very transparent system.
It is not very clear why there is a need to transfer a fraction directly from the central to the local level
and then another fraction to the same local level but this time via the county. Also, the power of cen-
tral government to announce changes in the share and pooling of funds creates an uncertainty in the
revenue flow at LGU level. Another issue may be the "quality" of the equalization system (the fiscal
capacity, fiscal needs, fiscal effort, variability of poverty etc.) but this is beyond our scope of work.
Interesting research in this area is the IPP 2005. 
The following comments were also given by CSPD for the development of the revenue system at
LGU level in Romania: 
! The total revenues to the local budgets increased significantly in the period 1999-2003;
! The percentage of local taxes and fees and shared amounts of PIT from the total LGU budgets
decreased, while various transfers from the state budgets increased, especially earmarked
grants, and to a lesser extent the equalization grants; 
! The financial autonomy of LGU to establish policies based on local taxes and fees decreased, by
a gradual but obvious limitation of the LGU variation margins in setting these taxes and fees; 
! There are large gaps between the general purpose revenues before equalization, especially
between cities (mostly county seats) and communes. This situation is apparent if we discuss
public services delivery, with big differences in volume and diversity between urban and rural
areas. 
! Equalization grants are mostly directed to communes (because they have low own revenues due
to economic underdevelopment) and to county councils due to the gap between the mandates
transferred to them (especially in social welfare) and the available financial resources (local taxes
and fees and the amount from PIT which is shared out).
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! As for establishing, tracking, collecting and controlling these revenues, the principle of local
autonomy (transfer of the competence for levying these taxes and fees to the LGU) has led to a
significant increase in collection of revenue. 
6. BORROWING PILLAR OF DECENTRALIZATION IN ROMANIA
In accordance with the LPF, the local public administration's authorities have the following compe-
tencies and responsibilities for local public finances: 
! Direct contracting of domestic and external loans, in the short, medium and long terms and pur-
suit on maturity of the payment obligations that arise;
! Guaranteeing of domestic and external loans, in the short, medium and long terms and pursuit
on maturity of the obligations for payment arising from the respective loans.
The local public authorities can contract or guarantee loans only with the approval of the Commi-
ssion6 for Authorization of Local Loans (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). The local and
county councils and the General Council of Bucharest Municipal City can decide to contract or to guar-
antee loans with the vote of at least half plus one of the counselors. The mayor or the president of the
county, as the executive body, is responsible for the implementation of this decision. 
The LPF stipulates the two instruments for borrowing that an LGU can use as being bonds and
loans taken from commercial banks. It also stipulates the purpose of borrowing as financing local pub-
lic investment or refinancing of the local public debt. It limits the debt destination at LGU level to infra-
structure projects in the public sector and/or of public purpose. 
The LPF does not allow the total annual debt which is represented by the contracted loans, bonds,
financial leasing and LGU collaterals to exceed 30 % of the total current revenues in the budget of any
LGU. The debt service ratio is calculated as the annual debt over the total own revenues, including PIT
shares. This has been interpreted to mean that the debt service installments due in any single year
should not exceed 30% of the total own revenues of the local budget.
The LPF also allows for a temporary short term financing of cash deficits from the Treasury.
Starting with 2006, LGU are allowed to hold commercial banks accounts to administrate contracted
loans. LGU funds in the Treasury do not yield interest. 
External borrowing
LGU must have approval of the Commission if the maximum amount allowed (periodically updat-
ed) is to be exceeded. Under special circumstances, the Ministry of Public Finances-MPF can guar-
antee an external loan contracted by a LGU and in that case will supervise the contract procedure and
the repayment of the loan. 
Internal borrowing
The local or the county council that decided to contract a loan or a bond issue must present all doc-
uments regarding the loan to the Commission. Internal borrowing can be contracted and managed by
local authorities without any support from the central government once it is approved by the
Commission. 
6) The Commission consists of representatives from LGU administration, central government and National Bank of Romania. The Commission
meets monthly and analyses all requests coming from LGU, to confirm compliance with the law. More about the Commission, in the section
on: Approval, monitoring and disclosure.
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For short term borrowing, the cash flow deficit must not exceed 5 % of the LGU budgeted revenues
including taxes, fees, contributions, other income and the allocated share from income tax. When tem-
porary cash deficits occur, these can be covered by loans granted by the MPF from the general cur-
rent account of the Treasury. The reimbursement of funds borrowed under the provisions of this arti-
cle is guaranteed by the estimated income for the relevant budgetary year. In case the loan is not reim-
bursed by 31st of December, the MPF is authorized to execute the account of the respective adminis-
trative-territorial unit.
Guarantees
In accordance with the LPF, a local guarantee is an engagement assumed by a local public author-
ity to pay at maturity any non-honored obligations of an economic operator or public services subor-
dinate to them for which the public authority acts as guarantor.
The LGU must guarantee any contracted loan with its own revenues or it can use intercepts of inter-
governmental transfers or use its reserve funds. Intercepts can provide a strong boost to credit mar-
ket development without any implied central government guarantee or other cost to the Treasury. As
such they merit particular consideration in the development of municipal credit policy and law. 
In general, the following types of pledge can be used to provide a guarantee:
! Pledge of physical or monetary assets;
! Pledge of the right to operate a facility or provide a service;
! Pledge of selected revenues, such as:
! tariffs, fares, or rentals;
! particular taxes or special levies;
! grants or shared taxes (intergovernmental transfers).
! Pledge of the power to set specific tax rates, utility tariffs, and other levies;
! Pledge by the executive to budget for and recommend payment of future debt service, without
an explicit binding pledge that those appropriations will be made;
! Pledge to assign the payment of future intergovernmental revenue.
In the case of Romania the "special purpose transfers from the state budget" may not be pledged
for the payment of municipal debt. The LPF authorizes municipalities to pledge other transfers from
the central government e.g. quota and other amounts derived from particular incomes from the state
budget and their "own source revenues". This is a positive reflection of autonomous control over such
funds. 
Almost half of all municipal bonds issued are insured by private insurance companies for timely
payment of debt service. Unlike free government guarantees, private insurance does not create any
incentive for inefficiency. A premium is paid for guaranty coverage because the guarantors have spe-
cialized staffs that assess the risks of municipal finances or project financing thus, the greater the risk
the greater the premium charged to obtain the guaranty. Note that this is not a substitute for munici-
pal creditworthiness as the guarantor will only guarantee debt of municipalities that it has deemed to
be creditworthy (see more in USAID LGAP 2002).
Characteristics of debt
According to the definitions in Art. 2 points 3 and 4, and the provisions of Art. 3 (3) of Law No.
313/2004, financial market loans raised or guaranteed by local public administration authorities are
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part of Romania's public debt, though not representing Government liabilities. Such loan-related pub-
lic debt is serviced either by local budgets or  by refinance loans. 
The instruments of local public debt are:
! Bonds;
! Loans from commercial banks or other credit institutions;
! Supplier credits;
! Financial leasing;
! Local guarantee;
The issuing and launching of titles of value on the market can be done directly by the local public
authorities or through agents or other specialized institutions.
The central government retains a legitimate interest in the integrity of municipal budgeting and
financial management. One interest is to ensure that municipalities provide the basic public services
expected of them, before they invest in non-core activities.  A second interest is to ensure that munic-
ipalities prepare and execute balanced operating budgets. 
In respect to the overseeing of municipal credit, the central government has two critical concerns
in ensuring compliance with legally mandated procedures. One concern is to limit the consolidated
public sector's outstanding debt to comply with international benchmarks and thus to preserve the
government's ability to borrow abroad in order to build a solid base for the national economy and
future participation in the European Union. The second concern is to guard against imprudent borrow-
ing that could threaten the integrity of the overall public finance system and so to put pressure on the
national government to deliver costly bailouts.
i. Maturity
The maturity of a debt instrument should be no longer than and matched to the economic life of the
asset it is financing. Ideally, amortizing the liability on one side of the balance sheet is matched by the
depreciation of the asset financed on the other. In Romania short term loans used to cover possible
liquidity issues are under the competency of the State Treasury.  
ii. Interest
Although the provisions of the LPF do not expressly authorize debt which bears interest, the provi-
sions imply that such debt may be issued. The bank regulations and the contractual provisions of any
loan prevail. 
iii. Debt Service
The debt limitation formula is an incentive for structuring substantially equal debt service install-
ments and thus to avoid the dangers of deferring larger or balloon installments of principal to the end
of the loan term.
iv. Foreign Currency
As a rule, municipalities should be discouraged from assuming foreign currency risk. The LPF pro-
vides that debt denominated in a foreign currency is subject to the approval of the Commission.
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Additionally, Annex 1 to Government Decision 978, October 4, 2001(II) requires approval by the
Commission of municipal guaranties of loans denominated in foreign currency.
The MPF report on government domestic debt in Romania from February 2006 says: "the increase
of domestic public government debt is made under a strict observance of the ceiling of domestic pub-
lic indebtedness, approved by Parliament. Thus for 2006  a domestic public indebtedness ceiling of
RON 9.600 million was approved. The domestic credits contracted directly or guaranteed by the state
and local authorities represented 0.25% of this ceiling at the end of February 2006".
In Romania at the end of February 2006, the outstanding domestic credits guaranteed by the state
amounts RON 2,139 million. The debt contracted by local authorities under state guarantee to finance
investment projects under the SAPARD program amounts RON 87.2 million which is 4 % of the out-
standing domestic credits guaranteed by the state.
Approval, monitoring and disclosure
The Commission7 has been established by Governmental Decision No. 158 of March 3, 2005 (OG
No. 220/March 16, 2005) to consider and advise local public administration authorities on borrowing
and issuance of loan guarantees. The Commission consists of nine members, of which four are MPF
representatives, including the Commission Chair, two are Ministry of Administration and Interior rep-
resentatives, and three are representatives of the local public administration associative structures.
The Commission reviews, based on the documentation provided by applicant:
! the loan amount to evaluate compliance with Romania's annual public indebtedness ceiling;
! the timing of any securities issue in relation to the schedule of MPF issues in order to avoid
unnecessary competition in attracting capital market loans;
By the 15th of every month, local government borrowers, including the guarantor administrative
units, must report on the status of outstanding borrowing for the previous month. Such reports must
be structured as required by MPF-developed norms. Norms and procedures for authorizing local gov-
ernment borrowing or loan guaranteeing are illustrated in the Annex 4.
Borrowings and guarantees by a local public administration authority must be entered in the local
public debt register and local government guarantee register, as applicable, of the respective authority.
In accordance with the LPF, the Local Public Debt Register (LPDR) is an official paper which pres-
ents, in chronological order, the position of the directly contracted local public debt. The LPDR has two
components namely the sub-register of the local domestic public debt and the sub-register of the local
external public debt. The LPDR will include information which specifies the total sum of debt of the
local authorities, together with details of the debts and other information concerning the LPDR required
by the methodological norms issued by the MPF. The total value of guarantees issued by the local
authority is written in the registry of local guarantees of this authority and it is reported annually in its
financial statements.
In accordance with the LPF a Local Guarantees Register (LGR) is an official paper which presents,
in chronological order, the position of the local guarantees granted by the local authorities. The LGR
has two components namely the sub-register of the local domestic guarantees and the sub-register of
the local external guarantees. The LGR will include information which specifies the total sum of guar-
antees of the local  authorities, together with details of the guarantees and other information concern-
ing the LGR required by the methodological norms issued by the MPF.
7) Before that there was a Commission but only for external borrowing authorization.
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Financial distress and insolvency
Before the amendments to the LPF were adopted, the law provided that, in the event of default in
the payment of short-term debt or a violation of the limit in the amount of short-term debt that may
be issued, the Court of Accounts must request the municipality to submit a recovery plan. The LPF
contains a chapter (Chapter VI, articles 74 and 75) on financial distress and insolvency of LGU. A spe-
cial law for implementation of these provisions is being drafted. Starting with 2007, situations of fis-
cal distress and insolvency in LGUs will be regulated and observed more thoroughly.
In the LPF there is a list of definitions which includes a definition of insolvency but not of financial
distress. However later in the text financial distress is defined as non-payment of liquid and matured
debts, older than 90 days, registered at the end of a quarter of the financial year, and which exceed
30% of the total budget of that quarter. The definition also includes non-payment of salaries as fore-
seen in the budget of income and expenditure for a period longer than 90 days.
In accordance with the LPF, the definition of insolvency is: 
"A situation in which a debtor finds himself when his goods have a lower value than the totality of
his obligations that need to be satisfied with those goods" 
Our comment on this definition of insolvency is that not only goods can satisfy the liabilities but
also the expected future proceeds of these goods and because solvency should be defined in net pres-
ent value terms. 
The syndic judge, through the decision to opening an insolvency procedure, will appoint an admin-
istrator who undertakes all prerogatives of the main credit release authority of the administrative terri-
torial unit which is the subject of the insolvency. Within 30 working days from the administrator
appointment, he/she elaborates, together with the territorial structure of the Audit Court, a Plan of
Insolvency Recovery. 
If the insolvency is found to have ceased, the syndic judge, at the administrator's proposal, will pro-
nounce the closure of the insolvency proceedings in the administrative- territorial unit. The adminis-
trative-territorial unit remains in the financial crisis situation, while the main credit release authority and
the local council regain their prerogatives and start applying the Plan of Financial Recovery in order to
release the administrative- territorial unit from its financial crisis situation.
The opening and closing of the insolvency proceedings are registered by the main credit release
authority within 5 days from declaration of the insolvency. The registration is made in the Local
Register of the Administrative-territorial Unit which is administered by the general directorates of pub-
lic finances of the counties and by the Bucharest Municipal City in the case of Bucharest. The open-
ing and closing of insolvency procedures must be communicated monthly to the MPF in order to
record them in the National Register of Insolvency for the administrative- territorial units.
In a financial crisis, the main credit release authority has to draw up the Plan of Financial Recovery.
The plan will be elaborated by the main credit release authority, together with the general directorate
of public finances of the county or of the Bucharest Municipal City and the territorial bodies of the Audit
Court, within 30 days from the day the financial crisis is declared by the deliberative authority. The
control of executing and fulfilling the measures set out in the Plan of Financial Recovery lies with the
territorial structures of the Audit Court.
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Table 10. Characteristics of Financial Crises and Insolvency at LGU Level
Insolvency is a situation in which a debtor finds
himself when his own goods have a lower value
Financial distress than the totality of his obligations that
should be satisfied with those goods
Conditions
! non-payment of liquid and matured debts, older than
90 days, registered at the end of a quarter of the
financial year and which exceed 30% of the total
budget of that quarter;
! non-payment of salaries, foreseen in the budget
of income and expenditure for a period longer than
90 days.
Initiation
Declaration by the deliberative authority
Plan
The main credit release authority to draw up the Plan
of Financial Recovery. 
The control of executing and fulfilling the measures
set out in the Plan of Financial Recovery lies with the
territorial structures of the Audit Court.
The Plan includes:
! economic-financial analysis of the
administrative-territorial unit
! measures for maintaining the essential public
services by the local public administration's
authorities throughout the period for which the
Plan of Financial Recovery is in force;
If the LGU is unable to pay the matured debts exceed-
ing 50% of its budget for a period of 120 consecutive
days
Any creditor or group of creditors having one or more
true, liquid and matured debts to be claimed from an
administrative-territorial unit, with a value above 50%
of its budget, for a period of 120 consecutive days,
can file, with the Court of Law in the territory in which
the unit is located, an application for the opening of
proceedings of insolvency against that administrative-
territorial unit.
The administrator will administrate the insolvency
recovering procedure of the administrative-territorial
unit.
The Plan includes:
! measures for re-establishing the financial viability of
the administrative- territorial unit;
! measures for further fulfilling the essential services of
the administrative- territorial unit throughout its insol-
vency;
! negotiated measures and the schedule for paying the
debts to the creditors in order of the debt seniority.
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7. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ISSUES
In Romania there is a single Treasury system, so that, in principle, the government knows at all
times the aggregate amount of resources available in the Treasury. This means that, although individ-
ual local governments maintain records of their own finances, their accounts are actually under the
control of the central government (local governments can hold accounts in commercial banks for the
EU grants received for infrastructure/development projects). This can constrain local fiscal flexibility.
The Audit Court at the central level is responsible for control of local community's expenditures.
Public institutions are obliged to transmit their budget to the territorial unit of the Treasury. The exec-
utive authorities and the presidents of the county councils are obliged  to publish on the Internet site
of the public institutions and/ or to post in a public place  the budget draft, the approved budget, the
budget execution, its development, the budget rectification and final accounts.  This information must
be updated at least once a quarter.
In accordance with the LPF, the main credit release authorities of the local budgets shall draw up,
annually, a public investment program, in accordance with the functional classification and to include
both financial and non financial information.
The financial information must include the total value of the project, engagement credits, budget
credits, the financing graph by source and by year correlated with the execution graph, the cost-ben-
efit analysis and the operating and maintenance costs after commissioning. 
In Romania, the LPF introduces a solidarity principle as: "by means of local budgetary policies,
administrative-territorial units and physical persons found to bet in extremely difficult situations can be
assisted by allocating sums from the reserve fund constituted within the local budget". 
The budgetary reserve fund at the disposal of the local and county councils comprises 5% of the total
expenditure. The reserve fund is used on the proposal of the main credit release authority, based on a
decision of the council, to finance certain urgent or unexpected costs that come up during the budget-
ary year. The reserve fund can also be used for the removal of the effects of certain natural calamities
and for granting assistance to the administrative- territorial units in cases of extreme difficulty.
In accordance with the LPF, in order to cover the financial risks deriving from the guarantee assured
by the administrative-territorial unit for the loans contracted by the economic operators and the pub-
lic services found  in local subordination, a risk fund is constituted separate from the local budget. The
risk fund is kept a separate account, opened at the territorial units of the Treasury to provide for local
guarantees to domestic loans and for guarantees to external loans. 
The most transparent means of financial management at local level is to separate the capital budg-
et from the current budget. The current budget's surpluses can be used to repay loans used for invest-
ment i.e. for capital needs. In accordance with the LPF the Operational Section is a compulsory main
part of a local budget which comprises the income for covering the current expenditure needed to
carry out the duties and competencies established by the law and to cover the current expenses; 
! measures for increasing the realisation of  own 
income, as well as for attracting other income;
! measures for decrease in expenditure;
! economic-financial and budgetary planning until 
recovery;
! establishing the tasks for fulfilling the provisions with-
in the Plan of Financial Recovery
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Development section is a complementary part of a local budget which comprises the income for
covering capital expenditure. Capital expenditure will be in accordance with the established develop-
ment policies, at national, county, zone or local level and be based on programs and projects. The zone
level means the territory of two or more neighboring administrative-territorial units on which an action
or a program has been agreed by the local communities. These articles from the LPF are not yet imple-
mented, and are not clearly defined. They will be enacted in 2008, when methodological norms will
be issued.
The programmatic budgeting is prescribed thus moving toward performance budgeting as opposed
to the input based budgeting. In accordance with the LPF, a Program is an activity or a coherent
assembly of activities that refer to the same main credit release authority which has been designated
to achieve an objective or a defined set of objectives and for which there are established program indi-
cators for evaluating the results to be obtained, within the limits of the approved financing.
Following the commitment of the Government in 2001 to move from cash to accrual accounting
(as per the Strategic development plan for public financial management Reform 2005-2007):
! A strategy for the move to accrual accounting was developed for SAPARD8 and ISPA funds to
provide working models based on the accrual accounting principles;
! Cash methodology is being developed for PHARE transactions together with norms for account-
ing on an accrual basis that need to be approved by the Ministry;
! New accounting methodology based on accrual has been developed to apply to all public enti-
ties at central, regional and local government level. The reporting system became operational in
January 2006. Communes now have double entry accounting systems which also started in
January 2006.
8. BONDS 
In accordance with the LPF, bonds are defined as titles of credit, on the middle and long term,
issued on the authority of a local public administration, with reimbursement  guaranteed by the income
of the administrative-territorial units, and goods belonging to the private property of the administrative-
territorial units.
In 1998 the USAID funded project managed by the Urban Institute, made a training needs assess-
ment for the banks in Romania. They collected information from the five largest banks that have
expressed an interest in lending to municipalities and regii. These banks included Bancorex, Romanian
Commercial Bank, Romanian Development Bank, Bancoop, and Savings Bank.
Since then, two Romanian banks, the Romanian Commercial Bank and the Romanian Development
Bank have been the underwriters to most of the LGU bonds issued in Romania. Major investors have
been the banks, investment funds, companies and insurance companies. Pension funds are not
involved in investment so far. At first it was the LGU that initiated the issuance of bonds although later
the banks have also become initiators. 
8) Three pre-accession instruments have been financed by the European Community to assist the applicant countries of Central and Eastern
Europe with their pre-accession preparations: 
- Phare program that provides support for institution building, investment to strengthen the regulatory infrastructure needed to ensure compli-
ance with the acquis communautaire and investment in economic and social cohesion,
- SAPARD, which provides aid for agricultural and rural development; and 
- ISPA, which finances infrastructure projects in the fields of environment and transport.
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The LGU worked with independent consulting companies that assisted in:
1. Analyzing the indebtedness capacity of the LGU and recommending the amount of money that 
can be borrowed;
2. Analyzing other alternatives such as treasury bonds, credits, external borrowing;
3. Suggesting the optimal timing for bond issuance, the nominal value of the bonds and the 
maturity rate;
4. Negotiating the interest rate;
5. Estimating the macroeconomic trends and interest rates in the capital market;
6. Analyzing the budgetary flow of LGU and making mid term forecasts.
According to the Urban Institute report of 1998, apart from the perceived wisdom that the issuance
of bonds is more complicated than contracting a loan, in Romania the bond market is considered to
be less politicized and more transparent than the bank market. In fact the procedure for issuing bonds
is less complicated than getting a bank loan and the interest rate in the capital market has been lower
than in the banking sector. However, the LGU loan market has become a competitive one and LGU now
prefer loans to bonds. Some consulting agencies have become involved in offering consulting servic-
es related to LGU borrowing. The interest rate on a loan is calculated based on the BUBOR which is
the rate at which the banks in Romania borrow among themselves. The margin between the interest
on a loan and BUBOR is in the range 0.5 % to 2 % per annum. The banks also charge a facility com-
mission of not more than 1 % and an administration fee of 0.01 % of the outstanding loan. The bank
charges a commission in case of reimbursement ahead of schedule.
In case of issuing bonds, there are additional costs for the external consultant, the stock exchange
etc. These additional bond costs are outside the 25 % debt limit (only the coupon and the final pay-
ment are included in the 25 % debt limit). The Romanian Commercial Bank 
In Romania in the event of a default on a municipal bond issue, the present law leaves bondhold-
ers to pursue remedies on individual basis since the legal framework does not permit bondholders to
act in an organized and effective manner to enforce their rights, and to create a contractually based
role of bondholder representative. The legal framework in future should permit bondholders to act in
an organized and effective manner to enforce their rights. 
The first municipal bonds were issued in 2001 and from the very beginning the LGU found financ-
ing through bond issues attractive. In the first year 7% of new domestic debt was in the form of bonds
(two issues). In 2002, the proportion of bond issues increased to 35% (eight issues). In 2006 Bucha-
rest issued bonds denominated in Euro. 
Table 11. The Profile of Romanian Municipal Bond Features, 2004
Source: CSPD from MPF, CNVM. 
Number 9 issues at year end 2004 
Value Average: ROL 39.68 billion, or about $1.42 million
Range: ROL 5 billion-ROL 150 billion, or $0.17-$5.34 million
Maturities Generally two to three years, although Deva has 4+years, and Oradea has 6+years 
Fees Range: ROL 100,000-ROL 2 million, or $3-$60
Coupons Range: four to 12
Rates Generally [(BUBID+BUBOR)/2]+1% -3 %.  
Most rates are set on a trimester basis.
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According to Fitch, in the period 1999-2002, local public debt increased from 35% to 38% of total
public debt and has stabilized at about 11% of GDP. The main overseas lenders to Romania are the
EBRD and the EIB while in the domestic market the principal players are Banca Comerciala Romana,
Banca Romana de Dezvoltare and BankPost. In 2002 local branches of international commercial banks
(such as ABN AMRO and Raiffeisen Bank) were also becoming active providers of funding to
Romanian municipalities. In view of the latest regulations, which permit municipalities to open
accounts in commercial banks for loan transactions, the number of lenders is expected to increase.
For loans other than those from the Treasury, LGU were permitted to open accounts with commer-
cial banks since 1 January 2004. This is a positive development since establishes a bank-client rela-
tionship between banks and municipalities, with the banking sector becoming more familiar with the
financial affairs of LGU. 
9. CONCLUSION 
After the initial early start to the process of decentralization with the drafting the Law on Local
Public Administration and the Law on Local Elections in 1991 in Romania, the process has been slow
with heavy central government and political influence rather than rapid decentralization. It took a cou-
ple of years to institutionalize local autonomy by means of the Law on Local Taxes and Charges 1994
and the European Charter which was ratified in 1997.  
New changes in legislation took place in 2006 but have yet to be implemented. There are high
expectations for transparency, professionalism and less political voluntarism. The main difficulty with
the institutional framework has been its changeability, arising from the high number of regulations
affecting it and the frequency with which legislation has been amended, replaced or abolished. Another
issue has been the limited involvement of local government officials in the legislative process, espe-
cially in decisions over revenue and expenditure. With the changes in the Law 215 this should be
changed and the LGU should be consulted in a timely manner about any change in legislation. 
It seems that the problems related to the decentralization process in Romania are well identified and
the changes in the legislation in 2006 are considered to be a major step forward. These changes
include the  adoption of the Framework Law on Decentralization, the new LPF and Law 215.
Implementation has yet to begin and so the benefits cannot yet be assessed. 
With the Framework Law on Decentralization, the competencies are now clearly assigned to local
and county level. However, the inefficiency in providing services as a consequence of the fragmented
territorial structure remains a problem especially for the smaller LGU. There is the lack of strong rela-
tionship with the business community for many reasons such as the low rate of return of projects, the
presence of subsidies and political sensitivity. Strengthening this relationship with its different instru-
ments (PPP for example) might improve the situation by ensuring more efficient spending of public
money in providing services. 
There was an attempt at recentralization during the period of 2001 to 2004 in terms of control and
intervention at local level from the central level. There was confusion in sharing responsibilities espe-
cially in the health and social sectors. The result was a lower level of investment and underdevelop-
ment of the borrowing market at LGU level because of lower demand for capital caused by uncertain-
ty. At LGU level, property rights and ownership are not yet clear. 
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The LGU revenue system experiences systematic error. The deferred payments not collected in the
previous fiscal year are actually counted as planned revenues for the next fiscal year. Another prob-
lem is the dependency on central government transfers mostly due to low efficiency in administering
own revenues and a failure to improve the collection rate although since the LGU have become respon-
sible for collection, the rate has increased to about 80%-85%. 
The intergovernmental transfer, even though in one respect transparent (formulas in the legislation and
detailed explanations), remains complicated and creates uncertainty due to possible changes in percent-
ages each year by the central government. This creates difficulties in fiscal planning for the lower level
governments. Allocation of equalization funds often becomes a political negotiation rather than the result
of a transparent effort to differentiate between local needs. During development of the equalization sys-
tem the WB wanted to remove the counties from the system of redistribution as they are exercising too
many discretionary rights.  The WB preferred a central level system in accordance with a formula but the
Romanian government wanted to retain the system. The compromise reached was to use devolved units
i.e. the Prefects. Further discussion with the WB related this issue is envisaged for 2007.
As for borrowing, best practice is followed in relation to the definition of borrowing, debt limits and
institutions. The debt limitation was increased to 30 % from 20% with the Emergency Ordinance 425 of
own revenues. A "Financial Crisis" is clearly distinguished from "Insolvency", there are insolvency pro-
cedures prescribed in the LPF and what now remains is to see how the legislation will work in practice.
In relation to the guarantees from own revenues of LGU, the WB would like to resolve the situation
concerning shared revenues. The definition of PIT is unclear as to whether it is a shared or an own
revenue and this creates confusion.9 There is a twinning program of the EU to prepare a separate Law
on Public Debt and the LGU which will deal with LGU insolvency rather than this issue simply being a
part of the LPF. It is WB opinion that in case of insolvency, the Treasury should not give loans because
of the moral hazard (classical bail out). In contrast domestic experts think that these loans are the last
resort to fix possible problems and should remain. 
Starting in 1999 and after 7 years of practice the system of borrowing at LGU level has developed
significantly with loans and bonds being issued.  There still are some issues to be resolved such as
permitting bondholders to act in an organized and effective manner to enforce their rights. The loans
were mainly used for infrastructure projects (water, sewage, roads, land fields etc)
Before 1998, 17 loans were provided by the EBRD mostly for water rehabilitation. These loans had
government guarantees (60 % from the EBRD, 20 % from the county council and 20 % from the cen-
tral government). LGU borrowing was allowed in 1999 but the banking sector lacked knowledge of
LGU finances, the LGU didn't have accounts at the banks, the legal system was unpredictable and
changing and the collateral system was weak. Municipal services loans are provided from the WB to
the MPF in Romania. It is interesting that the WB now is preparing a policy note on LGU Financing. It
should cover the topics of: decentralization, LGU financing processes and EU funds, access of LGU
to the banks, financial market structure etc. 
The bank's loan market started to be operational in 2001. It started from a low base and has
increased about 400 fold by 2005. The proportion of capital investment financed from borrowing is
9) The unclear definition of PIT is very similar to the Macedonian situation described in the Macedonian country report.
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about 85 % and mostly in public services. There is no borrowing experience for operational spending.
Also, 10 banks signed a memorandum of interest with the Ministry of Administration and Interior to
lend to the LGU. The largest Romanian bank (25 % of the total banking sector assets) is also the
largest investor in the LGU loan market. The final result of these developments is lower spread in inter-
est charged. The purpose of the loans was to provide services in water supply and transportation.
Maturities varied from 1 to 10 years with variable interest rates. 
In case of taking a loan from a bank, an LGU has to organize a tender and to have at least 5 banks
making offers with information on interest rates, fees, maturities and commissions. The credit analy-
sis is done by the banks. After the tender procedure is done the LGU provide financial statements, con-
tracts with construction companies etc to the banks. For their own credit analyses, the banks look at
LGU: revenues, own revenues, actual versus planned revenues i.e. the fiscal effort (80 % is consid-
ered sufficient) and own taxes over total revenues i.e. the level of dependency (40 % is considered
sufficient). Other information and data banks examine include the relationship and political prolifera-
tion of the Mayor versus Council, managerial skills of mayors etc. The banks develop their own pro-
cedures for credit analyses of LGU. Banks are not interested in the intergovernmental transfers as
these are considered as certain. 
In 2005 the city of Bucharest issued Euro Bonds with the rating agency being S&P. The problem is
that the proceeds are idle in a bank account and waiting for the fruitless debate on what they should
be spent to end. Such an experience shows that Euro Bonds are a political instrument rather than an
instrument to raise capital for investment.
Some LGU are listed at the stock exchange (13 or 14 of them). EBRD and IFC are enhancing the
financial collateralized debt obligation in order to create special purpose vehicles to issue bonds and
to help the process. There are also special guaranties from these financial institutions. 
The possibility of LGU borrowing in Romania has served as an incentive for improved cost recov-
ery through user charges even though subsidies remain especially for the heating and gas supply. For
example, the joint initiative between the PHARE and the EBRD and EBI developed an application form
for the SAMTID funds to be used for regional projects. LGU that had access to the SAMTID funds were
forced to increase their tariffs and this was stated in the contracts. The willingness to pay was high
but subsidies to the poor stratum of the population were introduced.
There are big differences in financing the LGU. The large LGU were financed mostly by the ISPA
and WB but small and medium LGU gained nothing. The general wisdom in Romania is that the large
LGU are afraid to borrow and the small LGU are not informed. 
Currently sub-national governments have not used borrowing to pay for current expenditures. There
is no type of regional development fund, no sub-national banks, bureau for development etc. There
were some initiatives in this regard but these were not successful.
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Annex 1. Field visit in Romania
A number of factors limit the extent of this report. One being the short time allocated to conduct a
reasonable number of interviews during the stay in Romania (list of individuals interviewed follows).
It was not possible to observe in any depth the challenges faced by all levels of governments and
stakeholders on a daily basis and was also not possible to base analysis here on a detailed local finan-
cial data. Thus, much of the report relies on the information obtained in the interviews and a review
of legal documents and existing studies.
Table 12. List of people interviewed in Romania 
Annex 2. Relevant legislation in Romania 
1. Constitution (1991 revised in 2003)
2. Framework Law on decentralization (339/2006)
3. Law on local public administration (69/1991 replaced in 2001 by Law no. 215 and now in 2006 
by Law no. 286) 
4. Law on local public finance 189 from 1998/2003/2006 
5. Law on civil servants 
6. Law on local elections (no. 70/1991) 
7. Law 340 on the prefects 
8. Law 188 on the statute of civil servants
9. Law 326 on local public utilities
10. Law on state budget (annual)
11. Law on local taxes and charges (1994) amended in 2002
12. Law on fiscal code (no 571/2003)
13. Emergency Ordinance from 2002 that establish maximum limits for taxes and charges related 
to buildings, lands, automobiles and construction permits.
14. Law on public domain that classifies the private domain that can be used as guarantee. 
15. Law on municipal services 326 from 2001
16. Law on public debt 81/1999
17. Order no. 219 (2000) regarding calculation of the debt services
18. Order no.7 (2001) that decides who is excepted from LGU bonds transaction
19. Order no. 1631 (1999) regarding the obligation of the local public authorities to send 
information about LGU borrowing
20. Order No. 7, 2001 grants tax exemption to municipal bonds held by natural persons.  
21. Law on patrimony for securing municipal debt with a mortgage on municipal property in the 
private domain. 
Interviewee Position Contact
Sorin Teodoru Consultant at the World Bank steodoru@worldbank.org 
Radu Dorcioman Ministry of Administration and Interior Affairs radu.dorcioman@yahoo.com 
Valentin Ionescu Legal expert at CSPD vionescu1961@yahoo.com 
Victor Giosan State Secretary at the Romanian General Secretariat vgiosan@yahoo.co.uk 
Casandra Bischoff Decentralization team at the World Bank cbischoff@worldbank.org 
Gabriela Matei Director of CSPD gabriela.matei@cspd.ro 
Adrian Oprica The BRD Bank adrian.oprica@brd.ro
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22. The Law regarding securities and stock exchanges (No. 52/1994) provides that municipal 
securities are exempt from the disclosure requirements established by the National Securities 
Commission ("NSC").  
23. Government Ordinance No. 35/30.01.2000 removes the restrictions of municipalities to deposit 
funds in banks for operations in "hard currency" 
24. Prudential investment guidelines for private pension funds
25. Law on concessions (no.219/1998), setting the general framework for concessions at the local 
government level 
26. Government Ordinance 92/2003 regarding the fiscal procedure code
27. Law 522/2002 on local taxes and duties 
28. Annex 1, "Competences fulfilled by local governments at the county level in providing public 
services" 
29. Annex 2 "Competences fulfilled by local governments at the commune and town level in 
providing public services"
Annex 3. Applications to the Commission to authorize borrowing 
ANNEX 1.1.
APPLICATION
for Borrowing Authorization*1)
1. Applicant name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Address in full, telephone/fax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Duly delegated persons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Loan destination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Local public administration authority approval  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Borrower  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Financier name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Conditions of the loan authorization for which is sought:
Date Signature
..............                         (Primary Spending Agency)
_____________
*1) To be filled in by local public administration authority if authorization of borrowing on the basis
of local public administration guarantee or state guarantee is sought, or if a subsidiary loan is provid-
ed to the administrative unit.
Loan amount
(in such 
currency as
denominated in
contract) 
Annual interest
rate
Term of Loan
Grace period Repayment period
Level and timelines for 
payments in principal, 
interest and fees
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ANNEX 1.2.
STATEMENT
I, the undersigned ...................., lawful representative of county/city ................ , as primary spend-
ing agency, state herein and am liable for this statement that the county/city has the following out-
standing domestic and/or  foreign loans or loan guarantees:
This Statement is part of the documentation required to authorize loan-taking/guaranteeing in the
amount of ................ and I am liable, in conformity with Art. 27 of Law No. 313/2004 and Art. 70 of
Government Emergency Ordinance No. 45/2003 on local public finance, as amended and made into
Law No. 108/2004, for any inaccurate data supplied.
Date Signature and seal
..............                         
ANNEX 1.3.
APPLICATION
for Loan Guarantee Authorization *2)
1. Applicant name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Address in full, telephone/fax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Duly delegated persons  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Loan destination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Local public administration authority approval  . . . . . . . . .
6. Financier name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Conditions of the loan for which authorization is sought:
Date Signature
..............                         (Primary Spending Agency)
*2) To be filled in by the local public administration authority, if authorization is sought of borrow-
ing by an economic agent or a public service coordinated by local authority, and also if a subsidiary
loan guarantee is provided by the administrative unit.
Lender Loan
amount
(currency
as
denomi-
nated in
contract) 
Loan
destina-
tion
Borrower Guarantor
Grace
period
Repayment
period
Loan duration Annual
payable
in 
principal
Annual
interest
rate
Fees
Loan amount
(in such cur-
rency as
denominated in
contract) 
Annual interest
rate
Term of Loan
Grace period Repayment period
Level and timelines for 
payments in principal, 
interest and fees
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ANNEX 1.4.
APPLICATION
for Authorization of Local Public Administration Borrowing by Securities Issues
1. Applicant/issuer name ...............................
2. Address in full, telephone/fax .......................................
3. Duly delegated persons ...........................................
4. Finance destination ..............................................
5. Local Public Administration authority approval ................
6. Information on securities issue:
- type of securities ........................................
- form of securities ........................................
- issue size ..................................................
- nominal value ..................................................
- selling price ..................................................
- interest rate ......................................................
- coupon yield ..............................................
- maturity date .....................................................
- issue guarantee ...............................................
- size of finance expected to be mobilized ..........................
- type of securities offer ................................
- if sale is mediated, name of intermediation company/syndicate (lead-manager) 
- period of implementation ................................................
- further details ........................................................
Date Signature
..............                 (Primary Spending Agency/Authority)
Annex 4. Norms and procedures for authorizing local government borrowing 
A. Borrowing by Administrative Units
Domestic borrowing by administrative units means:
! domestic state-guaranteed borrowing by administrative units;
! domestic loans taken and guaranteed by administrative units;
! borrowing from State Treasury general account availabilities to bridge temporary revenue-expen-
diture gaps in local budgets.
Foreign borrowing by administrative units means:
! foreign loans taken by the State for on-lending to administrative units;
! foreign loans taken by administrative units themselves with State guarantees;
! foreign loans taken and guaranteed by administrative units themselves.
A local public administration authority applying to the Commission to authorize borrowing shall
have attached to its borrowing authorization application (see Annex 3) the following documents:
a) statement by primary spending agency/authority, which is liable therefore, that the investment
project engineering and economic documentation was advised by the relevant Romanian authorities;
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b) local public administration authority decision to borrow, to specify loan amount and its financier,
the local budgeted servicing of the loan-related public debt, for the period of the loan, payment of any
taxes and charges associated with investment project implementation, which decision was made in
compliance with Government Emergency Ordinance No. 45/2003 Art. 57 (2);
c) local public administration authority decision on approving the engineering-economic documen-
tation, engineering and economic indicators of the investment project of local interest and its funding
sources;
d) decision on set-up of local council, county council of General Bucharest City Council, as appli-
cable, and the list of authorized signatures;
e) local budget as approved for current year and as projected for the period of the loan authoriza-
tion for which is being sought, to include own revenue and expenditure by MFP-approved budget clas-
sification, including local public debt servicing expenditure incurred by the loan;
f) the administrative unit's local budget annual accounts for 2 years before the year when loan-tak-
ing  authorization is sought, and the quarter-year accounts for the current year;
g) the draft loan contract (agreement) sent by financier, to include: loan amount, loan currency,
grace period, repayment period, rate of fees and other loan costs;
h) primary spending agency's statement for which it is liable of the status of other loans taken
and/or guaranteed by  the administrative unit, attached as Annex No. 1.2;
i) an estimate of the local public debt servicing during the period of the loan authorization of which
is being requested, to include payments in principal, interest, fees and other related costs, broken
down by domestic and foreign loan taken and/or guaranteed by the respective administrative unit, and
the loan the contracting of which is subject to authorization;
j) any other documents the Commission may request to review the application for authorization of
borrowing.
B. Borrowing Guaranteed by Administrative Units
Borrowing guaranteed by administrative units means domestic borrowing by economic agents or
public services coordinated by administrative units, with such administrative units providing guaran-
tees therefore.
Foreign borrowing guaranteed by administrative units means:
! foreign borrowing by the state for on-lending to economic agents or public services coordinated
by administrative units, with such administrative units providing guarantees therefore;
! foreign borrowing by economic agents or public services coordinated by administrative units,
with such administrative units providing guarantees therefore.
A local public administration authority applying to the Commission to authorize loan guaranteeing
under the statutory provisions in force shall have attached to the application for loan guarantee author-
ization (see Annex 5) the following documents:
a) statement by primary spending agency/authority, which is liable therefore, that the investment
project engineering and economic documentation was advised by the relevant Romanian authorities;
b) local public administration authority decision to guarantee the loan, to specify the amount of the
loan and financier, which decision was made in compliance with Art. 57(2) of Government Emergency
Ordinance No. 45/2003;
c) local public administration authority decision on approving the engineering-economic documentation,
engineering and economic indicators of the investment project of local interest and its funding sources;
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d) decision on establishment of local council, county council of General Bucharest City Council, as
applicable, and the list of authorized signatures;
e) charter of the economic agent or public service coordinated by the administrative unit which is
to guarantee such agent's or public service's borrowing;
f) decision of the Board of Directors or any other executive body of the economic agent or public
service coordinated by the administrative unit on approving investment and borrowing, to specify loan
amount and financier, local budgeted servicing of the loan-related public debt, for the period of the
loan, payment of any taxes and charges associated with investment project implementation;
g) local budget as approved for current year and as projected for the period of the loan the author-
ization of guarantee for which is being sought, to include own revenue and expenditure by MFP-
approved budget classification, including local public debt servicing expenditure incurred by the loan;
h) the administrative unit's local budget annual accounts for 2 years before the year when loan
guaranteeing  authorization is sought, and the quarter-year accounts for the current year;
i) the draft loan contract (agreement) sent by financier, to include: loan amount, loan currency,
grace period, repayment period, rate of fees and other loan costs;
j) primary spending agency's statement, it is liable therefore, of the status of other loans taken
and/or guaranteed by  the administrative unit, attached as (see Annex 5);
k) an estimate of the local public debt servicing during the period of the loan authorization of guar-
antee for which is being requested, to include payments in principal, interest, fees and other related
costs, broken down by domestic and foreign loan taken and/or guaranteed by the respective admin-
istrative units, and the loan guarantee of which is subject to authorization;
l) any other documents the Commission may request to review the application for loan-guarantee
authorization.
C. Local Borrowing by Issuance of Securities
Local public administration authorities may borrow by issuing securities in compliance with the leg-
islation on the treatment of securities. Securities may be issued and launched by local public admin-
istration authorities themselves or through agencies of other specialist institutions. A local public
administration authority shall submit to Commission Secretariat an application for authorization of bor-
rowing by a securities issue (see Annex 3).
The issue prospectus shall basically provide information on:
! total value of the securities issue and the project financed;
! terms and characteristics of securities (type, form, currency they are denominated in, nominal
value, issue value, annual interest rate, maturity, coupon frequency);
! terms and conditions of the securities issue (offer procedures, conditions and ways of selling
securities, payment agencies, the securities issue governing law).
Further Dispositions:
Within 10 days of effectiveness of a borrowing and/or loan guaranteeing contract/agreement, the
local public administration authority shall convey to the Ministry of Public Finance copies of each pri-
mary document confirming, as applicable:
! loan-taking/loan-guaranteeing;
! the additional act to the loan/guarantee contract/agreement, if amended with due respect for con-
tractual provisions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The following case study describes the development of the local self-government in Bulgaria with
special attention paid to issues of debt. Firstly, the study gives an overview of the regulatory changes
and legislative actions to set up the system of intergovernmental relations. Then, the structure of local
governments is described with attention paid to the election of the representative bodies. Basic infor-
mation on the responsibilities for expenditure and revenue assignment is presented in the subsequent
chapters. As the grants and transfers from the state budget comprise a substantial amount of the rev-
enue for a local government, the next section sets out the rules by which such funding is provided.
Next, an overview of the legislation on local government borrowing is presented and the results for the
local budget financing are discussed. In the last section, the unresolved issues and institutional obsta-
cles to debt market developments are set out. Based on this, some recommendations which are
potentially applicable for Macedonia are formulated.
This report is based on an extensive review of existing legislation and documents such as reports,
analyses and research studies. Additionally, during the field visit to Sofia (27-28 September 2006) the
main issues were clarified and discussed with the policy makers and researchers dealing with the
issues of municipal debt. 
2. BACKGROUND
The decentralization process started with adoption of a new Constitution in 1991, which defined
Bulgaria as country with local self-government. At the same time the Local Self-government and Local
Administration Act was adopted. Since then this regulation has undergone numerous amendments. 
Subsequently additional regulations were adopted to shape the system of local self government.
These were: 
The Administrative Division Act, 
The Local Election Act (1995) and 
The Municipal Budget Act (1998).
In 1995 the government adopted a concept for administrative-territorial reform, but it was not
implemented due to the economic crisis of 1996-1997. 
A major institutional step forward was establishment of the National Association of Municipalities
in late 1996. In 1998 the Law on Administrative Division was amended stipulating the replacement of
the 9 regions that previously existed with 28 new regions by the end of that year. This reform was fol-
lowed by approval of the Regional Development Act in 1999. 
The regime of municipal ownership was set up by the Law on Municipal Property specifying the
competences of each municipal authority in relation to municipal property. The rules for revenue col-
lection were determined by the Law on the Local Taxes and Charges (1997). 
In order to build consensus on the key issues confronting local government, the Local Government
Forum was organized in 2001. The following problems were identified (Manual, 2005): 
! permanent deficits, 
! a non-transparent and unstable system of transfers 
! a backlog in municipal investment.
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In order to provide solutions to these problems, a Fiscal Decentralization Working Group (FDWG)
was established in March 2002 by a resolution of the Council of Ministers. This group included broad
local government representation, officials from central ministries and from local government organi-
zations. It was mandated to make proposals for fiscal decentralization and to identify the requirements
for implementation of the program. The FDWG provided leadership for meaningful reforms. The first
result of its work was the Concept for Fiscal Decentralization (adopted in June 2002), which identified
the following objectives and principles for decentralization (Case study, 2005): 
(1) Clarify the responsibility for the assignment of expenditure at municipal level;
(2) Identify the responsibilities for the financing of state expenditure delegated to the municipalities;
(3) Identify the responsibilities for the financing of the municipal expenditure;
(4) Improve the legal environment for the development and implementation of municipal budgets.
Along with the Concept, a Fiscal Decentralization Program for 2002-2005 was adopted. Building on
the Concept, the program defined the legislative targets for enactment in the current year and the poli-
cies for subsequent years. The specific steps, tasks, deadlines and the institution responsible for
implementation were identified. 
FDWG organized itself into 3 task groups to work on the specific legislative changes that were
required. As a result of these efforts, at the beginning of year 2003 fiscal decentralization reform was
carried out. The main change brought about by this reform is the division of the public services pro-
vided by the municipalities into mandated and local option services. Fundamental changes in the inter-
governmental transfers system were carried out as a result of this division of the services in particu-
lar by the introduction of two new types of subsidies, the general complementary subsidy (for financ-
ing mandated services) and the general adjustment subsidy (for financing local option activities).
Another accomplishment of the reform is that the local governments were given powers to set the
rates of local fees.
All local government related laws mentioned above were updated in compliance with the changes
introduced by the fiscal decentralization reform.
A second working group was established in 2003 and dealt with development of the municipal
credit market (Municipal Borrowing Working Group). A draft of the legislation was developed and sub-
mitted to the Ministry of Finance in early 2004. This legislation was approved by Parliament in April
2005 and became effective on 1 June 2005 as the Municipal Debt Act which provided a comprehen-
sive legal framework for municipal borrowing. 
The third working group was established by the order of June 2004 of the Cabinet of Ministers, with
the task to develop and propose a permanent system for monitoring and evaluation of the fiscal decen-
tralization process. The group approved two documents (Assessment, 2004): 
(1) Permanent System of Indicators for Monitoring and Evaluation of Fiscal Decentralization 
(2) Report on the Development of Fiscal Decentralization in 2003.
After the Parliamentary elections in June 2005, the new government continued the policy of decen-
tralization. The FDWG was replaced by the National Council for Decentralization which was made up
of representatives from all stakeholders. In October 2005, the government signed the agreement on
cooperation with the National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria (the only countrywide represen-
tative body for the municipalities). The Council of Ministers and NAMRB jointly elaborated and adopt-
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ed (June 2006) a Decentralization Strategy for 2006-2015 and a Program for its implementation in the
period 2006-2009. Thus, for the second time since 2002 there has been a mid-term decentralization
reform agenda. 
Having EU accession in mind, municipalities were delegated functions on internal audit. In the first
half of 2006, three new acts on this issue were adopted: 
Public Sector Internal Audit Act,
Public Sector Financial Management and Control Act, 
State Financial Inspection Act. 
3. STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
The Constitution provides for two main levels of local government namely the municipality and the
region. Bulgaria is now divided into 28 regions and 264 municipalities. The municipalities represent
local self-government, while the regions are deconcentrated administrations of central government.
City districts and mayoralties are municipal subdivisions below the municipal level. Due to EU acces-
sion, a new tier of government (NUTS II) represented by the six planning regions has been established.
This level of the local government has the potential to develop regional development policy. Experts
still argue that two out of six defined regions do not correspond to the EU standards from the point of
view of the number of habitants (CED, 2006), and so consensus still has to be reached. 
Proposals for new borders for the NUTS II regions were made recently by the Ministry of Regional
Development and Public Works but these need to be approved by Eurostat in order to become valid.
The region (oblast) represents the national government at provincial level, and harmonizes nation-
al and local interests. The Governor of a region is appointed by the Council of Ministers. He is respon-
sible for governing the region and is assisted by a regional administration. Region administrations have
neither the legal power nor the financial resource to carry out public investments. Their activities con-
centrate on the preparation of development strategies. 
The municipality is the basic administrative territorial unit in which local self-government is carried
out. The body of local self-government in the municipality is the Municipal Council, which is elected
by popular vote and has a mandate of four years. The Municipal Council comprises of the elected
councillors, the number of which depends on the population registered in the Municipality. The Mayor
is the executive arm of the municipality. He is elected by the population for a four-year term of office.
The municipality has an independent budget and its own property. The rights and obligations of the
local authorities are defined in the Local Self-Government Act (LSGA). 
4. EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES
The scope of local services is regulated in the LSGA. Article 55 sets forth the financing responsi-
bilities of the municipal budgets as:
1. Operational costs and wage costs including social security contributions, for the health, social,
educational and cultural activities supported by the municipality;
2. Public utilities; Construction, extension, reconstruction, maintenance, and operating repair of
municipal property, and the acquisition costs for municipal property;
3. Joint initiatives with other municipalities;
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4. Costs of the Municipal Council and the municipal administration;
5. Administrative and technical services for the community where these are free of charge;
6.  Town planning and cadastral records;
7. Redemption of loans;
8. Environmental protection activities;
9. Capital investments in economic activities.
Over the last few years a reduction of the share of municipal expenditures in relation to GDP and to
the consolidated budget expenditures was observed (Table 1). The information presented in the table
illustrates the fall in municipal spending since 1999 and a trend towards centralization in the provision
of public services. As observed by Research Triangle Institute "these trends run contrary to the very
essence of fiscal decentralization". Two examples illustrate the tendency towards centralization: 
! transfer of social assistance to the Ministry of Labour in 2003 
! transfer of municipal hospitals to the National Health Insurance Fund. 
Table 1: Basic Data on Municipal Expenditure
Significant responsibilities for the provision of services have been assigned to municipalities with-
out the transfer of matching resources. As a result two thirds of the municipalities have arrears in local
activities (Assessment, 2004). The highest arrears occur in the case of local activities, but there are
also arrears in the case of delegated activities. Due to limited availability of funds, current expenditure
has taken precedence over capital outlays. Investments have remained small both in size and as a
share of total expenditure.
Based on the Concept, the assignment of responsibility for expenditure between the state and
municipal levels was clarified. The FDWG developed costing standards to determine the minimum
funding levels for mandated services in four sectors: education, health, culture and social welfare
(Mid-course, 2003). These funding levels are negotiated based on the previous expenditure pattern
and not on analysis of the spending needs necessary to reach some specified level of services. The
assignment of budget is revised every year before the State Budget Act for the following year is enact-
ed. In regard to local services, spending is driven by the availability of funds not by the estimate of
needs. The FDWG decided that the labour cost of municipal administration will be included in the man-
dated cost standards while the maintenance support costs were assigned as local expenses. 
There are some weaknesses in the existing costing standard for the mandated services. Firstly his-
torical data is used and the transfer for financing mandatory services is negotiated based on the pre-
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Municipal expenditure/ GDP 7.4 7.8 7.5 6.7 7.4 6.5 6.3 6.5
Municipal expenditure/ consolidated
budget expenditure 19.2 19.3 17.9 16.6 18.8 15.9 15.7 16.4
Municipal investments/ GDP 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.2
Municipal investments/Municipal expenditure 12.8 9.3 7.9 10.2 10.8 13.2 13.0 19.1
Municipal investments/ public investments 35.1 23.2 15.6 10.0 16.0 17.7 16.9 n.a.
Source: Ministry of Finance, data for municipal investments/public investments - Nenkova.
Note: capital expenditures are represented as category of 'capital and state reserve gain' thus starting from 2001 they
may be overestimated. Another source (Nenkova) provides the following figures for capital investments in municipal
expenditures: 2001 - 6.5%, 2002 - 8.6%, 2003 - 11%, 2004 - 11%.
47
vious expenditure pattern. The second weakness is the capital costs of mandated services. At pres-
ent, these are not included in the funding of mandated services and the government provides separate
specified capital investment subsidies, which are usually insufficient. As a result, municipalities have
no funds to finance capital investments and so the level of investment has declined steadily (Mid-
course, 2003). As at September 2006, the costing standards for mandated services still do not pro-
vide for capital expenditures. 
Certain activities have mixed financing. These include kindergartens and nursery homes. The oper-
ating costs of such an establishment are financed from a municipality's own revenues, whereas the
salary and social expenditures are financed from government transfers (Current status, UNDP). 
State delegated activities are funded from shared revenues collected under the PIT Law. When the
proceeds from PIT in a particular municipality are lower than the costs of its delegated activities, the
municipality receives a top up subsidy from the state. Local activities are financed from the munici-
pality's own revenues plus the equalization subsidy. 
5. REVENUE ASSIGNMENT
All potential revenue sources are defined in the Local Self-government Act (Article 53). The main
categories are:
1. Municipality's own revenues
2. Share in state taxes
3. Transfers and grants from the central budget
A municipality's own revenues include local taxes, charges and other local levies established by law
such as (Drumeva): 
! Tax on real estate;
! Inheritance tax
! Tax on donations;
! Tax on vehicles;
! Proceeds from granting of concessions
! Local charges on household waste
! Charges for technical and administrative services
! Charges for security and protection of agricultural property
! Charges for use of kindergartens, nurseries, social care institutions etc.
The locally sourced revenues also include the revenues from the renting of municipal property. 
The most important characteristic of the local revenue system is the lack of power of municipali-
ties to set either the tax base or the tax rates. As a result, local taxes are local in name only, although
the proceeds are spent in line with the decisions of the municipal council (Mid course, 2003). The
attempt to grant greater local control over taxation was blocked by the Constitutional Court. Therefore,
constitutional changes are necessary regarding the taxation rights of municipalities. 
Until very recently municipalities did not play any role in tax collection,as all of the local taxes were
collected by the Regional Tax Offices (Mid course, 2003). Pursuant to the amendments to the Local
Taxes and Charges Act, the municipalities took over the collection of tax revenues. In 2005 some of
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the municipalities were given the right to collect local taxes and charges as a pilot program. The results
of this program were positive and since 1 January 2006 local taxes and charges have been collected
exclusively by the municipal administrations. Despite some concerns about the administrative capac-
ity of local government, it seems that revenue collection has increased since the municipalities took
over this task. 
Lack of power to set taxes has some important consequences. Firstly, the share of local taxes in
municipal revenues has decreased since the beginning of the reforms in 2003 (Table 2) and revenues
are derived mainly through transfers from the central budget. Secondly, due to the low contribution
made by local taxes, local fees outweigh local tax receipts (Mid course, 2003). 
Table 2: Basic Data on Municipal Revenues
Source: Assessment, 2004
The lack of power to set taxes has led to the level of local taxes being frozen. A good example is
the property tax, which accounts for one-third of the municipal tax revenues. The rates and base of
the property tax have remained at the levels set in 1999 (Assessment, 2004). It is only in 2006 that
the official value of real estate has been raised by 20-30%, leading to an expected growth in munici-
pal property income of 18% (State Budget Act 2006). 
The municipal council has the right to set the price for every service provided by the municipality,
with the amount of these fees having to be set within the range stipulated in the Local Taxes and
Charges Acts. An amendment to this regulation, effective from 1 January 2003, has given the munic-
ipalities the authority to set the amount of fees, the methodology for determining the fee schedules,
the definition of exemptions and the collection procedures (Mid course, 2003). The Municipal Councils
now may raise the fees to a degree that allows them to cover the full costs of the relevant service. Due
to these legislative amendments, the revenues raised by the municipalities from their own sources
have increased significantly. The garbage collection charge accounts for the highest relative share and
importance in local budgets. 
In 2002, road tax was introduced as a new source of revenue to local government, with the purpose
of financing road repairs. The road tax was actually a surcharge placed on the vehicle tax, but because
of its purpose it was treated as a separate levy. In 2004 the revenue from road tax was replaced with a
one-off transfer of the amount equal to the road tax revenues reported for 2003. This action has strong-
ly increased the municipal budget dependence on central transfers (Assessment, 2004).
Municipalities are also eligible to receive a share of the taxes collected by the state. Until 2002 this
right referred to PIT (Personal Income Tax) and to CIT (Corporate Income Tax). In 2002 the legislation
on income taxes was revised and the corporate income tax was eliminated as a municipal revenue
source and replaced by the full amount of the proceeds from PIT. The reason was that there were large
variances in revenues between municipalities. In the State Budget Act for 2003, PIT was allocated to
finance the state portion of the mandated services. 
2003 2004 - projected 2005 - draft
Local taxes/ total tax revenues 1.9 1.7 1.4
Local taxes/ municipal revenues 9.1 9.6 8.4
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This is a substantial change as previously the share of the PIT allotted to local government was
defined each year in the State Budget Act (Epstein, 2000). Despite this arbitrary solution the share has
remained quite stable at 50% of PIT revenues. 
In the administrative sense, municipalities have the right to keep the PIT revenues collected on their
territory. Out of 264 municipalities only 17 do not keep the total amount of collected PIT. These 17 are
mainly big municipalities like Sofia and the other large cities. 
Municipalities may also receive revenues from the sale of municipal property. Proceeds from such
sales under Municipal Budget Act are registered as local revenues, whereas proceeds from sales
under the Act on the Privatization of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises are placed in an off-budg-
et municipal fund and may be used for investment or for paying off the debts of municipal enterpris-
es (Current status, UNDP).
From 2006 the municipalities were assigned a new competence with the right given to mayors to
suspend illegal construction and to impose penalties. Until then, municipal bodies were engaged only
in the identification of violations and submitting the information to the Directorate for National
Construction Supervision (CED, 2006). 
Due to the recently introduced changes, municipal revenues are expected to grow by 18% as envis-
aged with the State Budget Act 2006. There are two reasons for this namely the expected tax collec-
tion rate and the increase in property tax revenues. However, local governments still remain highly
dependant on transfers from the central budget.
Another category of local revenues are transfers and grants which are discussed in detail in next
section. 
6. INTERGOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL TRANSFERS
Major reforms in this field were introduced in 2003. The purpose was to change the system of inter-
governmental transfers, to rationalize the system of subsidies for capital investments and to stimulate
debt financing in order to provide the possibility of taking advantage of EU funds. In the new system
of intergovernmental transfers the funding was adjusted in line with service requirements. All munici-
pal responsibilities were divided into mandatory i.e. those delegated by the central government, and
those provided optionally by the local governments. 
The FDWG has developed costing standards for the mandated services that set the level of trans-
fer going to each municipality. The government has agreed on the mechanism for setting operating
cost parameters annually and to fund the operating costs of mandated responsibilities. All these
changes were included in the Municipal Budget Act that sets the minimum expenditure standards to
be financed by transfers for mandated services, establishes the size of equalizing transfer and distin-
guishes between current and capital expenditures. It also established a budgetary section for debt and
prohibits debt to balance current budgets. 
There are 3 types of government subsidies:
1. General complementary subsidy (for financing government-delegated activities)
2. General adjustment subsidy (for financing local activities)
3. Tied subsidy for investment
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The purpose of the general complementary subsidy is to supplement PIT revenues in the financing
of the delegated activities. 
The second type of subsidy, often called the equalization subsidy, is granted to those municipali-
ties whose revenues from local taxes per capita during the previous year were below the national aver-
age. The MBA sets a mandatory minimum of the equalization subsidy at not less than 10% of the self
generated revenue reported by all municipalities during the previous year (Nenkova).
The third type is investment subsidy. Up to 2002 the central government distributed investment
subsidies at its discretion and in the absence of appropriate rules. Moreover, the local capital expens-
es were capped at a certain percentage of the municipality's self generated revenues (the limit in 1999
was 10% of such revenues, in 2000 it was 5% and in 2002 up to 25% of projected revenues from
local taxes and non-tax sources) (Nenkova). Only in 2003 State Budget Act were the caps on using
self generated resources for capital investment purposes lifted. 
The capital subsidy comprises two elements. The first includes funds for national investment proj-
ects as determined by the state government. These funds are determined on an ad hoc basis every
year and channelled through the different line ministries and central agencies. The second includes
funds for local projects. These funds are determined on the basis of population, area and the number
of populated settlements. These funds may be used for financing both delegated and local activities
and distribution is decided by municipal council. Typically, the ad hoc subsidies amount to more than
the target capital subsidy allocated under the formula.
Investment activity of local governments was further undermined by the practice of allowing the tar-
geted investment subsidies to be transformed into a general subsidy at the end of the year (Epstein,
2000). There was also the risk that an investment started by a local government might not get financed
in subsequent budget years.
The formula for distribution of dedicated (capital) subsidy does not take into account the inter-
municipal disparities in investment funding capability (Nenkova). There is a great disparity across the
municipalities in their capacity to fund investment. The crucial issue related to capital subsidies is how
to find sources to match EU grants for regional development investments starting in 2007 as co-
financing is a principal requirement for use of structural funds. Given the EU requirement for match-
ing funds, the level of transfers has to rise substantially. 
Central government target subsidies for capital expenditures increased from 75 million BGN in 1999
to 123 million BGN in 2002 and 116 million BGN in 2003.
7. REGULATIONS ON BORROWING
Local government revenues increased by transfers from the state budget are insufficient to finance
the necessary investments. Given the financial constraint at the central government level, the only pos-
sibility was to allow borrowing at local level. In order to avoid the financial consequences of excessive
borrowing, some legal constraints had to be set. Municipalities had the general power to borrow under
the annual Municipal Budget Act as well as under the Local Self-Government and Local Administration
Acts, but there were many gaps in the existing regulations and so the new law was prepared. The
Municipal Debt Act (MDA) was approved by Parliament in April 2005 and became effective on 1 June
2005. The MDA provides a comprehensive legal framework for municipal borrowing thus completing
the existing regulations. 
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In line with the Local Self-Government Act, a municipal council has the competence to make deci-
sions on bank borrowing, interest free lending and municipal bond issues under terms and procedures
provided by the Act (art.21). A municipality may use bank loans, as well as interest free loans from
the central budget under terms and conditions provided by the government (art.52). Additionally, a
municipality has the right to issue bonds. The borrowing purpose is limited as a municipality has no
right to borrow for costs of a general nature such as paying wages or running current expenses. The
interest on loans obtained by a municipality is funded from its current budget (art.52, p.6). 
The rules on local borrowing were further specified in the Municipal Debt Act. 
Municipal debt shall be incurred only by a resolution of a Municipal Council.
Municipal debt comprises (art.3): 
! Issues of municipal securities;
! Debt incurred by municipal loan contracts;
! Debt of municipal-owned enterprises;
! Municipal guarantees that have become due;
! Interest free loans extended by the central government budget, including those to co-finance 
programmes by the EU;
! Obligations under commercial credit and arising from financial leases for a period exceeding two 
years.
The current liabilities of a municipality to suppliers of goods and providers of services shall not be
counted as municipal debt. 
The distinction has been made between short term and long term debt according to its purpose.
Short-term debt may be incurred in order to finance current expenditures but has to be redeemed
before the end of budget year (art.5). Long-term debt may be incurred to finance investment projects,
refinance existing debt, to prevent and mitigate the effects of force majeure and to meet payments
made under municipal guarantees that have become due. 
It is not allowed to secure municipal debt by means of pledge or mortgage of any items constitut-
ing public municipal property (art.8). 
Municipalities may incur debt in foreign currencies without any additional approval. 
The mayor shall prepare an annual report on the state of the municipal debt, which will be an inte-
gral part of the report on the implementation of the municipal budget (art.9). These annual reports
shall be transmitted to the Minister of Finance or the National Audit Office (art.18). The MDA stipulates
that a Central Municipal Debt Register shall be established at the Ministry of Finance, with individual
records for each municipality. 
Creation of the debt register is the task of the municipal debt department. This register has already
been developed and pilot testing has been implemented in nine municipalities. According to plans the
register should start operating at the beginning of 2007. The central register will comprise three ele-
ments: a sub-register for local governments bonds, a sub-register for loans given to municipalities and
a sub-register on guarantees. 
The MDA sets specific limits on debts. The annual amount of payments on the debt during each
particular year may not exceed 25% of the sum of revenues from a municipality's own sources and
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the equalizing grant under the last audited report on the implementation of the municipality budget
(art.12), and the nominal value of the municipal guarantees issued may not exceed 5% of the same
amount. The annual amount of payments on the debt comprise the principal, interest, charges, com-
mission fees  and other payments due on the debt incurred by the municipality. If the payments exceed
the above mentioned amounts then the municipality has no right to incur new debt or guarantees. The
operation register will allow monitoring of these precautionary limits. 
The MDA does not contain limits on the size of the outstanding debt. However, municipal debt is
the part of government debt, the upper limit of which is stipulated by Law on Government Debt (LGD): 
"The outstanding portion of the consolidated government debt at year-end as a ratio of the project-
ed gross domestic product may not exceed 60 per cent (art.10). In the event of any risk of non-com-
pliance with the requirement under Article 10, the Council of Ministers may require some restrictions
on the issuance of municipal debt and social security funds debt in the State Budget Law for the
respective year".
Within the meaning of this Law, the consolidated government debt shall be the face value of the
government debt, the debt of the municipalities and the debts of the social security funds. Within two
months from the coming into effect of this Law, the municipalities and the social security funds shall
inform the Ministry of Finance of their outstanding debt and the guarantees already issued by them.
The Minister of Finance must prepare an annual report on the state of the government debt, which
must then be considered by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the National Assembly as an
integral part of the government budget performance report for the year (art.15).
The Government Debt Directorate at the Ministry of Finance is responsible for reporting on gener-
al government debt. Every month the information on municipal debt (aggregate figure) is collected and
published. Once a year municipalities provide the Directorate with declarations on their planned debt
issue. Based on this, the ratio of debt to GDP is monitored. Data on the arrears and debts of public
utilities are not collected. 
There are no explicit guarantees of the municipal debt provided by government and does not con-
stitute a liability of the government, except in cases where a government guarantee has been issued
according to the appropriate procedure (art.30).
By law, the official information on the consolidated government and government guaranteed debt
shall be published on a monthly basis by the Ministry of Finance in the Official Bulletin and on the
Internet (art.38).
Besides these regulations, the Financial Regulatory Commission has established guidelines and
procedures for the public offering of municipal bonds. 
One of the weaknesses of the existing law is the lack of regulations concerning the default and the
MDA does not deal with such situation. However the ordinance "Law on Municipalities in Financial
Distress" has been prepared by a governmental working group. Based on this ordinance the govern-
ment has supported 14 municipalities which have accrued substantial arrears. These municipalities
have developed rehabilitation programs and the Ministry of Finance monitors the implementation of
these programs. 
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8. FINANCING OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT
No explosion of municipal borrowing is under way and Bulgaria had the chance to develop the legal
and policy framework before any development of the debt market. Creditworthiness of municipalities
is undermined by accrued arrears in the local activities although the monitoring of such liabilities is
questionable.
Table 3: Basic Debt Statistics, End of Period Data
Source: Ministry of Finance
Note: * end of November
There are numerous limitations on the development of municipal debt, which are now analyzed
within the framework proposed by Leigland. 
From the demand side: 
1. Lack of a system of legal and procedural protection of investor rights. The Law on Local 
Government Debt has been adopted only recently;
2. Lack of an active secondary market and transactions are still rare. Therefore the chances to sell 
investments before maturity remain very limited;
3. Municipal bonds are backed primarily by tax revenues. However, the ability of local taxes to 
generate strong and consistent revenues is currently limited;
4. Lack of institutions familiar with bond issues, which could play the role of underwriters;
5. Lack of information regarding investment risks. The Bulgarian market only now  has developed 
a disclosure system for the issuers;
6. Lack of financial intermediaries willing to provide assistance in interpreting information. Thus 
basic judgements about the credit quality of municipal bonds are difficult to make;
7. Municipal borrowing was limited due to the unstable financial standing of the banking system.
The banking crisis of 1996-1997 was followed by the introduction of the currency board from 1 July
1997.
From the commercial banks' perspective the following constraints on local financing were identified
(Case study, 2005):
1. Perception of municipalities as not being creditworthy due to their financial weakness and lack 
of financial knowledge. It was stressed that the growth in self generated revenues is a precondition 
for this perception to change (Mid-course, 2003);
2. Budgets rely heavily on state transfers and thus the volume of predictable income that can be 
used for debt repayment is limited;
3. Availability of collateral.  Banks have required physical property as collateral to secure 
municipal debt but privatization has reduced this asset base. Banks have not accepted municipal 
revenues as a source of collateral;
2002 2003 2004 2005*
Consolidated state debt (million Euro) 8793.9 8148.7 7557.8 6625.9
Municipal debt (million Euro) 22 33.8 46.6 83.5
Consolidated state debt (% GDP) 53.2 46.1 38.9 31.3
Municipal debt (% GDP) 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
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4. Municipalities have sought to finance investment projects and loans that were too large for the 
size of local budgets;
5. Lack of well prepared projects submitted to the banks, and so credit analysis was not possible;
6. Lack of belief by the banks that incumbents will honour the debt obligations undertaken by their 
predecessors in office;
7. Preference among bankers to finance revenue-generating projects rather than infrastructure 
projects.
From the supply side: 
1. The borrowing costs were relatively high and determined mainly by the macroeconomic 
developments. However, the costs of securities issuance are minimal making bonds an affordable 
financing alternative for creditworthy municipalities with the regular brokerage fee being around 
0.5% of the value of bonds sold (Strategy, 2004);
2. Short-term debt amortization. Relatively high risks and underdevelopment of the market did not 
allow extension of maturities;
3. Assistance for small borrowers is limited. The Development Credit Authority Guarantee 
mechanism is the only credit enhancement mechanism which is functioning in regard to the 
municipal credit market (USD 20 million guarantee fund). Through the DCA, USAID provides 
guarantees on behalf of potential borrowers to United Bulgarian Bank for 50% of the principal loan 
amount that is due. The portfolio comprises 13 municipal projects successfully financed under the 
DCA;
4. Lack of any form of responsible self-regulation with a focus on the disclosure of information. 
These limitations are counterbalanced by the high liquidity of the financial institutions such as com-
mercial banks and the pension funds. These investors are looking for good investment opportunities.
Therefore the potential available supply of capital does not pose a constraint on the enlargement of
municipality credit market activity (Strategy, 2004). A tax stimulus is in place under the Taxation of the
Income of Natural Persons Act effective January 1, 1998. Under this Act, interest paid on state secu-
rities is not liable to tax when acquired by natural person (the interpretation of the tax authorities is this
provision also applies to interest paid on municipal securities) (Epstein, 2000). 
The primary source of municipal debt is the provision of loans by the banking sector (Table 4).
However, only few commercial banks have municipalities as clients. In order to receive loan from a
particular bank, a municipality has to be a client of that bank and in most cases to move all its
accounts to the bank extending the loan. Banks recognize that few municipalities have budgets that
reliably generate the operating surpluses needed to service debt. Banking credits are used to cover
temporary cash deficits. Long-term lending is still rare (Strategy, 2004). There are also international
institutions providing loans to the municipalities. For example, Sofia received loans from international
institutions (EBRD, WB, JBIC, Council of Europe Development Bank). At the end of 2005 banking cred-
it from domestic and foreign sources comprises 52.9% of the municipal debt. 
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Table 4: Municipal Debt
Source: Ministry of Finance, State Debt, December 2005
Note: * end of November
Some banks prefer to finance municipalities through bonds rather than credits due to their higher
liquidity, the possibility to use bonds as collateral by investor, and the lack of pledge requirements as
is the case with loans. On the other hand public issue of bonds requires more information to be dis-
closed publicly than in the case of a bank loan. 
Bonds comprise 18% of municipal debt at the end of 2005. To date Bulgarian municipalities have
completed 10 bond issues with diverse structures (Table 5). Several municipalities have been unsuc-
cessful in issuing bonds (Strategy, 2004).
The law does not prevent borrowing in foreign currencies. However, the issues in foreign curren-
cies, namely Euro, are rather uncommon (Table 5).
Two issues of municipal bonds have been rated by international agencies namely: the Issue by Sofia
in 1999 rated by Standard and Poor and the 2000 Varna Issue rated by Moody. There are also domes-
tic rating agencies in Bulgaria, but lack of transparency regarding their methodologies and their short
history limits their credibility as a source of information for the financial community (Strategy, 2004).
There are institutions in place to regulate the issuing of bonds. Since 2003, the issuance of munic-
ipal bonds has been regulated by Ordinance 2/2003. Up to June 2004 no public or private offering was
made under these new requirements. Municipal debt (bonds and credits) is regulated and supervised
by the Commission for Financial Supervision (CFS) and the National Bank of Bulgaria. The public offer-
ing of bonds is supervised by the CFS. 
2004 2005* 2004 2005*
thousands BGN Structure
Domestic 52318.8 110027.5 57.4 67.3
Securities 10179.6 29459.3 11.2 18.0
Loans from banks and other financial institutes 26244.8 61144.8 28.8 37.4
Loans from central government 2764 4093.3 3.0 2.5
Loans from extra-budgetary funds 6276.7 8363.6 6.9 5.1
Other 6853.7 6966.5 7.5 4.3
External 38813.3 53348.4 42.6 32.7
Loans from banks and other financial institutes 18863 25299.2 20.7 15.5
State guaranteed 19950.3 28049.2 21.9 17.2
Total 91132.1 163375.9 100 100
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Table 5: Municipal Bond Issues
Source: Strategy (2004); Gumpel P.E. (2006) 
Another source of deficit financing is by loan from the budget (2.5% of municipal debt in the end
of 2005). In the past, the government provided credits to municipalities, which were spent to finance
current expenditure. This was possible as the purpose of loan was not regulated by law. Under the
amended Municipal Budget Act, from the beginning of 2004, municipalities have access to interest-
free loans from the central budget in order to pre-finance costs for approved projects under programs
co-financed by the EU, until such costs are reimbursed (Nenkova).
In the past the borrowing activity was constrained by the ceiling placed by the central government
on capital investments. The State Budget Act limited the amount of local government investments to
the amount authorized in the investment grant. Beyond this level with its targeted subsidy, local gov-
ernments were limited to additional investment spending of only 10% of self generated revenue as
defined by the Ministry of Finance. This investment spending limit was reduced to 5% in the 2000
budget.  (Epstein, 2000). In practice this was another borrowing limit, although the local governments
have not spent to the full amount of the limit. 
Svishtov Sofia Varna Sliven Dupniza Dobrich Varna Shoumen Svilengrad S. Zagora
Issued in 1999 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2005
Total value 0.37 million 50 million 3 million 3 million 1.3 million 2.6 million 3 million 4 million 2 million 5 million 
BGN EUR BGN BGN EUR BGN BGN BGN
Purpose n.a. Restructuring Street lighting Bus station Financing Streets Modernization Rehabilitation Financing Rehabilitation
of the urban (energy (1.85 million of network of urban road of the road of key of the road
infrastructure efficiency BGN), building infrastructure upgrade infrastructure network infrastructure network,
cost saving) covered projects projects opera house
and cultural pedestrian remodelling
and bridge
educational (850 ths. BGN)
facilities - building citrus
in the fruits market
proportion (150 ths. BGN)
50/50 and flower
market (150
ths BGN)
Type n.a. Interest- Interest- Interest- Interest- n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
bearing, free bearing, bearing, bearing,
transferable freely freely
transferable transferable
Interest rate 5.6% 9.75% 9% paid 9% 9% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
on annual semi-annually on annual
basis basis
Grace period n.a. None n.a. 1 year n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maturity 7 years 3 years 3 years 4 years 4 years 5 years 3 years 5 years 5 years 10 years
Repayment Coupon The coupon 1 million per Principal Coupon n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
schedule payment on a payment year repaid in three payment
semi-annual shall be made equal on an annual
basis on an annual instalments/ basis
basis the coupon on
a semi-annual
basis
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The growth in debt is necessary to remove the infrastructure investment gap. One analysis con-
ducted by the World Bank provided an estimate of the financial requirements needed by Bulgaria to
meet the environmental standards for EU accession (World Bank). The results were presented in
brackets. The lower estimate for municipalities to upgrade environmental infrastructure amounted to
over BGN 1,000 million per year in capital costs and the higher was BGN 1,800 million annually. It
means that current investment expenditures need to double. 
Besides banks, another financing source for the municipalities is Foundation for Local Government
Reform which provides short term credits (up to 1 year). In 2004 a revolving fund was established in
order to finance municipal projects such as small infrastructure projects and the pre-assessment and
preparation costs for investment proposals. Financing is provided for small projects (5-30 thousand
BGN) at interest rates below the market rate. The borrowing period is set at less than 12 months as
public tender procedures are required for longer debt periods Until now there were no problems with
repayment of these loans. In the market for long term borrowing, the commercial banks are very active
providing credits at very competitive prices which are below the price of bond issues. 
9. LESSONS LEARNT FROM BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE
The level of fiscal decentralization measured by local expenditures is still very low. There is no finan-
cial autonomy at the local level as self generated revenues remain lower than those allocated from cen-
tral government sources.  Local authorities do not control the scope and sources of their self generat-
ed revenues and are dependent on the resources allocated by central government. Local Authorities
also need to get authorization on spending. Central government controls more than 80% of local budg-
et revenues without bearing the responsibility for providing  public services to local residents.
The fiscal decentralization reforms accelerated significantly when the formal institutional body
(FDWG) was created. The FDWG comprised of representatives of all stakeholders from the municipal
leadership to key central ministries. The comprehensive plan of reform was prepared and its imple-
mentation was constantly monitored and adjusted when necessary. Thus, the fiscal decentralization
program was kept on track. The members of FDWG had access to reliable and up to date data on
municipal finance. Continuity of leadership has accompanied the reform process. 
This institutional solution allowed reforms to proceed, together with the solving of different prob-
lems according to the priorities assigned. Within a relatively short period of time the system of trans-
fers has been changed and a comprehensive legislative framework of municipal debt has been set up. 
As the law on local debt was implemented only in mid-2005, it is too early to evaluate how it works
in practice, although some observations can be made. The monitoring system is not in operation, so
complete information on municipal borrowing is not yet available. The current regulations do not deal
with insolvency issues, which is a significant weakness. Despite this the regulatory framework is in
place to allow the secure development of the municipal debt market. 
There are some unresolved issues. The most important is a change in the constitution necessary
to authorize municipalities to unilaterally set local taxes and fees. This constitutional limitation on local
discretion to set taxes has resulted in low proportion of self generated revenues in municipal budgets.
For now municipal revenues come mainly from shared taxes and transfers, making municipalities
highly dependent on centralized funding. Thus, there is no room for a municipality to have an inde-
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pendent investment policy. This is highly important as in 2007 Bulgaria joins the EU and accession
will require massive investments in environmental repair and improvement. There is also a need to co-
finance such investments with domestic funds. 
During the last two years the need for constitutional change has become understood and the
amendment is expected to be made by the end of 2006. The amendment will give municipalities the
right to determine the size of local taxes within limits defined by law (CED, 2006). It is planned that
along with increased powers of taxation, municipalities will be charged with new responsibilities such
as providing professional schools and specialized medical and social establishments. 
EU membership will create new investment opportunities with the price of having to provide co-
financing for the projects. In response to this, the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works
is drafting a new ordinance for the creation of a Local Development Fund in December 2006. It is
planned that the state budget will not provide more than 40% of the resources of this fund while the
remainder will come from a syndicated loan managed by the EBRD (CED, 2006). 
It is necessary to set a more transparent and predictable system of transfers. At present delegated
expenditure responsibilities are not sufficiently secured against revenues and thus municipalities are
more distributors of funds than independent policy makers. 
The remaining weakness is the unclear mechanism for determination of subsidies needed to cover
municipalities' investment costs. The existing law provides an option to transform dedicated subsidies
into all purpose subsidies which then could be used to cover current expenditures. Municipal invest-
ment expenditures are considered to be of low priority. The lack of stable rules for the amount of cap-
ital subsidy does not allow the municipalities to plan their investment programs (CED, 2006). The
strong dependence of municipalities on centralized funding restricts their ability to formulate and
implement independent local policy (CED, 2006). The municipal budget should be divided into current
and capital and the possibility to carry forward expenditures from one year to another should be con-
sidered. 
In general, there has been strong leadership shown in the process. Despite this, the level of decen-
tralization is low, as municipalities are still largely centrally financed. Expected constitutional changes
should improve this situation, but strong cooperation between central government and municipalities
remains a necessity. Further progress in decentralization could be measured by the financial autono-
my granted to the local governments.  Today such autonomy is very limited. 
Field visit to Bulgaria
List of people interviewed during the filed visit to Bulgaria (27-28 September, 2006)
Interviewee Position
Valentina Grozdanova Director of the Local Governments Directorate at the Ministry of Finance
Ljudmila Bojanova Head of Sector Analyses Division, Government Debt Directorate at the Ministry of Finance
Zdravko Sechkov Financial Director at the Foundation for Local Government Reform
Emil Kaltchev Senior researcher at the Center for Economic Development
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Legislation related to LGU borrowing in Bulgaria
A number of laws that affect municipal finance have been adopted:
1. Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Official Gazette, 1991
2. Ratification of the European Charter on Local Self-government, 1995
3. Local Self-government and Local Administration Act, Off. G. No. 77/1991 and amendments
4. Law on Local Elections, Off. G. No 66/1995 and amendments
5. Law on the Local Taxes and Charges, Off. G. No. 117/1997 and amendments 
6. Law on Administration, Off. G. No. 130/1998 and amendments 
7. Law on Civil Servant, Off. G. No. 67/1999 and amendments 
8. Municipal Property Act, Off. G. No. 44/1996 and amendments 
9. Law on Municipal Budgets, Off. G. No. 33/1998 and amendments 
10. Law on the Administrative and Territorial Division of the Republic of Bulgaria, Off. G. 
No. 63/1995 and amendments
11. Regional Development Act, 1999
12. Municipal Debt Act, Promulgated, SG No. 34/19.04.2005 (effective 1.06.2005)
13. Corporate Income Tax Act and Natural Persons Income Tax Act, 2002 - the corporate income 
tax was eliminated as a municipal revenue source and was replaced with the full 
amount proceeds from PIT. 
14. Monitoring and evaluation system, adopted by FDWG in September 2002 - the proposed 
amendment to the Constitution was submitted in 2003 in order to expand the taxation 
authorities of the municipalities. 
15. The formation of the regions as new administrative and territorial unit act (promulg. SG, No. 65 
of 1987, amend., No. 45 of 1989)
16. Law on the government debt, (Issued by the 39th National Assembly on 17 September 2002; 
published in the State Gazette, issue 93 of 1 October 2002)
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Annex 1: Local governments in Bulgaria
Source: Ministry of Finance
Thousands of BGN 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total revenue and grants 1,027,493.1 1,087,820.5 1,122,423.6 1,364,828.8 1,489,534.1 1,422,107.6 823,500.9 935,053.5
Tax revenue 858,351.8 848,029.9 864,538.5 1,020,320.4 1,082,910.2 933,381.5 224,659.1 245,529.4
Profit tax 266,711.6 251,495.3 245,518.9 393,338.2 394,979.3 ---- ---- ----
Income tax 508,497.7 507,349.9 524,177.2 522,114.8 520,376.0 724,059.9 ---- ----
Excise and fuel duties 101.1 22.8 30.2 33.1 28.5 15.5 4.2 1.9
Other taxes 83,041.4 89,161.9 94,812.2 104,834.3 167,526.4 209,306.1 224,654.9 245,527.5
Non-tax revenue 169,024.1 239,505.9 257,628.6 337,000.6 396,163.6 480,852.1 591,202.8 679,210.2
Grants 117.2 248.7 256.5 7,507.8 10,460.3 7,874.0 7,639.0 10,314.0
Transfers from central government (net) 617,701.0 737,678.0 832,555.9 640,856.7 870,719.6 755,725.5 1,590,111.4 1,663,644.1
Transfers without Income tax 866,051.5 939,584.2
Total expenditure 1,658,716.0 1,864,094.8 2,005,339.6 1,990,101.1 2,391,577.6 2,243,815.5 2,382,465.8 2,738,673.4
Current 1,446,785.8 1,690,971.4 1,847,382.8 1,787,162.7 2,132,942.8 1,946,699.0 2,071,586.8 2,214,724.7
Compensation of employees 692,642.4 821,280.4 782,813.3 667,750.5 785,013.6 845,891.8 922,944.1 947,697.0
Maintenance and operating 592,300.6 706,763.4 770,049.1 661,845.5 796,985.5 880,948.6 1,039,331.0 1,140,761.3
Subsidies 65,798.2 24,337.1 22,977.5 159,526.2 184,642.8 201,653.7 90,324.4 105,440.7
to non-financial enterprises 65,798.2 24,337.1 22,977.5 23,943.5 25,809.9 36,046.9 38,858.8 43,125.7
for health care and medical assistance 135,582.7 158,832.9 165,606.8 51,465.6 62,315.0
Interests 1,200.9 571.3 10,042.1 10,157.1 10,581.5 2,433.4 4,020.1 5,760.1
Social expenditures, scholarships 94,843.7 138,019.2 261,500.8 287,883.4 355,719.4 15,771.5 14,967.2 15,065.6
Capital and state reserve gain 211,930.2 173,123.4 157,956.8 202,938.4 258,634.8 297,116.5 310,879.0 523,948.8
Deficit -13,521.9 -38,596.3 -50,360.1 15,584.4 -31,323.9 -65,982.4 31,146.5 -139,975.8
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1. INTRODUCTION
The overall objective of this study on local government1 borrowing is to accomplish an all-encom-
passing review that systematically captures the entirety of the fiscal decentralization processes with
an emphasis to the local government borrowing in each of the three transition countries: Romania,
Bulgaria and Macedonia. As part of this larger study, the main purpose of this country report is to pro-
vide an overview of the progress in the process of decentralization after July 2005 when the process
started and an overview of issues with the local government borrowing in Macedonia.
This study is neither a credit rating analysis nor does it cover specific aspects of local government
borrowing in detail. Rather the study provides an overview of each of the building blocks of intergov-
ernmental fiscal relations (structure of the government sector, delineation of responsibilities for expen-
diture, assignment of revenue sources, intergovernmental transfers, financial management issues,
subnational borrowing legislation, infrastructure and the financing side of the subnational budget and
the municipal debt characteristics). The study also considers the technical nature of the strengths and
weaknesses of the decentralization process, with a special emphasis on experiences in local govern-
ment borrowing and recommendations for further development. 
Macedonia is in a position to develop the legal and policy framework first, in anticipation of the
future development of a municipality credit market. Macedonia can learn from the experience in
Romania and Bulgaria2 and from the risks that have become clear in other countries. Excessive bor-
rowing by sub-national government or debt issuance in the absence of an adequate legal framework
(one that clarifies critical issues like the status of guarantees and the remedies available to lenders in
the event of a municipality's non-payment) has exacerbated national economic crises. Premature bor-
rowing, before a municipality has established its creditworthiness and identified clear investment pri-
orities, is likely to drain local budget resources and to add risk to the fiscal system. The potential ben-
efit of soundly based local borrowing is great, but the risks involved in badly prepared borrowing also
are large. Stakeholders (LGU, national government, banks, and potential investors in municipal debt)
share an interest in ensuring that the policy issues surrounding credit market development are well
understood and that an appropriate legal framework is in place before the market actually opens.
We believe that by reviewing the process of decentralization one year after it started (1st of July
2005) we can gain important insights for the future borrowing at LGU level. Thus, the study opens
with review of the process of decentralization in Macedonia, followed by consideration of the many
aspects of LGU borrowing. Useful information and data are presented in the annexes especially the
insolvency matrix in annex 4 and the strategic analysis of LGU borrowing presented in annex 5. Annex
5 contains three two-dimensional matrices that served as a base for collating information obtained in
the course of our field trips and for developing this country report (originally developed by the GSU;
more in UNDP 2005). The three matrices in Annex 5 are labeled as Tables 25, 26 and 27.
! Table 25 (The Assessment Matrix): Identifies the current state of borrowing and maps policy
areas within the realms of borrowing and local government reform that present the current key
policy issues and obstacles for the further development of borrowing.
1) In this report we will use the Local Government Unit-LGU, subnational government, local government, county level, communes, 
municipalities and cities interchangeably. When necessary for more clear text we will stress what is the tier we are talking about. 
2) Basic data about these countries are illustrated in the Annex 1.
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! Table 26 (The Reform Initiatives Matrix):  Identifies and maps recent or ongoing initiatives pur-
sued by the national government, subnational governments and their associations, as well as
other donor agencies and stakeholders within the realms of borrowing and local government
reform that are aimed at addressing and resolving the obstacles and challenges noted in the
Assessment Matrix.
! Table 27 (The Reform Priorities Matrix): Within the same dimensions as the previous two matri-
ces,  the Reform Priorities Matrix identifies priorities for further action in areas that are either cur-
rently underserved in the policy discussion on borrowing or areas where a fresh perspective may
stimulate new policy thinking.
2. STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF THE GOVERNMENT
The process of decentralisation requires not only that the Government has the political commitment
but also has the capacity for the coordination and sequencing of the process. The Decentralisation
Working Group (DWG) was established by the government to monitor progress towards decentraliza-
tion. The DWG and its Sub-Groups did not succeed fully in achieving their aims of monitoring the
process of decentralisation, identifying and solving problems, managing risks and dealing with the
weak capacity of local governments. 
The evolution of decentralization in Macedonia has been a mixture of political inefficiency and eth-
nic disputes. Three periods can be identified in the process of decentralization.  
The first of these periods was one of centralization between 1991-1995 which left the municipali-
ties without competencies and without an efficient system of financing. The GDP declined continuous-
ly until 1996 when the unemployment level reached 32 %. During this period, the government was
focused on achieving macroeconomic stabilization and on privatization. 
During the second period 1995-2001, macroeconomic stabilization was achieved but the overall
economic performance was rather poor with an average annual growth rate of around 2 %. During this
period, for the first time after independence, a new Law on LSG was adopted in 1995 and a new Law
on Territorial Organization was adopted in 1996. Both laws were products of a highly ethnically and
politically motivated process. 
Contrary to the widely accepted "wisdom" held by donors that the Ohrid Framework Agreement
(OFA) brought about the process of decentralization in Macedonia, the process of decentralization in
fact started after Macedonia signed the European Charter in 1996 and ratified it in 1997. The process
was backed up by two important documents namely the Government Program of 1999 and the
Government Strategy for Reforming the Public Administration also of 1999. As a result of these two
initiatives, a Working Team within the Ministry of LGU was established in March 1999 to start the
process of decentralization. .
In 1999, the Kosovo conflict further complicated ethnic tensions in Macedonia leading to an armed
interethnic conflict in 2001. The crisis in Macedonia ended with the signing of the OFA in 2001. The
OFA called for constitutional changes as well as the adoption of a new Law on LSG (adopted in 2002)
and thus the decentralization initiatives of 1999 gained a new momentum. One consequence of the
politically-driven process (rather than a fiscal decentralization process motivated by a desire to
improve economic efficiency) was the reverse sequencing of decentralization, with revenue decentral-
ization preceding a loosely defined assignment of expenditure. 
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Essentially the decentralization of particular functions has been delegated to line ministries, which
have used every opportunity to slow down the process, as they had no incentives to "give up their
turf" to the municipalities. 
The speed of decentralization reforms greatly accelerated during 2004, as the Ministry of LGU
moved forward with a number of initiatives and intensified its contacts with the Association of LGU
(known by its Macedonian acronym ZELS). The Program of 1999 set out the activities for the imple-
mentation of the decentralization process in the period 2004-2007 and was adopted by the
Government in November 2004. These activities are related to the transfer of competencies, employ-
ees, equipment and property from the central to the local level and to capacity building in the munic-
ipalities to enable them to successfully take over the devolved competencies.
2.1. Legal framework
What the legal framework in Macedonia defines as decentralization is in fact devolution, i.e. that elect-
ed local officials are given power and resources to make decisions about the provision of public services.
Functional decentralization, i.e. the devolution of competencies, is left to the sectoral laws in Mace-
donia while the fiscal decentralization framework, including the inter-governmental transfers, is defined
in the Law on Financing LGU (LFLGU).
2.2. Territorial organisation
With the Law on Territorial Organization being adopted in 2004, the local governments in Macedonia
were restructured into 84 municipalities (15 of which have less than 5,000 inhabitants) and with the
City of Skopje as a special unit. Many of the LGU, after one year, are facing the fact that they do not
have the capacity to provide the necessary and expected services to their citizens. This is generally
caused by a lack of economy of scale due to their limited size or by limitations in their capacity
because of under-investment, low regional development, etc.
3. ASSIGNMENT OF COMPETENCES
The Law on LGU regulates the competencies of the local governments. A wide range of responsi-
bilities are listed in the provisions of Article 22 of the Law. The role of local governments and the cen-
tral government are well defined.
3.1. Subsidiarity principle
The European Charter for Local Self-Government includes among its provisions the subsidiarity
principle in Paragraph 3 of Article 4: 
"Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are
closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and
nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy."
Basically the provision of services should be exercised at the lowest possible level of government
that is capable of providing them efficiently. This principle results in a situation where, as far as pos-
sible, the area which benefits from a government service coincides with the territorial boundaries of
the level of government which provides the service. 
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Relying on this principle, it can generally be concluded that three types of functions are best per-
formed by the Central Government:
1. Provision of public goods and benefits that benefit entire country
2. Income redistribution by social policies
3. Activities that involve spill-over or externalities between local governments
The income redistribution programmes cannot be provided effectively by the local governments be-
cause:
1) Differences between local governments cannot be addressed; 
2) Wealthy households and companies have the incentive to move away from an area where the
local government attempts to undertake income redistribution;
3) Local governments may produce inefficient levels in certain public services if these activities
involve spill-over effects into neighbouring local government areas. 
This means that there basically are two dimensions of the subsidiarity principle which are relevant
to Macedonia: 
1) The size of the local governments; 
2) The competences assigned to the local governments. 
Conducting an analysis of the optimal minimum size of local governments is a difficult task because
one has to measure the output of all services and their benefits. Empirical analyses show that the min-
imum size for an effective municipality might be between 5,000-8,000 citizens. 
In analyzing the economies of scale in the administrative costs of local governments (CEA bulletin
2004 covering 123 local governments at that time), a composite index is calculated from three variables:
1. Number of employees in the administration per inhabitant;
2. Salaries as a percentage of total expenditures;
3. Total municipal budget expenditure per inhabitant.
The calculated administrative cost composite index for each of the 123 local governments in
Macedonia is illustrated in the next figure.
Figure 1.
Economies of scale
of administrative
costs at LGU
in Macedonia
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Overall the figure shows that the greater the number of citizens in a local authority area implies
lower average administrative costs. More specifically, the figure illustrates the increasing economies
of scale of up to 4,000-6,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, the figure shows that the optimal minimal size
of local government in Macedonia is around 6,000 inhabitants if the criterion is the cost of providing
administrative services.
3.2. Competences assigned and expenditure arrangements
Monitoring of the process of decentralisation is conducted by the DWG, which has operated
through ten thematic Sub-Groups. The Sub-Groups have established Action Plans which set out the
risks identified related to the competences that have been transferred to the local level. The general
conclusion is there is a lack of financial resources for the reassigned competencies. For this reason
assessment and cost analysis must be carried out before any further transfers are made. 
One risk identified was the transfer of to little finance from central to local government to provide
the assigned service. This situation could be improved by using the "principle of neutrality of ear-
marked transfer" i.e. that the central government transfers funding to the local government at the same
level that it had previously cost the central government to provide the service. An example of this prob-
lem can be seen in the case of the Ministry of Education and Science where the transfers to local gov-
ernment in 2005 were less than it had spent in the previous fiscal year in providing the now assigned
services    
3.3. Deconcentration and Decentralisation
The Government adopted the Detailed Plan for Transfer of Competences and Resources  in April
2005 in which administrative decentralisation was planned in terms of  transfer of institutions, assets,
employees and documentation. In the Plan, the deconcentrated units of the line ministries were to be
transferred to the local level. 
This, together with the new legislation provided an efficient legal framework for the process of
decentralization. However problems with transfer of staff and resources still remain. These problems
were identified by the Sub-Groups of DWG.
3.4. Overall assessment
Macedonia is no exception in making the mistake of defining the assignments and not calculating
the costs of conducting the competencies assigned to the lower level of government. This is not so
bad provided the central government identifies the under-funding during implementation and then
makes the right decisions to deal with the problems. So far central government does not appear to
have made sufficient effort to resolve the disparity between expenditure and revenue. Therefore, local
governments are forced either to provide services of lower quality or to build up further arrears which
in the long run lead to further under-investment in capital projects.
One interesting example is the Municipality of Veles where an analysis of the school system was
undertaken which resulted in some schools being closed. This is positive because the local govern-
ment was thinking in terms of improved efficiency.
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Given the fact that some LGU in Macedonia are too weak to provide the assigned competencies to
its citizens, it is worthwhile to consider the possibility of an asymmetric assignment of functional
responsibilities. This should be based on firm analysis which in turn would require a strengthening of
the analytical capacity within the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of LGU.
It is difficult to judge whether or not local governments in Macedonia provide a sufficient quality of
service given the environment in which they operate and the short period of review to date.
The financing of services provided by local governments should follow a function, i.e. for each
assigned responsibility there must be revenue assigned as well. If this rule is not followed, then the
level of revenue transfer from central to local government should increase. In order to establish  the
exact current status within the system there must be a strong central ability to monitor and evaluate
the process of decentralization. For that purpose and in accordance with the LFLGU, a Commission
for Monitoring of the Development of the System for Financing has been established. 
Given the discussion above and considering the report of the Commission, one gets the impres-
sion that the report contains little information on the problems encountered and lacks a sufficiently in-
depth analysis of different aspects including:
1. Fiscal gap (needs assessment and fiscal capacity calculation) in providing local services for 
competencies that have been transferred
2. The problems with collection of own revenues by local governments (taxpayers' record transfer, 
development and distribution of tax returns system, etc).
3. Current status and measures to improve the situation regarding arrears
4. Whether earmarked grants are in line with the transferred competencies
5. The tendency to discuss problems at DWG-level without information being transferred to lower
levels afterwards.
6. Financial management issues related to local governments appear to have been addressed.
7. In dealing with the legal framework it appears that a list of problems identified and options for their
resolution is required.
8. To clarify the VAT transfer as a source of stable financing for local government. 
9. The results that have been brought about by the Law on Local Self-Government through the imple-
mentation of fiscal decentralization. The main points being the criteria that were taken into account
and the measurable indicators that were monitored and, in general, how the assessment of a "good
result" was made.
10. The report itself is not fully up-to-date given that it only covers the period up to December 2005.
It was adopted June 2006. 
4. OWN REVENUES
The major change brought about by the new legislation was the assignment of property-related tax
administration to the local level. Moreover, it is not only the revenue from these taxes that is assigned
to local governments but the powers to determine the rate for these taxes and to collect them. By uti-
lizing the possibility of inter-municipal cooperation, local governments can contract joint tax adminis-
tration or one local government can contract out the tax administration to another local government. 
Reportedly, the Public Revenue Office (PRO) has used low-quality data from the cadastre system
for property taxes and lacks a good statistical information system. Moreover, these revenues were not
directly distributed to the local governments where they were collected but rather transferred into the
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treasury system and then distributed among local governments in accordance with a formula within
the so-called "cap system". Clearly, there were no proper incentives for higher collection rates so that
the system can provide a sustainable and predictable revenue stream. 
Table 1. Size of LGU Revenues 
4.1. Structure - types of own revenues
The sources of financing in accordance with the LFLGU identifies both own and shared sources of
financing.
Own Source Revenues:
1. Own Source Revenues 
a. Local taxes (property tax, transfer of property tax, inheritance tax and gift tax)
b. Local fees (communal fees, administrative fees) 
c. Local charges (construction land charges, communal activity charges, spatial planning 
charges)
d. Revenues from property (rents, interests, capital revenues from property sale)
e. Donations
f.  Fines
g. Self contributions 
2. Donations (a contract between the donor and the mayor following approval by the municipal 
council) 
3. Self contributions (a municipal council decision defines all related variables)
Shared revenues:
4. Personal Income Tax (PIT) revenues 
a. 3% of PIT collections from salaries are allocated to the local government where the 
employee resides. The employer is responsible for paying the PIT on behalf of the employee. 
The transfer goes through the treasury system automatically, leaving no room for discretionary 
decisions by the central government. 
b. 100 % PIT collected from artisan activities.
An issue is that the wording of the LFLGU is such that it defines the PIT and VAT transfers3 as own
revenues of local governments. However:
1. The transfers from VAT and PIT generally are not enough to cover the fiscal gap arising from the  
provision of transferred competencies
Total revenues as % of GDP
Bulgaria 2005 6.2
Romania 2003 6.9
Macedonia 2004 2.4
3) More on the VAT transfers see in the section of inter-governmental transfers.
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2. The central government sees the VAT as an unconditional transfer for equalisation purposes even 
though it is defined in the LFLGU as an own revenue for local governments. In contrast ZELS 
views VAT as a kind of unconditional transfer with the comment that central government should 
introduce a new equalisation transfer
4.2. Sufficiency
Common wisdom is that the total revenues of local governments should be enough to cover the
provision of services to citizens and to pay for capital investments. In Macedonia, it is difficult to judge
if the current system is sufficiently well established to provide that given that no comprehensive analy-
sis has been done on costs of providing local services including possible capital needs. Indicative in
this regard are four main issues:
! The centralised system until 2005 has led to under-investment by local government and it should 
be realised that there will be high capital requirements and demand in near and distant future
! The requirements stemming from EU-related legislation on environmental protection, quality and 
standards of services, etc.
! The issue of viable size of local governments
! Expected increase in public awareness and expectation 
These four issues alone should be sufficient to alert the central Government that the current sys-
tem of revenues (own and transfers from the central level) is likely to be insufficient in the mid and
longer terms. This is a further compelling argument for the building of a strong analytical unit within
the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of LGU to develop and utilise an extensive data system. 
4.3. Principles for own revenues
The system of own revenues is now analyzed and some principles are set out:
1. Local government should be allowed to set tax rates.
2. The tax base should be relatively immobile.
3. The taxes raised should be borne primarily by local residents.
The above three principles relate to property taxes and, given that the Law on Property Tax allows
local governments to set tax rates so it can be said that a degree of fiscal autonomy has been secured. 
4. The tax yield should be adequate to meet local public spending requirements.
In Macedonia, the share of own revenue in relation to the total revenue is low and thus there is high
level of fiscal dependency (transfers over total revenues). 
5. The tax yield should be able to grow in response to increases in spending requirements without
altering tax rates.
The need for changes in the tax base and rates can be a result of inflation, growth of the national
economy, population growth or income changes of the population. In Macedonia, the exemptions for
business-related property taxes should be abolished. The central Government should provide other
measures to attract businesses without causing a lower level of tax base for the local governments.
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6. The tax yield should be predictable and not prone to substantial variations from year to year.
The property taxes are easily predictable.
7. The tax should be easy (not overly costly) to administer fairly.
In theory, property taxes are easy to administer once a proper system for registration and monitor-
ing is established. 
8. The tax should be considered fair by taxpayers.
One criterion is whether wealthier taxpayers pay more than poor taxpayers, i.e. equity judged on the
basis of ability to pay. An alternative criterion focuses on whether those taxpayers who derive greater
benefits from public services pay more than persons receiving lower levels of benefits. These two cri-
teria can lead to conflicting conclusions regarding the equity of a local tax instrument. However, it is
too early to debate the fairness of the tax system in Macedonia. 
4.4. Local administration of transferred revenue tasks
The first initiatives taken by the local level to establish its own system of property tax illustrats the
initial, not so positive approach to development of the system. Some local governments announced
the start of their own revenue collection and addressed the taxpayer with the following:
1. An announcement in the old-fashioned way informing citizens that if they do not comply then the 
penalty provisions will become operational
2. No explanation to the citizens how the system would operate
3. No information provided to the citizens
4. Use of outdated data in the system (old title of ownership of the asset)
5. Immediately reaction by Central Government as to what local governments can and cannot do
6. Traditional expectations that everything should be regulated (tendency for overregulation)
Shortcomings observed in the Law on Property Tax are the self-assessment of the value by the
owner, the lack of a well developed database of taxpayers and of a sound system of monitoring.
4.5. Overall assessment
The overall assessment is that the property tax system in Macedonia is performing poorly and is
in serious need of improvement. 
Box 1. Bringing services closer to the citizens or not: Case study on tax administration in LGU Aerodrom.
The LGUs in Macedonia administer property taxes and have the authority to set the tax rate. 
Current situation and procedure for a taxpayer to register new property
(Interview with an accountant from Skopje).
There is an office in LGU Aerodrom related to the tax issues. Should a taxpayer want to register property for the
purpose of property tax, the employees in the office just tell the potential taxpayer that he has to go to the PRO
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What now remain are problems that can be solved easily, for example: 
1. The transfer of the record of property taxpayers from the devolved public revenue offices to the PRO
2. Given the low initial base for the devolved taxes, it will help to increase the property tax collec-
tions in medium term after devolution
3. This initial momentum should not create space for comfort and allow local governments to for-
get the need for further development of  the revenue system in the areas of assessment, audit,  col-
lection and monitoring
4. For local citizens to see progress that is meaningful to them, mayors and council members need
to be able to see beyond the appointment of a primary accountant or the transfer of staff from the PRO
(see the box above)
5. Self assessment of the tax base requires a strong system of monitoring
6. Building database of taxpayers
7. Building efficient tax administration
8. Increase in the tax effort
5. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS
The nature and implications of inter-governmental transfer mechanisms can differ substantially.
This section, as the ones before, presents a framework for evaluating different mechanisms. 
office located in the centre of Skopje to submit the documents for registering a new property. The information
on the registration has to be typed and returned by the PRO office to the LGU Aerodrom from where the tax
return is finally issued. It can be seen from this example that nothing has really changed for a citizen by way of
improved services through the devolution of the tax administration. Devolution has complicated the procedure,
has created confusion and imposed additional transaction costs. The new system is likely to hamper the com-
pliance of potential taxpayers. 
One set of improvements might be:
1. The LGU Aerodrom prints information about property taxpayers and provides proper guidelines for citizens on
the tax procedure. The guidelines should include the new rules  the benefits for the citizen will get.  The guide-
lines should be placed where it is easily available for everyone who is interested.
2. Window halls in the PRO should be marked so that a citizen can see which services are provided at each
window.
3. Information should be also distributed with the local newspaper of the LGU Aerodrom. 
4. The LGU should not require the taxpayer to go to the Skopje PRO office but should accept the taxpayers'
documents.
5. The LGU should collect such documents daily or weekly and forward them to the Skopje PRO (this might be
done via e-mail as well).
6. The LGU should introduce a phone "hot line" for the taxpayers.
7. The LGU should change the working hours to suit the taxpayers and not close the office at 14:00 hours.
The above are the preliminary steps that the LGU can take in order to:
1. Explain the benefits of decentralization
2. Explain why taxes should be paid
3. Bring decentralization closer to its citizens
4. Ensure future participation by citizens 
5. Increase compliance and decrease tax evasion
6. Increase revenue collection
7. Increase the tax effort
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5.1. Structure - types of transfers
The phased approach to fiscal decentralization is closely connected with the inter-governmental
transfers. The process of fiscal decentralization is envisaged by the LFLGU to evolve in two phases
(for details see Annex 3). The first phase started 1 July 2005 with the introduction of the earmarked
grants. The second phase will start upon fulfillment of certain conditions. It is in this phase that block
transfers will start to be distributed. The major principle of this phased approach is to allow a gradual
devolution of responsibilities in line with the demonstration of greater capacity by local governments
to undertake those responsibilities, and to provide an equitable and adequate transfer of funds for an
efficient and ongoing execution of transferred competencies. 
The LFLGU envisions the following channels of transfers from the central Government:
1. VAT revenues (total fund equal to 3 % of the VAT collections in the previous fiscal year). This
unconditional grant will be distributed by a formula with at least 50 % according to population and not
more than 50 % according to other criteria. These other criteria will be stipulated in a methodology to
be defined by the government in agreement with the Commission for Monitoring of the Development
of the Financing System. The proposal for the following fiscal year has to be prepared by 30th June
of the current year. The methodology makes separate provisions for the City of Skopje. 
2. Earmarked transfers of specific grants for operational costs in the areas of education, culture and
social policy. The appropriate ministries and agencies monitor the use of the earmarked funds. 
3. Capital transfers. (In accordance with programs specified by the Government.)
4. Block transfers. (In accordance with article 22 paragraphs 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the Law on LGU); the
appropriate ministries and agencies are responsible for defining the methodology and criteria to be
used in the transfer formula. 
5. Funds received for delegated competencies. In this case the amount of funds is determined by
way of a contract signed by the mayor of the local government and the appropriate ministry respon-
sible for the competency.
The Bureau for Underdeveloped Regions and the off-budget Road Fund components to provide
transfers are still in place. There is an urgent need for evaluation of their cost effectiveness and
whether they should be consolidated in the line with the new draft Law on Balanced Regional
Development.
5.2. Vertical equalisation
Both central and local governments are required to provide public services. It is common to find
that the own-source revenue raising powers of local governments are insufficient to meet the costs of
providing the services they have been assigned. The resulting gap can be filled only by increasing local
revenue raising powers or by increased transfers. For reasons that include concern for macroeconom-
ic stabilization, the lack of appropriate local revenue bases, and the low capacity to administer taxes
locally, transfer mechanisms may be the more suitable way to achieve vertical equalization. 
Related to the salaries for transferred staff, the Government has yet to formulate plans for 2007
about when the LGU will be required to pay the staff directly. 
The procedures for calculating the earmarked grants are related to the budget process and the
budget circular. However, the view of the Ministry of Finance is that even though the procedure for dis-
tributing the amount to the LGU is transparent for the education sector (by students), it is based on
historical costs and there are indications of substantial under-funding. The situation is similar in the
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culture sector. The earmarked grants for the social sector and the kindergartens are found to be suf-
ficient. 
5.3. Horizontal equalisation and equity
There are often wide differences in the ability of local governments to mobilize resources across
localities. If only local taxes were available to finance local services, there would be substantial inter-
jurisdictional differences in the quantity and quality of public services. Inter-governmental transfers
can be used to help equalize those differences. The conflicting views concerning the VAT transfer were
discussed earlier. ZELS and the Government should first agree if this is an equalization fund, and, if it
is, then this should be stated clearly in the LFLGU. It then needs to be decided how to proceed with
the two steps in its implementation: 
1) The estimation of the total pool; 
2) The formula. 
In this regard, it is strongly recommended to include a formula in the law for calculation of fiscal
capacity of local governments. 
The equity criterion relates directly to the issue of horizontal equalization. The criterion is complex
since it commonly involves a combination of factors that are not easily measured. Transfer systems
should distribute resources between local governments in a manner that accounts for differences both
in the expenditure needs (providing more to those with greater need where the need factor includes
variations in the unit cost of producing public services) and in the fiscal capacity (providing less to
those with greater capacity). Specifically, it should attempt to decrease or equalize these differences. 
5.4. Revenue adequacy and growth
The objective of revenue adequacy and growth is obviously related to the ability of a transfer sys-
tem to meet local spending needs, both at present and as those needs increase in the future. 
5.5. Predictability, simplicity and transparency
The desires for predictability, transparency, and simplicity are closely intertwined. Fiscal planning
requires there is a reasonable degree of certainty associated with the flow of resources from the cen-
tre, including its timing. This means that it is desirable for local governments to have a general idea of
how much money they are likely to receive from their various sources of revenue when they begin the
planning and budgeting process for the following year. Similarly, it is important that the transfers allo-
cated to localities actually are distributed on a timely basis for use at the local level. 
Local officials should be able to ascertain how their share of a particular transfer was determined.
This understanding is facilitated by use of relatively simple but explicit formulas. This requires that the
requisite data is available to be used in a formula.
5.6. Allocative efficiency
Allocative efficiency means that the resources are allocated to those services that are most need-
ed at the local level. Grant systems should not distort local fiscal choices. This means that grants
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should not influence how local governments allocate their resources across sectors or in terms of its
choice of how to combine factors of production. For example, a transfer limited to investment in
rebuilding roads can discourage local governments from maintenance of existing roads. In the pres-
ence of jurisdictional spill-over these guidelines will need to be modified in order to achieve an effi-
cient allocation of resources from the national level.
5.7. Overall assessment
Local governments are likely to view the transfers as substitutes for their own resources and to
decrease their efforts at raising local revenues. Also, since the existing public infrastructure is a part
of the resources that must be "managed" by local governments, grant systems can have an adverse
effect on the willingness of local governments to maintain such infrastructure. In Macedonia, the sys-
tem of capping own revenues provided no incentives for greater fiscal efforts and public infrastructure
was maintained by transfers from the line ministries and in the case of the communal services, from
user charges. The cap system had adverse effect on the fiscal effort, the transfers from the line min-
istries were not transparent and the communal services continue to face revenue collection problems.
This is a difficult situation and the new system which abolishes the old cap system for own revenues
and introduces earmarked grants, is expected to improve the situation. 
As for the grants, if they are to be systematically distributed to local governments, several policy
decisions need to be made. These include: 
! determination of the grant pool, i.e. how much will be available to be distributed to local 
councils; 
! the method used to allocate that pool across all eligible local governments 
! the degree of restrictions associated with how the grant funds can be spent by local 
governments.
In the next table, the typology of grants is utilized to discuss the Macedonian context for PIT and
VAT transfers. 
Table 2. Typology of grant programs
Source: Bahl & Linn 1992.
The advantage of A-type is because it is a pure shared tax, it is certain and it simplifies the fiscal
planning of the local governments. Further, it is not conditional and it can increase the fiscal autono-
my. Sharing gives the local governments an income and inflation elastic tax base. The disadvantage
is that it is an inflexible solution because it is difficult to change the percentages once they have been
established, and thus the vertical balance. This might be important in the Macedonian context with its
Method of determining the total divisible pool
Methods of allocating the divisible pool Law decision
among local governments Sharing (Ad hoc decision) Reimbursement
Origin of collection A N/A N/A
Formula B F N/A
Total or partial reimbursement C G K
Ad hoc D H N/A
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high economic uncertainty (prices of energy, weak economy, high unemployment etc). Another dis-
advantage is that the A-type does not provide equalization and in principle increases inequality. All in
all, PIT-sharing is beneficial given the current level of tax administrative capacity at local level. The per-
centages can and should be revised after a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal gap and vertical
imbalance is done. Higher percentages can provide greater incentives for compliance by the taxpay-
ers and to decrease tax evasion if the taxpayers can consider it as "own".
The PIT tax, even though considered as an own tax for the local governments, is actually a sharing
type-A because:
1) The local governments have no control over determination of the rate and base; 
2) The allocation is based on the origin of collection. 
As for the VAT grants, the total divisible pool is shared and the allocation is by formula and thus it
is a B-type grant. The VAT formula-based grant is transparent but the lack of timely and adequate data
to be included in the allocation formula is a serious deficiency.
The way the formula is stated in the law at present makes it difficult to see what the Central
Government is trying to achieve. Is it to equalize the fiscal capacity, to reduce the disparities in pro-
viding public services or to encourage a local government to mobilize its own resources? This confu-
sion should be resolved as soon as possible. Also, the number of population requirements within the
law for the VAT distribution formula (at least 50 % of the weight) probably shows the weakness of the
state statistical system and lack of data (the population data being most credible). 
Box 2. Examples of intergovernmental transfers based on non transparency, often according to the gov-
ernment majority at the central level, the political party to which a mayor belongs and to different regional-
ly based lobby groups. 
The aim of this box is to present some negative practices that might impact on the credit rating of a LGU.
The bases for intergovernmental transfers are determined in the laws: the Law on the Government of the
Republic of Macedonia (Official Gazette of the RM No 12/03, 55/03); the Law on Execution of Budget of the
Republic of Macedonia (adopted each year and for 2006 published in the Official Gazette of the RM as No
120/05), the Law on Public Roads (Official Gazette of the RM No 26/96, 40/99, 96/00, 29/02 and 68/04); the Law
on Environment (Official Gazette of the RM No 53/05, 81/05); Law on Organization and Operation of the State
Administration Bodies (Official Gazette of the RM No.58/00); Law on Stimulation of the Development of the
Economically Underdeveloped Regions (Official Gazette of the RM No. 2/94 and 39/99); the Law on Limiting the
Original Revenues for Financing the Public Needs (adopted every year); the Law on Financing  the LGU and other
bylaw acts.
Examples:
1. According to the Decision for distribution of assets for the building of water supply and drainage systems
in Republic of Macedonia in 2006, the Government (Ministry of Transport and Communications) distributed
around 2 million euros allocated as capital subsidies to the LGU, under program 35 - water supply system at LGU.
The assets were distributed unfairly and opaquely, without any agreed criteria and favouring municipalities whose
mayors are a member of one of the governing parties at central level. The mayors and ZELS have reacted to this
kind of distribution.
2. According to the Law on Public Roads, based on the Annual program for building, reconstruction, mainte-
nance and protection of the national and regional roads in the Republic of Macedonia, the municipalities and the
City of Skopje, were provided with around 8 million euros as capital transfers for local roads and streets for 2006.
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Source: Interview with a Mayor from Macedonia and active member of ZELS bodies. 
6. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
The financial management at LGU level is regulated primarily by the LFLGU, the Law on Budgets,
the Law on Budget Accounting and Budgetary Beneficiaries, and Law on Public Procurement. 
In the latest regulations on the criteria for the distribution of assets, the criteria were changed. Whereas in previ-
ous years the main criteria were the number of registered motor vehicles, fuel consumption and the length of the
local roads and streets, the latest criteria introduced were the number of citizens and the municipality area. This
resulted in significant redistribution of the assets with drastic reductions in the case of some municipalities. This
resulted in serious problems brought about by the sudden change in the system. Such problems include dam-
aged road networks, the rapid deterioration of the road network, and municipalities being unable to get other
resources for maintenance. Another problem is the inadequate total sum of assets for distribution. The total sum
instead of being increased in line with increased   revenue from excise duties on oil derivates, vehicle registra-
tion tax and motorway tax, has remained the same or has actually decreased.
3. In 2006 only around 1 million euros were allocated for financing projects based on the Program for invest-
ment in the environment for 2006. Although the environment should be the top priority, the Republic of Macedonia
sets only symbolic sums for this purpose. A large amount of finance is needed to provide for the acceptance and
treatment of solid waste and the building of drainage and collector networks and waste water treatment plants.
4. Typical was the improper distribution of part of the assets from the privatization of the Macedonian
Telecommunications that was made by the Government of Republic of Macedonia in April 2001. In this case some
of the municipalities were granted over 5,000,000 euros, and in other municipalities, where the mayor was from
the opposition parties, no grant was made.
5. A similar case was the distribution of the assets from the "Program for granting finances for investment
projects in the economic and non-economic infrastructure and for equity investment in financing individual invest-
ment projects in the economy". These assets were distributed through the Bureau for Economically
Underdeveloped Regions which is a part of the Ministry of LSG. The decisions made were opaque and greatly
influenced by the political elites and lobby groups.
6. Here are some more examples of the unfair treatment of LGU by the Government of Republic of Macedonia.
a) The Government of Republic of Macedonia made reforms to ARM for it to adjust to the standards of NATO.
Many of the assets that were used by the army, eg barracks, and living quarters of ARM, were given to a few
municipalities without any compensation and part of that property was sold without any explanation. In addition,
the privileged municipalities gained very valuable property without compensation, sometimes to the extent of mil-
lions of euros even though these were built by the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.
b) The Government of Republic of Macedonia without any public procedure made decisions on contracts giv-
ing motor vehicles to some municipalities before the end of the government mandate in August 2006.  The munic-
ipalities involved included Gostivar, Cair, Oslomej and Kumanovo. This brought these municipalities into a privi-
leged position compared with the rest of the municipalities.
c) Typical is the disrespect of articles in the Law on financing LGU for capital subsidies. The Law defines cap-
ital subsidies as a subsidies aimed at financing the municipality projects that require capital investments. Such
subsidies are used according to the program determined by the Government based on proposals made by the
authorized ministries and funds. In addition, priority should be those projects that have fully planned financial
assets.
d) The inconsistency of the Government and disrespect for the articles is evident because the Government has
not met the deadlines and has not decentralized capital investments in the education sector. There is no logical
explanation for this, other than the mistrust of the LGU and the need for the Ministry of Education to maintain con-
trol.  Instead the Government has managed the expenditure by inviting tenders and issuing contracts at a state
level.
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6.1. Budgeting
The LFLGU outlines a modern type of LGU budget by separating capital and operational budget
("general budget" and "special budget"). However, the building of performance budgeting is far away
even though piloting of performance measurement in transferred competencies was introduced in
some LGUs  although this activity was mainly donor driven. 
The LGU budget for each year is passed by the Council of the municipality, pursuant to a proposal
from the Mayor, not later than 31st December of the preceding year. If the Municipal Council fails to
pass the Budget for any reason whatsoever during this predetermined period of time, the Council is
obliged to pass a decision on temporary financing - including a financial plan for implementing tem-
porary financing for the first quarter of the coming year. The Municipal Budget is prepared in accor-
dance with the Law on Budgets and guidelines drafted by the Minister of Finance. The Budget ought
to be balanced, meaning that it cannot have a budgetary deficit. Within fifteen days of the Budget being
approved, the municipality is obliged to submit it to the Ministry of Finance so that it may be exam-
ined in light of the country's overall public expenditures. In approving the Budget, a municipality must
pass a decision to implement that Budget. It is important to emphasize that finances must be spent
for specific purposes and in accordance with the amounts determined in the Budget. The budgeting
process should start no later than 30th September each year. By this date, the Minister of Finance
should have prepared and submitted a budgetary circular to inform the municipalities of all economic
indicators, detailing the main directions for preparing the Budget, describing the resources that are to
be transferred from the national budget to the municipality, and to inform the municipality about vari-
ous other possible sources of income. Budgeting proceeds in phases and in terms set in a budgetary
calendar, as approved by the Municipal Council. The Mayor provides the budget beneficiaries with
directions for the preparation of the Municipal Budget. After preparing their plans, beneficiaries should
submit their financial plans to the Mayor, who then submits the budget proposal to the Municipal
Council.
It is encouraging that in Macedonia there are elements of citizen participation related to the budget
process in some LGU. The assessment by the Ministry of Finance is that this is on the right track but
what should be further developed is a strong civil sector so that such initiatives are not only encour-
aged by the government (at both levels) but also by the citizens. 
The benefits of citizen participation during the budget process can best be achieved if preliminary
information on the budget is available to all interested parties, alongside a public appeal procedure
wherein all interested individuals can submit their opinions. Additionally, these benefits can be
achieved through organizing public forums to discuss the draft budget - in urban communities,
amongst associations of citizens, within educational and social welfare institutions, and through cul-
tural and sports institutions, etc. Once public discussions have been conducted, and useful propos-
als incorporated into the text of the budget proposal, it is submitted to the Council. If it happens dur-
ing the fiscal year that revenues and expenditures are not in accordance with the budget plan, the
Mayor may propose a re-balancing of the budget to the Municipal Council, whereby amendments and
changes to it can be made.
As part of the budget execution it is advanced management to compare the actual with the budget-
ed expenditures and to calculate the variances through the use of other analytical techniques for the
purpose of budget control. The best method is to have a transparent procedure for revenue projection.
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The revenues should be tracked by budget source and compared with the projected income. This is
important as politicians may overestimate when faced with hard decisions regarding spending. 
6.2. Accounting
The LGU and the public services keep accounting records in accordance with the Law on Budget
Accounting and Budgetary Beneficiaries, consistent with generally accepted accounting principles,
practices and standards, and in keeping with international accounting standards for the public sector.
The Mayor places an accountant in charge (he or she must be a graduate of economics with at least
five years of working experience in the field of financing) who, alongside the Mayor is responsible for
the legality of municipal accounting.
Still the LGU are using cash accounting with all its limitations (apart for its simplicity) such as not
adequately recording the liabilities, future services, recognition of services and goods received which
are not yet paid. 
6.3. Treasury management
There is a single treasury system, so that, in principle, the government knows at all times the aggre-
gate amount of resources available in the Treasury. The Ministry of Finance also has developed a man-
ual on treasury management for the LGU. This means that, although individual local governments
maintain records of their own finances, their accounts are actually under the control of the central gov-
ernment. This, in turn, can constrain local fiscal flexibility. 
6.4. Reporting
The LGU in accordance with the LFLGU prepare internal financial reports on a monthly basis and pre-
pare quarterly reports to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry has prepared guidelines for the LGU on
how to report, including arrears, borrowing, financial planning, etc. However, the quarterly reports are
to be revised due to the daily input that the Treasury in the Ministry is now receiving on municipal budg-
ets. Our recommendation is that the debt and guarantees report and the quarterly plan for the budget
execution should remain and that all other reports are eliminated. This will reduce the workload of the
municipality and will help Ministry to introduce discipline on regular and accurate reporting.
This external reporting seems to be well regulated (around 50 out of 84 LGU are reporting regular-
ly which is considered a success by the Ministry of Finance and as a good start) but the internal
reporting is not yet strong. The most important thing for the reporting is to be accurate and timely, so
to provide the required information and to function as a management tool. However, one must also
have in mind that reporting should assist in fulfilling the LGU duty to be publicly accountable. This
reporting should enable users to access that accountability, to evaluate the operating results and to
assess the level of services that can be provided by the LGU.. 
6.5. Internal audit
Internal Audit is an assurance function that primarily provides an independent and objective opin-
ion to the organization of the degree to which the internal control environment supports the achieve-
ment of its objectives. Internal audit also seeks to help line management improve the internal control
environment in an organization. 
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The LGU are obliged to establish an internal auditing system and procedures consistent with inter-
national standards for the performance of a professional audit acceptable to the Ministry of Finance.
The internal auditor is appointed by the Municipal Council upon a proposal from the Mayor. The inter-
nal auditor has an independent function and answers both to the Mayor and the Council. The external
audit of financial accounts is carried out by the State Auditing Service. The Mayor has the responsi-
bility to provide the State Auditing Service with a report on the implementation of the Budget, in addi-
tion to a final accounting report, within 30 days of their completion.
6.7. Overall assessment
The development of a modern financial management system at LGU level is something new in
Macedonia. Given the good progress made in terms of preparing consolidated budgets by the LGU
and in some elements of the budget planning and reporting, overall progress to date can be consid-
ered as a success. This initial success is mostly because of the effort from the central level (Ministry
of Finance) in preparing guidelines and providing training for the LGU. The Ministry of Finance also
considers that donors have been   helpful in this regard. Examples of instruments developed by the
Ministry are modules for budgeting, supplementary budgeting, treasury plans and financial planning. 
However, there are objective reasons (given the scale of the reforms) for possible concern as the
staff at LGU level needs further capacity building. Of particular importance is the building of planning
capacity especially related to decreasing the systematic error between the planned and realized budg-
et. There are also "ethnic" issues as some LGU are requesting tax returns in two languages but this
will require additional money, more staff and time for development. 
In Macedonia, there is neither a law nor a separate regulation on LGU insolvency but LGU financial
instability is defined within the LFLGU. Financial instability in a municipality occurs if the state auditor
determines that there have been major irregularities in financial undertakings. Financial instability also
occurs if the municipality account has been blocked for 30 consecutive days or if there have been 45
days with interruptions occurring in a period of 60 days. Finally financial instability occurs in cases
where the municipality fails to pay its debt within 90 days of its due date or if its approved loans lim-
its are exceeded . In these circumstances, a special committee must be established to prepare a plan
of action to set measures for overcoming the financial instability.
The legal framework for the rights and obligations of participants involved in a process of public
procurement is set in the Law on Public Procurement. An LGU is obliged to provide all bidders with
an equal and non-discriminatory position in public procurement processes, with fair competition,
transparency and exposure to public scrutiny. 
7. BORROWING AT LGU LEVEL
7.1. Sources of financing of infrastructure projects
In Macedonia the 2002 Law on LGU designated some responsibilities of LGUs. These functions
remain in the central government domain, until the respective line ministries develop sectoral laws
spelling out the process of devolution of a particular function. Nowadays, since the line ministries have
completed the devolution of designated functions to the local level, local government responsibilities
are beyond the "municipal housekeeping," that is, they have responsibilities which require very sub-
stantial capital investments. 
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The underlying purpose of the development  of a municipal credit market is to increase the volume
of local capital investment to support essential municipal services. Well-designed investment and bor-
rowing plans often can provide immediate finance the construction of infrastructure facilities that are
needed and then to repay the debt from the future earnings of the facilities themselves, through user
charges or through cost savings in service operations.
The next table illustrates the pros and cons of different sources of financing LGU projects. 
Table 3. Sources of financing of infrastructure projects 
Source: Felix Ejgel from S&P. Slight adaption by the author. 
The next table illustrates the pros and cons for allowing LGU borrowing 
Table 4. Pros and Cons for LGU borrowing 
Source Pros Cons
Own resources Cheap Less predictable, rarely sufficient
Grants from EU and central governments Cheap Restriction on the use of funds, slow 
pace of approval, strict control
MFO loans Long-term, grace periods, amortizing Foreign currency risk, restrictions on the 
repayment use of funds
Domestic bank loans Local currency Short-term, restricted capacity
Bonds Diversity of investors, liquidity, Expensive depending on size,
depth of markets bullet repayments
Own sources or borrowings of enterprises No direct costs Contingent liabilities and more expensive 
PFI/PPP deals No direct costs, more effective private Long-term agreement with
sector provision of services concessionaires, off-balance sheet risks
Investment banks and funds for LGU Deposit risk attenuation, lower interest rate,
possibility of contributing to capitalization
of the bank, LGU could provide guarantee
with their current revenues as well, the
Bank can provide consulting services to
the LGU as an auxiliary service
Pros
1. Inter-temporal equity, meaning that with the borrowing we
overcome the problem of inequitable burden costs among tax-
payers i.e. the borrowing promotes intergenerational equity by
having the generation of citizens that benefits from capital
facility's services pay for its construction;
2. Optimal allocation of resources, meaning that payments
from current users are partially used to repay the loan
because by financing a project through loan or through issuing
bonds most users will pay for the benefits either through local
taxes or directly through user charges; 
Cons
1. The microeconomic con is in the potential indebtedness
that may lead in default of repayment of the loan and
decreasing the level of quality of provision of public services; 
2. The macroeconomic con is that the LGU debt is added to
the overall national public debt that might become unsustain-
able; 
3. The special danger might come from borrowing for cover-
ing current operating expenses and possible cash flow prob-
lems. This type of borrowing can lead to rolling over loans;
4. Borrowing can create a fiscal illusion that the voters/tax-
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Source: Swianiewicz 2004. 
7.2. Regulations on LGU borrowing in Europe
Within perfect capital market conditions, the market itself automatically regulates the financial dis-
cipline. If the LGU debt becomes relatively high, high interest rates will sanction such behavior by
requiring a higher risk premium. However, the LGU market for borrowing is imperfect because of:
1. Asymmetric information i.e. the lenders do not have all the creditworthiness related information
about the LGU;
2. Moral hazard problems i.e. the market expects that the LGU cannot go bankrupt and the central
government will bailout the LGU.
3. Benefits from accelerated local development are higher than
the cost of borrowing. For example if a piece of land of inter-
est to investors have no good access to a road the LGU can
decide to borrow, to build the road and sale the land benefiting
from higher price of the land or higher rent for it. Here are also
other positive effects like higher employment, more tax rev-
enues, attracting other potential investors etc.;
4. Reduction of operational costs. This pro has the same logic
as the third one. Namely, if the LGU wants to improve the con-
dition with the public transportation by replacing old busses it
can do this either by replacing the buses one by one using the
current surplus from the budget or it can borrow and replace
more buses at once. The multiple positive effect is higher with
the second public choice because there are positive externali-
ties for the environment, health of citizens from lower level of
pollution, higher reliability of the vehicles, financial savings in
the cost of maintenance of the buses etc.;
5. There is a tendency that longer projects cost more. If the
projects are financed from the current revenues it will delay
the completion of the project which might lead to higher fixed
costs due to longer period of time for completing the project;
6. Access to grant from EU and other development funds but
the LGU will be required to participate in a matching funds
scheme and/or to cover all the costs of the project and than to
claim reimbursement after completion of the project;
7. Debt finance typically has a positive effect on municipal
planning and budgeting, financial management, capital invest-
ment planning, project management etc;
8. Borrowing allows a LGU to carry out a more ambitious cap-
ital program than otherwise would be possible.
h) Public illumination;
i) Sanitation;
j) Primary social assistance services for child
protection and for the elderly;
payers are over-demanding the public services sponsored by
borrowing and not by their tax effort;
5. Possible crowding out effect to potential private investors
since the LGU is more attractive to lend to;
6. The borrowing by the LGU can cause an upward pressure
of the interest rates;
7. The budget deficits at LGU can cause rising of inflation and
thus, increase of cost of capital i.e. interest rates;
8. Political cycle driven borrowing in order to please the elec-
torate.
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Thus, it is more efficient to have well designed system for regulation of LGU borrowing. The prac-
tice in different countries is illustrated in the Tables below.
Table 5. LGU borrowing regulations in Western Europe countries
Source: Swianiewicz 2004. 
Norway
Denmark, UK, France, Spain
Switzerland
Denmark
UK
Germany
Switzerland
France
Italy
Spain
If the LGU presents an unbalanced current budget it will not
receive approval from the state regional commissioner. If a
deficit occurs, Norwegian LGU are required to repaid it within
two years.
There is no approval for the budget but there is compulsory
external audit. If a current deficit occurs it has to be paid
within the current fiscal year. Spain does not separate current
from capital budget.   
If deficit occurs and the LGU has done nothing to avoid it, the
canton may impose compulsory increase in the LGU tax rate.
Also, the tax rate increase can be automatic if the deficit is
more than 3 % of the budget.
Based on borrowing control. Borrowing is prohibited but LGU
can receive permission to borrow for investments in public
utilities and/or in priority areas identified by the central gov-
ernment. Another waiver to the prohibition is the discretionary
permission for which the government announces an upper
limit each year. In this way the central government controls
the behavior of the LGU. 
Based on borrowing control. Each LGU receives an individual
borrowing limit.  
Based on four year financial plan prepared by the interested
for borrowing LGU. 
Different across cantons. At one canton if a project cannot be
covered by annual budget it must go to local referendum. 
Based on control of the level of indebtedness. The prefect
checks the level of LGU each year and if it is not in accor-
dance with the law the case is passed to the Regional Audit
Chamber-RAC. The current budget has to be higher than the
annual debt repayment. If the deficit exceeds 5 or 10 % of the
annual budget (depending on the size of the LGU) the RAC
proposes appropriate fiscal measures.  
Based on borrowing control. Interest and capital payments
cannot exceed 25 % of the current revenues. 
Based on borrowing control. Central government and regions
decide together about the annual limits of deficit and debt
level. No individual limits to LGU.
BORROWING FOR CURRENT EXPENDITURES
BORROWING FOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
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Table 6. LGU borrowing regulations in newly EU countries
Source: Caluseru and Johnson (2005, p.68)
Table 7. LGU borrowing regulations in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Romania
Macedonia Romania Bulgaria
For capital or operating Both Both For investments only
purposes?
Limit of overall debt The total amount of short-term loans during The annual debt representing the due No limits on the size of the
the current fiscal year shall not exceed 20% installments deriving from contracted outstanding debt of local
of realized total revenues of the current-ope- loans shall not exceed 30 % of the total governments
rative budget of the Municipality in the current revenues of the local budget.
preceding fiscal year. About the short term borrowing, the
The total amount of annual repayment of cash flow deficit shall not exceed 5 %
long-term loans shall not exceed 15% of of the LGU budgeted revenues including
realized total revenues of the current-opera- taxes, fees, contributions, other
tive budget of the LGU in the preceding payments, other income and allocated
fiscal year. shares from the income tax.
The total amount of the undue long term
debt of the LGU, including the issued
guarantees, shall not exceed the amount
of the total revenues of the
current-operative budget of the LGU in
the preceding year.
Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Poland Lithuania Slovakia
For capital or Both Long-term - for Both Both Both For investments 
operating investments only, only.
purposes? but no separation
of capital budget.
Limit of overall No limit 60% of net revenues No limit 60% of total Borrowing cannot No limits but from
debt (without state revenues exceed 10% of total 2005 - 60% of cur-
earmarked grants) revenue in approved rent revenues; state 
budget, sublimate or supported loans
5% for short-term not included
loans
Limit of debt No limit 20% of net revenues Adjusted current 15% of total 10% of total No limits, but from
service own revenues net revenues revenue excluding 2005 - 25% of
of short term earmarked grants revenues; state
commitments and support loans not 
liabilities included
Sanctions for not Not applicable Since 2003 - Effectively no Effectively no, but Effectively no Not applicable
following possibility to hold ex-ante control of
state fund transfers Regional Audit
Offices
Any other Forecast balance Presentation of "Core properties" Limits applying Minister of Finance Ministry of Finance
conditions sheet for 2-5 years; development plan; cannot be used as when public debt can impose lower ex-ante approval
internal audit; with guarantees by local collateral exceeds 50% GDP borrowing ceiling of credits over
some exceptions - govt. prohibited for individual muni- (approx.) 2 mln
guarantees by local cipalities based on USD is required
govt. prohibited budget performance.
Comments Limits were Debt of municipal Debt of municipal Debt of municipal Long- term credits Guarantees by local
introduced for short companies is not companies not companies is not must be approved governments
periods only no included in the limits included in the included in the limits by loan commission prohibited
larger than 15% of limits (unless formal (unless formal of the MOE
budget revenues guarantees exist) guarantees exist)
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Any other conditions The Municipality may borrow from abroad LGU must have approval of a 25% of own revenues and
only after an approval by the Government of Commission if maximum amount equalizing grants
the Republic of Macedonia, under an opinion (periodically updated) will be exceeded.
of the Ministry of finance. By the 15th of every month, borrowers
The domestic borrowings shall be in of funding in outstanding local public
domestic currency. debt, including guarantor administrative
The municipality shall not be allowed to units, shall report information on the
mortgage municipal property that serves for status of borrowing in the previous
realizing activities of public interest prescribed month, structured as required by
by law. LGU Regularly submits positively MPF-developed norms.
assessed financial reports during a period of
at least 24 months since implementation of
the Law on financing the Local self govern-
ments and has no arrears to creditors in the
last 2 years since implementation of the Law
on financing the Local self governments
(before these deadlines the Municipality can
borrow only after an approval by the Govern-
ment and an consent by the Ministry for a bor-
wing from international financing institutions.
Sanctions for not From the penalty provisions: the municipality Crimes: expenditure commitment, authorization If not followed than the
following if has incurred debts abroad, without previous and payment beyond the ceilings approved in municipality has no right to
consent of the Government, puts an asset of the budgets, expenditure commitments in the incur new debt or
the municipality, which is used for the budgets beyond the approved budget credit, guarantees
activities of the municipality of public interest, use of local public borrowing proceeds for
under mortgage, uses the means from the other than the approved purposes, use of
short-term loan for payment of penalties and erroneous data in preparing the background
penalty interests, surpasses the limitation of documentation for authorization to borrow/
20% from the realized total revenues of the guarantee borrowing, perform any finance
current and operative budget of the munici- involving attributions during management of
pality in the previous fiscal year, according to the state of insolvency.
a total short-term incurring debt during the Offences are introduced for noncompliance.
fiscal year, payment of the long-term loan is
not conducted in equal or decreasing
annuities, the municipality surpasses the
limitation of 15% of the total revenues of the
current and operative budget of the munici-
pality in the previous fiscal year for the total
annual payment of the long-term loan, does
not comply with the conditions for the amount
of the total not received long-term loan, fails
to submit the Loan Contract and compensa-
tion plan, within ten working days, to the
Ministry of Finance, fails to inform the
Ministry of Finance for each paid installment,
within a period of ten working days;
Any other conditions The municipality shall submit the Loan LGU must have approval of a Commission if The nominal value of the
Agreement and the Terms of Redemption to maximum amount (periodically updated) will municipal guarantees
the Ministry of Finance within 10 days of the be exceeded.  By the 15th of every month, limited to 5% of own
day the Agreement has been signed. The borrowers of funding in outstanding local revenues and equalizing
Municipality shall inform the Ministry of Finan- public debt, including guarantor administrative grants. Limit on general
ce about every installment payment regarding units, shall report information on the status of government debt of 60%
the debt within 10 working days. The munici- borrowing in the previous month, structured of GDP.
pality shall not be allowed to mortgage muni- as required by MPF-developed norms.
cipal property that serves for realizing activi-
ties of public interest prescribed by law. LGU
Regularly submits positively assessed
financial reports during a period of at least
24 months and has no arrears to creditors in
the last 2 years.
Source: Adopted from the regulations of the proper countries. 
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As of May 2004, the total outstanding LGU debt in Macedonia is estimated at around 47 millions
of euro or 1.4 % of the Macedonian GDP. This compares with the average of 5.6 % in the original 15
EU member states (more in Schlumberger Sema 2004). The structure of local debt in Macedonia is
as illustrated in the next table. It should be noted that these figures are arrears and not traditional debt
in their nature. However, the LFLGU states in article 18 that all arrears which have been due for more
than 90 days will be counted as debt. The experience shows that if the LGUs put aside 15% from the
current-operating revenues for payment of their debts, 24 LGU (out of 84) will need more than 7 years
to pay their debt and 10 municipalities will need more than 10 years.
Table 8. LSG debt structure
in Macedonia in 2004
Source: Schlumberger Sema (2004).
A similar pattern of arrears as an issue for budget execution is also observed in Romania i.e. around
70-80 % of the arrears are actually payment due to suppliers. 
Most of the aggregate amount of debt (arrears) in Macedonia is concentrated in just ten LGU (72
% of the total debt). As can be seen from the table, local debt is dominated by arrears to suppliers.
Arrears represent a major problem and article 45 of the LFLGU requires that by the end of 2004, each
LGU should provide a plan for solving the outstanding debt that was accumulated prior to 31st of
December 2001. However, it appears that no effective resolution is available, although the problem is
being considered by the government under the coordination of the Ministry of Finance.  
The arrears will have a powerful impact on the creditworthiness of the Macedonian LGU and their
capacity to use credit instruments in their capital programs because this is a form of hidden operat-
ing deficit. 
According to the Ministry of Finance, since the start of decentralization, the LGU are gradually
decreasing the amount of arrears (Euro 24 millions at the end of 2005). 29 out of 84 LGU in this peri-
od have reduced their stock of debt (arrears), one LGU has increased its debt and the remaining 55
have not progressed in resolving this problem.
Recently a new Department for Debt Management (DDM) was established within the Ministry of
finance The DDM is too remote to perceive the existing debt of the LGU as part of their competency,
even though people from the budget department have asked for that.  The main problem remains the
gathering of the quarterly reports from all Municipalities by the Budget Department. The processing
and reporting of the municipal real debt (meaning loans and securities) is a responsibility of the DDM
and does not include the arrears. The DDM, according to the Law on public debt, has to agree to all
initiatives for borrowing by public institutions (including the municipalities) bearing in mind the debt
management strategy, annual borrowing limits and debt sustainability. Regarding agreement for bor-
rowing by the Municipalities, coordination with the Budget Department is carried out.  Sensitive to IMF
cautiousness on level debt, the central Government might tend to become too demanding in seeking
information from the LGUs.  
Debt structure
Arrears toward construction enterprises 79 %
Restitution liabilities 9 %
Arrears toward Electric Power Company-ESM 7 %
Arrears upon salaries 2 %
Other current liabilities 3 %
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Table 9. Stock of public debt of the Republic of Macedonia (GFS methodology)
(in millions of EUR) 2005 30/06/2006 31/07/2006 31/08/2006
EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT* 1,441.16 1,219.60 1,216.36 1,214.08
General Government Debt 1,245.35 1,037.70 1,030.65 1,030.98
Central Government (consolidated) 1,245.35 1,037.70 1,030.65 1,030.98
Central Government 1207.95 999.50 992.60 990.64
Public Funds 37.40 38.20 38.05 40.34
Municipalities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Central Bank 52.66 47.82 47.45 47.03
Public enterprises 143.15 134.08 138.26 136.07
DOMESTIC PUBLIC DEBT 750.39 753.30 773.16 792.52
General Government Debt 603.66 641.18 656.21 669.48
Central Government Debt 603.46 640.98 656.01 669.28
Structural bonds 533.50 512.00 511.07 510.85
Stopanska Bank Rehabilitation Bond 26.61 21.29 21.29 21.29
Small Bond 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bond for selective credits 16.98 16.98 16.99 16.99
Stopanska Bank Privatization Bond 77.24 72.95 72.95 72.95
Bond for old foreign exchange savings 306.50 280.90 280.42 280.42
Denationalisation Bond (I, II, III,  IV and V issue) 106.16 119.87 119.42 119.21
Continuous Government Securities 69.96 128.98 144.94 158.43
o.w.  Treasury bills for monetary purposes 0.00 43.64 64.50 80.84
Municipalities 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Central Bank 146.74 110.59 115.37 121.41
Public enterprises** N/A 1.53 1.59 1.63
TOTAL PUBLIC DEBT-GFS 2,191.55 1,972.90 1,989.52 2,006.60
GDP*** 4,522.00 4,840.10 4,840.10 4,840.10
Average export*** 1,624.00 1,858.14 1,858.14 1,858.14
External public debt as % of the  public debt 65.76 61.82 61.14 60.50
Domestic public debt as % of the  public debt 34.24 38.18 38.86 39.50
Public debt as % of average GDP 48.46 40.76 41.10 41.46
Public debt as % of average export 134.95 106.18 107.07 107.99
General Government Debt-GFS 1,849.01 1,678.88 1,686.86 1,700.46
External debt of the General Government as % 67.35 61.81 61.10 60.63
of the  General Government Debt
Domestic debt of the General Government  as % 32.65 38.19 38.90 39.37
of the General Government Debt
General Government debt as % of the average GDP 40.89 34.69 34.85 35.13
General Government debt as % of the average export 113.86 90.35 90.78 91.51
Public debt calculated on the basis of the
Public Debt law**** 1,992.16 1,770.85 1,762.21 1,757.32
External public debt as % of the public debt 69.70 66.17 66.33 66.41
Domestic public debt as % of the  public debt 30.30 33.83 33.67 33.59
Public debt as % of average GDP 44.05 36.59 36.41 36.31 
Public debt as % of average export 122.67 95.30 94.84 94.57
* Source: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia/Ministry of Finance. Author's adoption.
** Beginning April 2006 public enterprises started submitting to the Ministry of Finance  reports on the stock of debt  (according to 
the Public Debt Law).
*** Source: IMF tables (data for 2005 and 2006 are revised)
****Total public debt excluding the debt of the monetary authority (IMF loans; CB bills and Treasury bills for monetary purpose)
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The data on local debt consists only of debt incurred through loans and issuance of securities and
excludes the arrears (obligations towards suppliers that are due but not paid). Local debt represents
0,01% of the total public debt (or 0.004% of the GDP), which is insignificant and shows that for the
purpose of debt sustainability analysis  local debt can be neglected and cannot damage the whole sys-
tem. If we include the arrears in the local debt figures, this represents 1.03% of the total public debt
(or 0.47% of the GDP) which is still a very low share.
In most EU countries the local debt to GDP is on average 5 % of GDP which is quite low and in 11
out of 15 EU countries the local debt to GDP ratio decreased between 1995 and 2000 (more in
Swianiewicz 2004).  
Table 10.
Local expenditure/total public expenditures and local investments/total public investments 
Source: Fiscal strategies of Ministry of Finance and budget of LGU for 2005 and 2006.
On an annual basis we can conclude that the Municipalities are becoming more active in the total
general government expenditures, both for current and capital expenditure. But the fact that decentral-
ization started in the middle of 2005, advises caution towards interpreting data for that year and to see
how 2006 will finish, as the execution of the general budget is turning out to be different from the
planned budget for both central and local government.
7.3. The LFLGU in Macedonia
The LFLGU establishes a budget of the current revenues and expenditures and a budget of the cap-
ital revenues and expenditures. 
The budget of the current revenues and expenditures consists of all revenues and expenditures,
including the payment of interest on long-term borrowings but excludes capital donations, self-contri-
bution revenues, revenues from property sales, block grants and borrowing inflows.
The Macedonian LFLGU prescribes the 20 % debt limitation for long term borrowing that might
prove inflexible in future. A good example is the case of EBRD investment in Romania where one LGU
was required to create a "reserve fund" equal to the amount of the annual debt service of the loan. In
the case where the debt has been fully reimbursed during the year, it is questionable to have such a
conservative debt limitation of 20 % for the Romanian LGU which they are required to keep the reserve
fund in the Treasury without bearing interest thus increasing the cost of financing. Following this prac-
tice and the recent change in the Romanian legislation prescribing a 30 % limit of debt, perhaps the
debt limitations in Macedonia should be more flexible for the LGUs that have good creditworthiness
indicators. 
(in mill denar) 2005 2006
Local expenditures 5003 8388
Public expenditure 100206 107874
Local expenditure/total expenditure (%) 4.99271501 7.77573836
Local investments 2446 4482
Public investments 10192 12976
Local investments/public investments (%) 23.9992151 34.5406905
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7.4. Net operating surplus at LGUs in Macedonia
The net operating result is simply the difference between an LGUs operating revenues and its oper-
ating expenditures over a given time. If the result is positive and large enough to cover a local govern-
ment's anticipated debt service payments, the LGU can be considered creditworthy. Conversely, if the
result is negative, or less than what is needed by a local government to cover its debt service pay-
ments, then the LGU should not borrow and a bank should not lend even if the anticipated debt serv-
ice payments are less than the statutory limit.
The operating revenues in Macedonia for an LGU are considered to be all revenues except for:
! Projected savings from the operative revenues for financing of capital expenditures
! Block grants from the budget of RM for financing of the capital investments
! Revenues from property sale
! Self-contribution revenues
! Inflows from borrowing
Thus the revenues which are considered are from: property tax, communal fees, PIT and VAT transfers.
The operating expenditures are all expenditures except the ones on capital investments (purchas-
ing of equipment, IT, furniture, physical space, preparation of projects, infrastructure). 
Table 11. Macedonian LGU operating surplus
Source: Ministry of finance. Author's calculation. 
2000 2004 2005
Taxes 712,628,158.00 3,195,760,482.00 3,293,469,433.00
Transfers Received 204,644,405.00 1,258,231,939.00 2,001,540,168.00
Other 7,070,711.00 310,441,253.00 189,320,841.00
Current Revenue 924,343,274.00 4,764,433,674.00 5,484,330,442.00
Operating expenditure 783,991,179.00 2,081,679,723.00 2,303,634,812.00
Operating Balance 140,352,095.00 2,682,753,951.00 3,180,695,630.00
Interest Paid 261,502.00 3,483,246.00 2,896,549.00
Current Balance 140,090,593.00 2,679,270,705.00 3,177,799,081.00
Capital Revenue 1,672,592.00 107,029,025.00 75,149,262.00
Capital Expenditure 100,870,960.00 2,660,268,957.00 2,665,409,943.00
Capital Balance - 99,198,368.00 - 2,553,239,932.00 - 2,590,260,681.00
Balance Before Debt Variation 239,288,961.00 5,232,510,637.00 5,768,059,762.00
Debt Repayment - 15,411,230.00 32,000,000.00
New Borrowing 424,000.00 3,953,168.00 13,640,000.00
Net Debt Increase (Decrease) 424,000.00 - 11,458,062.00 - 18,360,000.00
Net Surplus/(Deficit) 239,712,961.00 5,221,052,575.00 5,749,699,762.00
DEBT STOCK
Short-term N.A. N.A. N.A.
Long-term N.A. 2,900,000,000.00 1,400,000,000.00
Total debt N.A. 2,900,000,000.00 1,400,000,000.00
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Analyzing the 2006 budget of the Municipalities, all of the municipalities run an operating surplus
(84 out of 84), which may look like they are capable of incurring debt in the future. However, these
figures do not reflect the whole reality, as they do not take into account the arrears which are moni-
tored off the balance and must be paid before a municipality starts any new borrowing. 
The biggest obstacle in Macedonia to monitor and to define the capacity of the municipalities to
borrow is the cash/accrual accounting issue. The central government does not have the correct data
and the municipalities does not provide adequate budget accounting and reporting of the operational-
current balance. If this situation does not change by the end of 2006 to enable the municipalities and
the Ministry of Finance to have an accurate operational-current balances for 2006, it will not be pos-
sible to start the new phase (planned to start at 1st August, 2007) which would allow the municipal-
ities to borrow within the limits defined in the law.
Thus, the data in the table do not reflect the reality in the local government sector in Macedonia and
must be treated with reserve. 
It should be noted that some revenues that are classified as operating revenues by Macedonia's
charter of accounts, most importantly the revenues from the Land Development Fee, should be con-
sidered capital revenues because they come from the one-time use or sale of  assets and are not
recurrent revenues. 
7.5. The EU perspective
The general principles of LGU functioning are set in the EU Charter of LSG. Accession to the EU will
require considerable financial resources for investments in the environment sector and the
Macedonian public sector will have to meet the requirement for 25 % matching funds to obtain pre-
accession grants. 
The Stability Pact and Maastricht Criteria limit the overall public debt (which includes the debt on
the central, regional, and local governments including social security funds, but excluding public enter-
prises) to less than 60 % of the GDP and the total annual budget deficit to 3 % of GDP. In Germany it
was discussed whether to give 1.93 percentage points out of the 3 % to the federal government and
the rest to the other tiers of the government but this proposal was not adopted. (Farber, 2002). The
definition of public debt can be an important policy issue in deciding the boundaries of local govern-
ment borrowing prerogatives. Concern about how to meet the limitations imposed by the Maastricht
Criteria has led to discussion about how to coordinate debt incurred at the sovereign level with that at
the sub-sovereign level. A special problem can be that the debt of public utility companies is usually
not counted in the debt to GDP ratio thus creating a hidden debt. These companies are owned at local
level (in Romania and Macedonia) and LGU give them guarantees and subsidies.
Box 3. Approximation/Convergence
Approximation, in an accession context, is described as a unique obligation of membership of the EU. It is an
obligation to fully align national laws, regulations, rules and procedures in order to give effect to the entire body of
EU law contained in the acquis communautaire.
There are three key steps to approximation:
1. Transposition. Transposition is the first step toward approximation in an EU accession context. It means that
the requirements of EU legislation must be fully incorporated into national legislation. This will require adoption or
amendment to national laws, regulations, rules and procedures;
2. Implementation. Also known as Practical Application. Implementation is the incorporation of EU law by the
competent authority/ies into individual decisions. It includes providing the infrastructure, budgets and provisions
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The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics-NUTS classification is hierarchical in that it sub-
divides each member state into three levels: NUTS levels 1, 2 and 3. The second and third levels are
subdivisions of the first and second levels respectively. Member states may decide to go further still
in terms of hierarchical levels by subdividing NUTS level 3.
The territorial units are defined in terms of existing administrative units in the member states, which
are associated with a geographical area of authority. The classification of these areas is based on the
population according to the following criteria: 
Table 12. Classification criteria of NUTS area
Source: EC
At NUTS Level II Romania created 8 development regions to comply with European Union acces-
sion requirements and to be eligible for the EU structural funds. These regions are not territorial admin-
istrative structures; that is they do not have executive or legislative powers or separate budgets but
rather serve the purpose of providing units of observation for collecting statistical data according to
EU rules and providing the framework for implementing Romania's regional development policy and to
be the recipients of EU structural funds. In Macedonia the preparation of the Law on balanced region-
al development is yet to be adopted.
Here is information on population by the NUTS Level III in Macedonia. (Vardarski region does not
comply with the minimum population requirements in accordance with the NUTS criteria)
needed to enable the competent authorities to perform their obligations under EU law and to take appropriate deci-
sions; and
3. Enforcement. The necessary controls and penalties must be provided to ensure full and proper compliance
with the law. Thus the objective of the approximation process is to fully integrate all the EU legislation requirements
into the national legal system so that the accession country is then ready and able to fulfill all the EU Member
States' obligations. This will usually include a complete institutional re-structuring so that the accession country
can comply with all EU requirements such as reporting to the Commission.
Convergence is a somewhat different process. It means bringing two legal systems closer together rather than
the full alignment required by approximation. Convergence implies that the main principles/features of one legal
system should be reflected/integrated into the other legal system, taking into account the specificity of the other
system and without necessarily adopting exactly the same requirements in detail. Convergence implies the follow-
ing process:
! Analysis of the relevant EU legislation in order to define the main principles and features;
! Review of the national legislation in the particular area and analysis of institutional arrangements to 
determine to what extent it integrates these EU principles and features;
! Adaptation of the national legislation and / or development of implementing regulations which integrate the 
main principles and features of the EU legislation; and
! Adaptation of the institutional arrangements to implement the adapted national legislation in practice.
Level Minimum population Maximum population
NUTS 1 3 million 7 million
NUTS 2 800,000 3 million
NUTS 3 150,000 800,000
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Table 13. Population by NUTS 3 level in Macedonia 
Source: Census 2002. Author's calculation.
(For more about indicators by NUTS 3, 4 and 5 in Macedonia visit www.lsg-data.org.mk). 
With the introduction of the development regions it is expected that self generated revenues will
have to increase and that they will benefit from the following EU funds: 
! SAPARD - for agricultural and rural development, and the protection of the environment and
! IPA - for financing important projects which aim to protect the environment and to support trans-
European transportation networks.
Since the EU system is founded on a promotion of compliance and enabling approach to regula-
tion and the Macedonian approach is still largely based on command and control (weak institutional
capacity), convergence will require a focus on the identification of instruments or legislative provisions
that move the society and institutional structures towards more modern approaches to compliance,
backed by economic incentives.
There may be certain risks in Macedonia that can impede or delay legal convergence for example:
1. Political climate must be mature for changes in legislation;
2. A "difficulty" in convergence is to select what not to transpose/ implement. However, generally,
if convergence is embarked on, it would seem advantageous to transpose as much of the EU legisla-
tion as possible. The limits are likely to be those of cost and lack of compliance in implementation.
Provisions with no prospect of implementation and enforcement should be reconsidered;
3. The consequences of convergence may not be fully known, which could lead to wasted oppor-
tunities in terms of "getting it right";
4. Institutions and human capacity for management planning and implementation may not be avail-
able. The institutional set-up may also carry inherited conflicts of interests.
The changes in legislation should be accompanied by standards and guidelines to assist the imple-
mentation. The imposition of minimum standards can eliminate local decision-making powers. By set-
ting minimum service standards, there is the implication that the local government is primarily
accountable to the central government (which sets the standards) rather than to the residents who
elected the council and mayor. On the other hand, if standards are set well beyond the abilities of local
governments to meet those standards with existing resources, the situation is no different than anoth-
er type of unfunded mandate. Another way is to establish a system of benchmarks across LGU but
this will require a strong statistical system. 
NUTS 3 level Population (census 2002)
Pelagoniski 238.136
Vardarski 133.180
Severoistocen 172.787
Jugozapaden 219.741
Skopski 578.144
Jugoistocen 171.416
Poloski 305.930
Istocen 203.213
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7.6. Financial market structure in Macedonia
The economy in Macedonia used to operate on a cash basis with a small and highly centralized
banking sector and no functioning capital markets. Major capital spending at LGU level was financed
by grants or soft loans and was directed by the central government or, in the case of smaller routine
projects, financed on a pay-as-you go basis by the LGU. Donor help was not systematic but rather at
their discretion. As a result of the format and purpose, financial reports often gave little insight into the
financial condition of the local governments. 
Table 14. Risk categories and levels by instruments 
Source: Mr. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel presentation on pension funds and capital markets in 
Macedonia. Adoption by the author.  
The financial institutions in the Republic of Macedonia are banks (20), insurance companies (10),
leasing companies (8) and the brokerage houses (11). All these entities function in separately regula-
ted and supervised segments. However, the Macedonian financial system has the same characteristics
as the continental one (Europe) as most dominant sector is the banking sector (table), where around
90% of the total assets  of the financial institutions are located together with a  50% share of GDP.
Table 15. Financial institutions in the Republic of Macedonia (as of end of 2005)
Source Ministry of finance. Author's adoption. 
Sovereign Risk Exogenous Credit or Maturity Risk Exchange-Rate
Idiosyncratic Risk Solvency Risk Risk
Current Government Moderate Low Moderate
Bonds
Future LGU bonds Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
Government 
T-Bills and T-Bonds Moderate Low High to moderate
Current NBRM Bills Low Low Very high
Bank Deposits Moderate Moderate, High
heterogeneous
Corporate Shares High High Low
Mortgage Securities Low Low Low
Corporate Bonds Moderate Moderate Moderate
Foreign Investments Very low Very low Very low Low High: ST-MT
(Foreign Government (LT) deprec
Bonds) (apprec) risk
Banks Insurance companies Brokerage houses Leasing companies
Assets ( in mill denar) 140345.0 13618.0 447.0 2275.0
Share in the total assets of the
financial institutions 89.6 8.7 0.3 1.5
Share in GDP (%) 50.6 4.9 0.2 0.8
Concentration in % (largest
two/three) from the total asses
of the industry 66.0 81.4 58.8 61.0
Capital (in mill denar) 21670.0 2894.0 348.0 121.0
Foreign capital in % 52.5 63.0 100.0 100.0
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The remaining segments in the financial markets of the Republic of Macedonia are in a process of
development. In the last couple of years the capital market and the insurance segment have seen rapid
development, though much remains to be done. 
Until now the only issuer of bonds has been the Government (except in 2004 when one private
company issued bonds to a known buyer). The Ministry of Finance started issuing government secu-
rities in 2000, when big structural problems (frozen currency deposits from the former Yugoslavia,
denationalization, rehabilitation and privatization of the banking sector) in Macedonia were resolved
through issuance of long term securities to the legal and physical entities concerned. However, the
typical government securities (3 and 6 month) were first issued in 2004. Since then the Ministry of
Finance conducts regular auctions for both short and long term government securities (primary mar-
ket) allowing these securities to be traded afterwards on the Macedonian Stock Exchange and in the
Over-the-Counter Market (secondary market).
One can gain a general idea of the relative size of the financial markets by comparing figures that
are collected at the international level. For example, the volume of listed securities in exchanges or
transactions in the exchanges to the overall GDP of the country is a rough indicator of the relative role
of the financial markets in the economy (in Macedonia this ratio is 11% at the end of 2005).
More precisely in terms of credit markets, one would look at listed securities in the debt market
(such list including any exchange listings, as well as bonds in the OTC market) in relation to the GDP.
In Macedonia the only listed bonds are government bonds, the stock of these securities to GDP is
insignificant (only 13.7% in August, 2006)
One source of useful information regarding potential demand (as well as an overall measure of per-
ceived sub-sovereign risk) is the weighting that banks must use to calculate their capital adequacy.
Although these have varied internationally, they are increasingly coming into conformance with the
BIS-Bank of International Settlement capital adequacy ratios. The ratio refers to the ratio of bank cap-
ital to performing loans (non-performing loans carry special provisions). The BIS minimum is current-
ly at 8%.
Under the BIS regime, loans to the sovereign government of the same country as the bank are
assigned a 0 sectoral risk weight (i.e. they are assumed to be domestically risk free) and those of pri-
vate-sector firms are assigned a 1. The BIS recognizes that the relationship between the central gov-
ernment and sub-national governments vary from country to country and therefore allows the central
bank in the respective countries to assign the appropriate risk weight. Thus, the weightings provide
the central bank's opinion as to the relative risk of loans to the sub-national governmental sector in
comparison to the sovereign and the private sector.
In the US, the BIS credit factors range from 0.1 for general obligations to 1 for private activity (cor-
porate) bonds. In foreign countries, sub-national government obligations that have explicit central gov-
ernment guarantees have BIS ratios of 0 (which makes them tantamount to direct sovereign obliga-
tions) and those that do not, have ratios that can range up to 1 or even higher. Ratios can be changed
to recognize overall changes in sectoral credit strength. This recently happened in South Africa, where
the ratio was increased from 0.1 to 1 for sub-national governmental securities when the national gov-
ernment announced that it would no longer guarantee municipal and provincial debt.
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7.7. The demand side of LGU borrowing in Macedonia 
The challenge for Macedonia is to increase both private and public investment to support econom-
ic growth and modernize its infrastructure while maintaining a stable macro-economic environment.
The LGUs and municipal companies will play a critical role in this context, as they are responsible for
undertaking a substantial portion of the infrastructure investments required. 
Table 16. Stakeholders in municipal credit market development
Source: USAID and LGAP 2002. Adapted by the author.
LGU investments are well below what is required to meet EU infrastructure standards over the pre-
accession period. Currently, most of local infrastructure is obsolete and a large amount of effort is
required for its replacement and modernization. Services such as water, sewage and solid waste sys-
tems involve large unit costs. To increase the level of such services will require considerable invest-
ments.  It is evident that large part of development, replacement, and renewal of local assets will need
to be financed out of LGU budgets.
The EAR project on strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of environment and physical plan-
ning prepared estimates for meeting the capital and operational costs of the investments required to
comply with European Union directives and policies in the "heavy investment" areas of environmental
management. Within this project, the indicative estimates for the cost of accession in the heavy invest-
ment areas have been estimated as: 
Table 17. Assessment of total investments in millions of euro/per capita in euros for
approximation of Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria to EU environmental legislation 
Source: EAR 2002-2003 and WB 2005. Adapted by the author. 
Demand Side (Borrowers) General purpose LGU, municipally owned companies, 
public-private joint ventures
Supply Side (Creditors) Commercial banks, specialized banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds, wealthy individuals
Market Makers Stock Exchange; Licensed Financial Intermediaries; Financial 
Advisory Firms; Credit Rating Agencies 
IFIs World Bank; European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development; European Investment Bank
Overseers & Regulators Ministry of Finance,  Court of Accounts, Securities 
Commission, National Bank, IMF
TA Providers USAID, US Treasury and SEC advisers, World Bank, EBRD, 
private consulting organizations
Macedonia Romania Bulgaria
Urban waste water treatment, sewerage 229/113 1,385/63 2,056/267
Large combustion plants 274/136 402/18 1,627/211
Municipal waste management, landfills 80/40 NA NA
Municipal waste management, other installations 120/59 NA NA
IPPC-air emissions 381/187 806/36 3,261/424
TOTAL 1,084/537 10,593/475 6,944/902
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7.8. The supply side of LGU Borrowing in Macedonia
The financial sector in Macedonia is still dominated by the banks as the core of financial activity
and commercially based funding. Due to the weak performance of the commercial sector, most banks
have shifted away from customer lending towards investment in central government securities and
NBR deposits.
Absorptive capacity of domestic capital market: 
! Outstanding stocks of financial assets:
! Government debt outstanding: EUR 669 m. (August 2006)
! Total bank deposits: EUR 1.79 b. (June 2006)
The Macedonian financial system and the real economy are gradually developing. The banking sec-
tor is gradually reducing the non-performing loans (10% at the end of 2005) and broadening the range
of entities for financing (crediting). Average credit growth in Macedonia in the recent years is 25%.
Municipalities may be interesting entities for banks but with high captiousness, as the financial state-
ments quality within each municipality needs carefully to be checked (which initially will make munic-
ipalities less attractive for the banks).
Apart from the banking sector, the capital market shows rapid deepening as well as an increment
of awareness in the broader population about the advantages of investing in securities. However, the
corporate governance issues have to be reflected in the practice as well in order to increase confi-
dence in the capital market issuers and institutions. At the moment, the securities law does not make
any specific or additional requirements for the municipalities as potential issuers of debt (in a form of
municipal bonds). The main obstacle for the supply/investors would be:
! untrustworthy financial statements of the municipalities
! lack of transparency and accountability in the local governance
! lack of skillful staff within the municipalities for long term financial planning
! lack of good ideas/projects to be financed with limited possibility to forces the revenues from the
investment
7.9. The investment at economic scale
Economic scale can be analyzed by considering the regional balance, relative size of LGU, instru-
ments to attract investors (inter-municipal cooperation for example) and institutional solutions
(Municipal credit bank for example).    
The next table reveals a wide disparity in expenditure level and composition among LGU in
Macedonia. Disparities in expenditure per capita are quite dramatic. The poorest LGU spends in per
capita terms only one-fourth of the average LGU and just a small fraction of that of the wealthiest LGU.
Expenditure composition is also varies a lot. It appears that some LGUs spend 100 percent of their
current expenditures on the wage bill while other LGUs have relatively high shares of investment
expenditures.  It seems that the situation improved in 2006  as the variability and discrepancy is lower. 
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Table 18. Disparity in LGU expenditure level and composition in 2002
Data Source: Ministry of finance. Author's calculations.
Table 19. Disparity in LGU expenditure level and composition in 2006
Data Source: Ministry of finance. Author's calculations.
Having in mind that in Macedonia a certain percentage of LGU are too small to access the private
capital market, it could prove beneficial to reorganise the Bureau for Underdeveloped LGU as a
Municipal Bond Bank.  Small municipalities frequently have financing needs that are of such a small
scale that they cannot attract sufficient attention and gain access to various sources of capital.
Additionally, the costs of debt issuance are a substantially higher percentage of project costs and are
often prohibitive.  Capital supply sources are often not interested in expending the effort to lend to
such small-scale projects and to smaller municipalities.  Thus, a Municipal Bond Bank could be cre-
ated by legislation in order to:
! Borrow from the private capital markets on behalf of smaller municipalities, 
! To lend capital to the smaller municipalities and 
! To benefit economies of scale and share the costs of debt issuance among several projects.  
The policy issue is whether a special intermediary should be created for jurisdictions that cannot
access credit markets through existing market mechanisms. Special intermediaries should not replace
existing commercial lending and underwriting institutions, but instead should complement them. Many
kinds of intermediary models are possible, beside a Municipal Bond Bank, such as bond pools, revolv-
ing loan funds, and municipal lending institutions.
A fundamental consideration has to do with fiscal capacity. This relates to the ability and willing-
ness to pay, and largely governs which units are candidates for debt issuance. Such considerations
are not always correlated with size, but larger jurisdictions typically are of greater interest to private
providers of credit for a number of reasons, including greater sophistication, the ability to draw upon
more resources and the ability to spread the fixed costs of debt transactions over larger volumes of
borrowing. Three groups of jurisdictions can be identified as regards to the likelihood for the issuance
of sub-sovereign debt in private markets:
Min Average Max
Expenditures 
Current (as % of total) 22 84 100
Wage bill (as % of current) 7 45 100
Investment (as % of total) 0 16 78
In per capita terms
Current (in $ US) 3 12 102
Wage bill (in $ US) 1 5 27
Investment (in $ US) 0 3 38
Min Average Max
Expenditures 
Current (as % of total) 24 61 91
Wage bill (as % of current) 13 30 53
Investment (as % of total) 9 39 75
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! Those units that because of size and financial and managerial resources already have access to
capital markets;
! Those that either have none or only limited access to capital markets, but can generate revenues
sufficient to their responsibilities and are otherwise capable of borrowing private capital. This
group consists of those units that (a) are large and that have sufficient capabilities to attract pri-
vate interest without direct central government help, and those (b) that are too small or that lack
the managerial capability to attract private lending at present, but with assistance could gain
access;
! Those that cannot generate sufficient revenue either to provide the services they require or to build
the needed infrastructure. Jurisdictions in this group, which for all practical purposes are "finan-
cial wards" of higher levels of government, do not have access to capital markets and most likely
should not. That is why consideration should be given to the creation of a Municipal Bond Bank.
The above classification of the LGU in accordance with the creditworthiness is useful for analytic
purposes, such as describing potential demand for credit access and the likely size and viability of a
local government securities market. But, should such distinctions be codified into a law or regulation
for purposes of predetermining which units can access the markets and obtain credit? In developed
economies, freely operating credit markets effectively classify borrowers on their merits, and reflect
their credit assessments in the prices charged for borrowing. Nonetheless, even in these mature mar-
kets, regulatory classification is sometimes practiced by central or state governments in order to pro-
vide certain privileges to some borrowers or to impose restrictions on others. For example, in the
United States most state governments differentiate among local governments through various legal
classification mechanisms, and these differentiations can include differential borrowing powers.
However, the credit market itself further differentiates among governments, based on varying assess-
ments of creditworthiness. These assessments are based on perceived differences in the jurisdictions'
economic vitality, managerial efficiency, financial condition, and the necessity for and viability of indi-
vidual projects. Such a detailed prescription of creditworthiness by the regulator can crowd out the
self regulation of the efficiency of the capital market. 
However small an LGU is, it will need capital investment and if it is not ready to finance its needs
in order to provide a certain level of quality in its services, it becomes a central government obligation
to step forward to fill the gap. If central government chooses to do so by subsidy for a loan or by guar-
antee, the potential exists for large amounts of failure which can lead to national bailouts, an increase
in the supply of credits and to inflationary pressure. 
Encouragement to investors from relatively small LGUs can come from upgrading LGU financial
management practices, reporting and disclosure in order to attract attention.
Table 20. Percentage of LGU having less than 2000 (1000 for Bulgaria)
and less than 5000 inhabitants
Source: NISES- National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies for Romania, NSI Bulgaria. 
Percent of total Number of inhabitants
Romania (census 2002) 451 LGU (16 %) < 2000
Romania (census 2002) 2095 LGU (72 %) < 5000
Bulgaria 0 LGU (0 %) < 1000
Bulgaria 30 LGU (11.4 %) < 5000
Macedonia 1 LGU (1.2 %) < 2000
Macedonia 15 LGU (17.9 %) < 5000
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In general those LGU with less than 5000 citizens are too small to build technical, fiscal and finan-
cial capacities. Also, such municipalities are too small to undertake investments at an economic scale.
They are likely to have higher average costs than larger jurisdictions (one instance where economies
of scale cannot be realized). They may  find difficulty in retaining capable staff and are more likely to
lack the capacity to provide public services effectively.
With the Law 339 in Romania, the local government units are classified into two categories,
depending on their administrative capacity (Article 10):
a) 1st category, to which belong the local government units that have the necessary administrative
capacity to perform the transferred competences. These local governments can efficiently, fully and
immediately perform the transferred competences;
b) 2nd category, to which belong the local government units that do not have the necessary admin-
istrative capacity to perform the transferred competences. These local governments cannot efficient-
ly perform the transferred competences.
The local governments belonging to the 2nd category are temporarily excluded from the transfer of
competences until they can build the administrative capacity necessary to perform the transferred
competencies, according to the law.
Thus it is critical to establish a regulatory framework to enable these municipalities to form various
types of joint ventures to undertake and finance investments. These can take the form of municipali-
ties associations, special purpose districts, intermunicipal companies, mandating the combining of
communes (counter to the spirit of decentralization and in the disputed case of Ceshinovo and
Obleshevo for example) and  providing financial incentives for LGU to join forces in the provision of
certain services. Pilot efforts by the donor community to demonstrate the economies that can be
gained from cooperative efforts among communes may be appropriate. Asymmetric functions that is,
some service responsibilities could be assigned to LGU but the responsibility of providing similar serv-
ices in rural LGU could remain a central function etc. The urban/rural discrimination in relation to the
asymmetric functions should be defined in the Law on LGU. In Romania the amendment of Law 215
Article 11 among other says:
"Associations for community development shall be set up based on local council's decision,
respectively county council's decision, in order to carry on together development programs of region-
al or zone interest or common delivery of a number of public services. The deliberative and execu-
tive authorities at the level of each constituent local authority maintain their local autonomy, accord-
ing to the law". 
This "according to the Law" phrase might create problem of "no action" as is the case in Macedonia
when 37 % of the LGU that were interviewed expect the Ministry of LGU and 34 % expect the line min-
istries to initiate any inter-municipal cooperation. Most of them believe that the obstacle for such coop-
eration across competencies is of legal nature4. This once again proves that simply adopting laws
means nothing in reality if there is no capacity to implement them in practice.
Having a large number of small municipalities is not an impediment to the undertaking and financ-
ing of investments at an economic scale as long as such joint ventures can be formed, revenues can
be assigned to them, and they have a right to borrow against these revenues streams to finance invest-
ments. Some forms of those joint ventures can be:
4) From an EAR project on decentralization in Macedonia. 
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! Entities created by agreement by more than one municipality to accomplish a special purpose
(e.g., to provide fire protection efficiently across a broad area). Their revenues and expenditures
can be separated from those of the organizing municipalities. Their powers can derive solely from
the municipalities ("joint powers"), or though legislation which can limit or extend such combin-
ing powers
! Quasi-municipal entities created by state or national legislation. These entities might provide
municipal services (e.g., water development, disease control, or transport services) where needs
do not necessarily relate to municipal boundaries. 
Typically, in a transition economy such as Macedonia,  LGU are highly dependent on transfers from
the central government. While transfers can be very volatile and untested for sustained periods of time,
they form a major portion of revenues and are attractive for interception to cover debt service pay-
ments. Intercepts can have a powerful impact on local borrowers, especially small and remote units. 
7.10. LGU services and borrowing
The LGU provides services many of which don't generate profits but are in heavy need of capital
investments. Also, municipal loans typically cannot be secured by real property that is used for the
provision essential public services. 
The following issues for Romania, related to services provided by the LGU and the need for bor-
rowing, also hold true in the case of Macedonia. (USAID LGAP 2002):
! The treatment of the citizen right of access to essential services in the legal framework, and the
role of national social welfare policy in assuring access to service among poor Romanian house-
holds
! Investment funding capacity of the local governments and municipal services providers relative
to assigned investment funding responsibilities
! Scale of investment required to meet recognized standards and policy goals
! Determination of the roles of market and non-market finance in supplying investment finance
needs
! Treatment of household ability to pay, especially for user charges for municipal services
! National sectoral modernization policy, especially for district heating
Investment capacity in Romania is limited because of:
! household incomes are low
! payments arrears are high
! rates do not cover renewal of existing assets, nor expansion of the system
! underlying assets are owned by local governments, and under Romanian legal     doctrine can-
not be sold, mortgaged or pledged to secure borrowing
! national policy denies access to targeted investment subsidy from GOR sources
! previous subsidy experience in district heating, the largest subsidy area, was premised on waste-
ful producer subsidies and poorly targeted end user subsidies
We would add in the case of Macedonia, related to communal enterprises-CE (see more in EAR
Phase 2; 2006):
a. Low level of revenue collection
b. Subsidy system based on affordability of the consumers rather than pursuing cost recovery pricing
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c. Problem of requirement for invoiced VAT payments by the Public Revenue Office
d. The court procedure for collecting revenues due
e. The LGU do not settle their liabilities toward the CE even though they are their founders
f. The regular political disputes between the Mayor and the Council leads to a late decision or no
decision made about financial accounts, prices, programs etc while the CE should operate daily and
because of that regularly operate outside their legal framework
g. The waste locations are far from modern facility's standards for the disposal of solid waste which
is nice example that communal activity is not an environmental issue but rather a cross cutting prob-
lem with environmental issues.
h. Some of the bye laws of the CE are not in accordance with the separate laws that regulate the
activity. 
i. There remain activities such as construction and trade set within the bye laws as communal activ-
ities
j. No tariff system developed for the price of communal services
k. Depreciated assets
l. Still some CE are not re-registered
How the Macedonian CE can provide the 25 % contribution necessary to access EU funding is
questionable and this is one reason more why LGU borrowing in Macedonia will be attractive in near
future. 
7.11. Sub-sovereign Rating Factors in Macedonia
Credit analysis is a product of the operation of a credit market and only becomes viable when and
where there are a variety of competing investments with differing risk and reward characteristics.
Credit ratings are the leading form of institutionalized credit analysis and assist in developing an active
securities market by pooling skills to develop opinions. Ratings play an important role in that they
focus on credit risk (risk of payment delay or default) which is then used to help judge risk and reward.
While the major agencies have different ways of weighting the factors, they agree on the major ana-
lytical ingredients they consider in judging the creditworthiness of sub-sovereign credits. These can
be summarized as in the next table, with some indications as to how various factors help or hurt a
credit rating.
Table 21. Factors considered in judging the creditworthiness of sub-sovereign credits
Factor Comment
Sovereign Rating Ceiling The rating of the national government usually sets the top limit on the rating that a 
sub-sovereign unit can enjoy. National government set monetary and fiscal policy and 
usually have first claim on foreign exchange and can change the rules of the game for 
the junior units of government. Exceptions to this rule can be found if the debt is 
secured by offshore assets or revenue streams.
Economy Fiscal health is usually closely linked to the health of the local economy and the 
diversification in activity (which often comes with size) helps balance the economy's 
performance. Demographics are important. A high dependency population (the very 
young and very old are negatives) and a too rapid growth in population are negatives. 
Higher-income and more educated population is a plus, as is an acceptable
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distribution and rate of growth in income. Creditors are also interested in the structure
of the local economy. Particularly, how much of it is in private hands, and how 
dependent it is on a single industry, or a small number of large employers. As a result, 
local governments should be able to present to creditors accurate information on the 
distribution of employment across types of firms and industries, as well information
on the general economic situation of the largest employers. Of particular value here, is 
information on the number of enterprises (and in fact individuals) who have substantial 
tax arrears, because tax arrears are generally a good sign of economic distress and 
monitoring them is often used by local governments and creditors to anticipate poten-
tial economic problems. Indeed, rating agencies typically require local governments to
provide them with lists of the largest employers and as well as lists of the firms with
the largest tax arrears. For Macedonian LGU individually it is worth estimating whether
they depend more on property tax revenues or PIT revenues in the context of econom-
ic activity since the PIT revenues are more elastic to economic fluctuations. Here a
reasonable long run solution for Macedonian LGU is to improve own tax administra-
tion, enforcing, collection.
An assignment of functional spending responsibilities consistent with revenue
resources is a plus. Intergovernmental transfers are looked at for their size and pre-
dictability. The willingness and ability of the national government to detect and stem
financial emergencies is a positive. The rigor and timeliness of budgetary and financial
laws are examined and can be either a plus or negative depending on the flexibility
they provide localities. Past performance in achieving budgetary balance are impor-
tant. Timeliness and comprehensive of financial reporting and following consistent
standards are a plus. In Macedonia, LGU were being assigned new expenditure
responsibilities without being assigned new sources of adequate revenues especially
in the education. Changes in environmental standards, for example, can lead to signifi-
cant increases in local government costs, while changes in the way businesses are
regulated can have an impact on their revenues.  
Revenue composition and trends are considered with ability to set rates at the local
level seen as a plus. Tax burdens should be acceptable in comparison to neighboring
regions. Effective use of charges and fees are viewed favorably, large transfers of gen-
eral funds to local enterprises are not. Possible indicators: % of revenues of GDP and
% of LGU that have revenues less than nation average. Another important weakness of
the current intergovernmental finance system is that Macedonian LGU have limited
powers to increase their revenues through their own policy decisions thus, the vast
majority of their revenues come from shared taxes and fees, or transfers. This is prob-
lematic for creditors for two reasons. On the one hand, it means that local govern-
ments have relatively little ability to adjust their revenue policies to meet their debt
service needs. On the other hand, it means that their revenues are fundamentally
dependent on the tax polices of the central government. Another problem can be
adverse effect of poor collection performance of own revenues from property. If some
taxpayers are not paying their legal tax liabilities whereas others are, the system
becomes less equitable. Particularly problematic is the case where wealthier and more
powerful segments of the locality are also delinquent in paying. This, in turn, can lead
those who comply with the tax to conclude that the tax is unfair and decide that they
too should stop paying. Another problem is the lack of forecasting abilities and possi-
Structure and Management
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ble overestimation of revenues (experience in Macedonia and Romania). The capital
budgeting should move from a wish list preparation to setting clear priorities and cost
benefit decision making. The unsuccessful transition and insider privatization process
led to a negative perception of private business thus, giving little space to PPP as a
window for the LGU to consider off budget projects. Other problematic areas are the
unpredictability of the system with the following determinants: the central government
(PRO) is resistant in transferring the records for the purpose of the property tax collec-
tion, no vision and solution to solve the arrears, instead of increasing the transfers for
decentralized competencies they are decreased (education and fire fighting for exam-
ple) breaking the basic rule of assigning competencies/services without revenues to
cover the costs of providing them, the possible change within the fiscal system (intro-
duction of flat tax) and the poverty, high dependency of central government in terms of
revenues. Within such a framework it is difficult to do any forecasting, analyses etc. 
Capital spending and maintenance spending are a plus; a large wage bill is a negative
since the expenditures are more rigid and there is less chance for operating surplus. It
also will create a hidden risk of unfavorable outcomes in bad economic times. In such
a situation the reserve funds of the LGU are becoming more important. The ability to
budget and to accurately realize budgets are a plus. Positive balances (surpluses) in
current operating budget are a strong positive. Capital budget planning and paying for
large amounts with current revenues a plus. Possible indicators: % of expenditures of
GDP and % of LGU that have less than the nation average. Forecasting and budget
planning and execution are important indicators of financial management of a LGU. If
the trend is toward lesser ratio of collection in time this is a clear signal that the budg-
et planning is bad and the technical skills in forecasting are poor it is also a risk to
build short term debt.
Liquid assets and marketable real assets are favorable factors, as are healthy reserves
in relationship to annual expenditures. Outstanding debt is considered. Short term debt
is a concern if not periodically retired. Long-term debt and contingent debt (where
there are guarantees to others) is generally a negative unless used in support of pro-
ductive (self-supporting) activities. Short maturity debt with principal due at the term
(bullet maturity) is a negative because of continuing pressure to refinance and poten-
tial burden on current revenues. Overlapping debt of other governments that relies on
same economic base is considered. Possible indicators: % of investment from total
expenditures and % of LGU less than national average.
The lack of clear laws, legal precedent or effective judicial system is major impedi-
ments, especially where there is restricted revenue or enterprise-based pledges. A his-
tory of repudiations or insolvencies is a large negative. Approval of borrowings by
senior units and other restrictions on local borrowing may be a positive if efficient and
nonpolitical, but can be a negative if complex, difficult and political. In Macedonia LGU
are forbidden from using as collateral any piece of property that is used for the provi-
sion of essential public services. This classification requires lenders to set aside high-
er percentages of their own capital as reserves in case borrowers default. The regula-
tory requirement that banks "set aside" or reserve different levels of their own capital
depending on the risk rating of a credit is designed to protect the banking system as
whole. But the high reserve ratio requirements required for high risk credits means that
Composition and trends
in expenditure
Financial position
Legal framework
Opinions on credit quality are not static and the relative importance of factors can change over time.
National policies concerning items other than local debt per se can change the mix and weighting of
credit factors. Laws governing purchasing policies, public employee retirement benefits or wages, or
the reassignment of functions and revenue sources can all shift the focus of analysts. 
8. CONCLUSIONS
In Macedonia it is important for the central level government to understand that decentralization is
a process and it is a process that will take many years to complete. It is not a process that can rely
only on the drafting of laws but it needs to be managed in a consistent fashion so that the government
has a vision of what it wishes the role of LGU to be. The monitoring unit established at the centre fol-
lowing the work of the Decentralization Working Group has so far proved to be only a one way "win-
dow hall" for receiving complaints and problems but with no will to make changes and decisions to
create analytical abilities and "bureaucratic- political" strength. The monitoring at the moment is not
based on hard data and analysis but rather on speculation and conjecture. Also the  main driving force
for the process remains donor sponsored projects rather than domestic will and intellectual debate.
Transition is required to go from a system in which financial capacity and strength is centrally con-
trolled to one in which financial capacity and strength is distributed and independence of action at local
level is institutionalized. 
Donors tend to have unique perspectives and interests, which underscores the need for effective
coordination across donor programs, and a mechanism to surface and address both potential collab-
orative synergy and occasional conflicts. 
Determining the strengths and weaknesses in fiscal decentralization will require constant monitor-
ing of the process. The DWG will need strong analytical abilities but also sufficient "bureaucratic-polit-
ical" strength since its conclusions are likely sometimes to run counter to the preferences of ministries
110
banks can use less of their capital for other loans, a cost that usually is reflected in
higher interest rates.  Sinking or debt retirement funds are also used for other types of
loans and serve to provide lenders with the guarantee that even if the municipality
experiences temporary financial difficulties, there will always be enough cash on hand
to meet a specified number of debt service payments. For this assurance to be legally
sound however, LGU must be able to deposit money in such funds for periods longer
than one year. In Macedonia, however, the Law on Budget states that public budgets
are purely annual constructs and that all monies unspent in a given year, should be
returned to the general budget. As a result, to make such debt retirement funds possi-
ble, the Law on budget should be amended to allow for multiyear budgetary appropria-
tions for the sole purpose of setting such funds.
The basis and quality of financial records is examined, and prompt, consistent reports
are a plus. Timely and independent audits are a positive. Cash flow information or
cash basis accounting that provides reliable information on cash available to pay debt
service is a positive. Evaluation of liquid assets and accounts receivable can be issues
in that required investments in government bonds can be risky and accounts may be
in arrears. Of special importance is the clear financial relationship between the LGU
and the enterprises (like communal ones) that might create hidden debt. Clear relation-
ships between them and possible accrual accounting recording all the accruals will
increase the rating of the LGU.
Accounting and financial
reporting
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and in some instances, ZELS. The monitoring should be based on "hard" data and analysis which
requires compilation of more detailed financial data than is available from the current single treasury
system in order to understand and analyze local fiscal conditions.
In general, the legal framework in Macedonia is sufficient to provide rules for successful fiscal
decentralization. Given the complexity of the process and the scale of the reform the legal framework
can be seen as a good start. Whether the process will continue on track will depend on the monitor-
ing system and how problems are identified, how (fast) solutions are identified and how the correct
decision is reached. Another important dimension of success is the participation and satisfaction of
each party (central government, local government, citizens and donors). 
In moving ahead, the process should be more domestic than donor driven in terms of initiatives,
and ownership of the process should be claimed as soon as possible especially by the citizens. So
far the citizens have not been sufficiently informed and have had a low level of participation. 
The current territorial division should be re-examined considering the capacity of some LGUs, and
possible asymmetric solutions should also be considered. A clear distinction between urban and rural
LGUs will benefit not only individual LGUs (and thus in the end their citizens) but will also help in the
future regional development strategies by narrowing the regional misbalances and to provide help in
the development of agriculture strategies as well. 
As for the assignment of competencies, the subsidiarity principle has generally been respected in
the process so far. The risk is, however, that that the local government system remains with a weak
system of financing, high arrears, low accountability and increasing economic and social misbalances
between different LGUs. To avoid this, the central government must enhance the analytical capacity of
the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of LGU in order to become more effective in the monitoring and
evaluation process. Examples of the areas that should be urgently addressed by these analytical units
are the fiscal gap in the provision of services by LGUs and to find solutions for revising the inter-gov-
ernmental transfer system.
The structure of own revenues and the devolution of authority to LGUs to set their own tax rates is
indeed a step forward in building accountable and efficient LGU system (as well as providing LGUs
with more funds). Furthermore, at the same time the LGU need support in the establishment of mod-
ern tax administration (zoning, property value assessment, database building, cadastre and other
information systems) and need to build a regular tax system and financial management skills. 
The possible introduction of flat taxing system should be considered more widely with an assess-
ment of its impact on the poor stratum of the population and the social assistance programs of the
LGU. The problem will be to establish the suitable tax rate given the poor wages and defining poverty
so that some categories of people can be exempt from taxes.
There exists some confusion in the definition of PIT as an own revenue whereas by all standards it
is a "classic" shared revenue and in the VAT transfer which is implicitly an equalization transfer. The
Ministry of Finance should, within the fiscal gap analysis, consider revising the PIT and especially the
VAT transfers. The wording in the LFLGU should be precise, the envelope for horizontal equalization
should be revised, the fiscal capacity formula should be stated in the LFLGU, and the equalization for-
mula should be such as to get the best from the data available in the statistical information system. 
112
The unclear status of the so-called "fund for equalization" but formally defined as own source rev-
enues from the VAT show that clear wording in laws is essential to prevent future misunderstandings
and problems5. The transfer of the VAT which defined as an own revenue, is perceived by the LGU in
Macedonia as such and not as a fund for equalization. The central government has a long history of
resistance to the equalization fund for many reasons including a lack of understanding its role, fear of
political abuse before even legalizing the instrument. Thus, the VAT transfer has ended with a perverse
definition as an own revenue but also with the hope of providing equalization (a view from the central
government). A way forward is to amend the LFLGU, stating clearly that the VAT transfer is an equal-
ization fund or to introduce another equalization instrument.  
In relation to financial management it appears that the right framework has been provided in terms
of laws and bye-laws. One of the main needs is for more experienced and skilled personnel at the LGU-
level, and so the LGUs should employ staff only based on quality and merit. Also, the possibility for
borrowing should soon be available to the LGU, and the Central Government should therefore adopt a
Law on LGU insolvency and establish a separate unit within the Ministry of Finance related to LGU-
borrowing. 
The Council must approve a local government's budget and with it, the year's investment priorities.
This means that funding for major investments is always in competition with the other investments
that may appeal to the municipal council in a given year. Indeed, what typically happens when local
governments do not use debt financing is that they end-up maintaining extremely broad, but shallow,
investment programmes as municipal councils divert (planned) funding for major, but costly invest-
ments in facilities like water and  sewage plants to other investments such as road improvements that
are cheaper and which have more immediate "political returns".  In contrast, the decision to incur debt
"locks in" the decision to build and pay for a costly but necessary piece of public infrastructure and
thus, serves to discipline the entire investment planning process by forcing local governments to more
carefully prioritize their investment spending.
In Macedonia most importantly we have macroeconomic stability, low inflation but relatively high
interest rates although these are on a declining trend. The decentralization process on the other hand
has just started and is celebrating one year after kicking off. It is still expected that much has to be
done in the area of improving the stability and predictability of the fiscal decentralization system,
strengthening of fiscal autonomy and predictability in LGU budget planning and execution and in cash
flow projections. There is not any substitution for municipal creditworthiness as the essential element
of a municipal credit market.
In relation to the macroeconomic stability, the central government would like to lower the level of
borrowing by the LGUs whereas the LGUs would like to increase it. On the other hand the central gov-
ernment would to avoid increases in local tax rates and thus to lower the investment level at local level.
This happened during the period of centralized management in Macedonia when large fraction of the
LGUs arrears was incurred for this reason. In future if the central government wants to avoid the incur-
ring of such LGU arrears, it should either increase the level of grants and/or allow long term borrow-
ing for investment. 
5) From an EAR project on decentralization in Macedonia. 
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A LGU would prefer a grants rather than a loans. Thus, there is the certain theory of game interplay
by introducing a loan limit and allowing grants and the level of local taxes as instruments of central
government to influence LGU behavior and to manage the macroeconomic stability. This is a further
complication which has a typical lack of full cost recovery for the utility services. The prices being
charged for public services such as water supply and sewage treatment are often so low that any
attempt to fully cover the costs of a new investment through price increases would be politically unac-
ceptable. 
Another fact is that because prices for public services in transitional countries are so low, con-
sumers are often over-consuming them. As a result, consumption can decline substantially if prices
are increased to cover the costs of a new investment. Because the scale of the decline in consump-
tion can be difficult to forecast, it is also difficult to forecast how much revenue the utility will have at
its disposal to pay back the loan. Creditors interested in lending to municipalities' utilities are aware of
these risks. They also know that in Macedonia municipal councils are ultimately responsible for
approving utility rates. As a result, creditors are typically reluctant to lend directly to utilities without at
least three things,  first, a clear municipal contribution to the costs of the investment, second, a so-
called rate covenant in which the municipality promises to raise rates in line with a specified sched-
ule so that the utility can meet its debt service payments and third, a municipal guarantee of all or part
of the loan. The latter is in part to make sure that the municipality makes good on the first two prom-
ises and also because the assets of the utility cannot be used to secure the credit.
The restriction on the LGU in Macedonia to keep their deposits in the treasury prevents the devel-
opment of a municipality as a customer of a bank and in turn for the banking sector to become more
familiar with the financial affairs and needs of municipalities. As a result of this restriction, municipal-
ities are not presently perceived by banks as "potential customers" since they are legally restricted
from depositing their funds in a bank.  This situation results in the lack of development of bank-client
relationships in which bankers become generally familiar with the financial affairs and needs of their
LGU clients. In Romania a recurring comment from bank representatives in connection with the devel-
opment of a municipal capital market is the lack of familiarity with municipalities, their financial affairs
and their creditworthiness in general. We recommend that the LGU in Macedonia to be allowed to open
accounts in the banks and that prudent investment requirements be established for such accounts
(government securities, only "best" banks).
Related to loans a legitimate question can be raised.  Is the banking system in Macedonia stable
enough to allow deposits by an LGU? This issue should be negotiated between the central and local
governments.  In the same context, are the LGUs mature enough to distinguish safe from risky banks
as politics is involved in the banking sector in Macedonia. In Macedonia it seems that the banks do
not understand the structure of municipal finances, or the types of information that should be used to
assess creditworthiness LGU. In the face of such uncertainty, the bank's normal reaction is to secure
municipal loans through a Government guarantee or to demand substantial liquid collateral or to
charge a high premium in terms of high interest rates (as per the NBRM, where the bank's claims are
"blocked" in the courts to the amount of 400 millions of EUR which is more than 10 % of GDP). 
In Macedonia it would be interesting for an LGU to assess whether the cost of bank loan is higher
or lower than issuing bonds i.e. to compare the interest rate of the bank loan with that of the bonds.
The banks are not familiar with the LGU finances and given the non profit type of services for which
the LGU investment projects are generally needed, it is likely that bank loans will cost more than a
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bond issue. On the other hand in the case of bonds, there are additional costs for the LGU in the need
to disclose a lot of information to potential investors as well as transaction costs for the registry, dis-
closure, regulators and administration.  Bonds are perceived more expensive and less flexible than the
bank loans but following the Romanian experience we could expect that the interest rate in the capital
market in Macedonia being lower than the current oligopoly in the banking sector and this could make
loans being more attractive than bonds. Macedonia should apply to both types of debt instruments
without discriminating between them. Competition between banks and a bond market can help to keep
the costs of capital as low as possible for municipal borrowers. 
However, the first bank to enter the field on a significant but financially prudent scale would have
an advantage in subsequent competition for market share. The following areas might be of special
interest for the banks to look at:
! Clarification of the legal rules surrounding municipal lending, use of collateral, legal recourse in
the event of non-repayment, etc and application of these rules to real-world management of
municipal credits.
! Analysis of a municipality's ability to repay loans, based on its financial statement, balance sheet
and other information, as well as its entitlement to transfers and revenue sharing from the cen-
tral level.
! Reducing risk through the use of collateral and other forms of security for local loans.
! Realistic assessment of a community's capital needs and the process of prioritizing investments
through preparation of a local capital investment planning and local capital budget.
In summary, progress in fiscal decentralizing in Macedonia has been made but much hard work
and many difficult decisions remain.
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Annex 1. Relevant legislation in Macedonia 
1. Constitution (OG 1/1991; 1/1992; 31/1998; 91/2001) 
2. Law on LGU (OG 05/2002)
3. Law on territorial organization (OG 49/1996)
4. Law on the city of Skopje(OG 49/1996)
5. Law on financing LGU (OG 61/2004)
6. Law on civil servants (OG 59/2000; 112/2000; 34/2001; 103/2001; 43/2002; 98/2002; 
40/2003; 85/2003; 17/2004; 69/2004; 81/2005; 30/2001; 100/2002 and 84/2003)
7. Law on public procurement (OG 19/2004)
8. Law on budget (OG 62/05)
9. Law on budget execution (OG 3/2006)Company Law (OG 28/2004)
10. Law on banking (OG 63/2000; 103/2000; 37/2002; 51/2003; 85/2003)
11. Law on securities (OG 95/2005)
12. Law on public debt (OG 62/2005)
13. Law on education (OG 52/2002)
14. Law on high education (OG 64/2000; 49/2003)
15. Law on environment (OG 4/2003)
16. Law on communal activities (OG 45/1997;23/1999;45/2002;16/2004)
17. Law on public enterprises(OD 38/1996;6/2002; 40/2003)
18. Law on culture (OG 17/2003)
19. Law on balanced regional development (draft)
20. Law on agriculture and rural development (draft)
21. Law on sport (OG 29/2002;66/2004)
22. Law on construction (OG 53/2001; 97/2001) 
Annex 2. Basic data for Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria
Table 22. Basic data about Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria for 2006
Source: For Romania and Bulgaria-from Internet (CIA, IMF).
Macedonia Romania Bulgaria
GDP (billion USD) 6,0 204,4 71,2
Surface area (million sq. km) 25,7 238, 3 110,9
Population (millions) 2,02 22,3 7,7
GDP per Capita (USD) 3002 9446 9223
Population Density (inhabitants/sq. km) 79 91 69
State Budget Balance (percent of GDP) 0.8 (0.8) 2.3
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Annex 3. The two-phased approach of fiscal decentralization in Macedonia
Table 23. Illustration of the two-phased approach of fiscal decentralization in Macedonia
Phase Starting date Assignment of responsibility Conditional on
1. Phase 1 July 2005 1. Transferring own revenues from If 90 % of the total municipalities comprising
(with amendments tax sources (the PIT sharing) to 90 % of the total population will provide:
on 30 Dec. 2004) municipalities (GOV) 1. At least 2 financial officers
2. Developing a methodology for 2. At least 3 tax experts
transferring the capital and earmarked (GOV)
3. The local governments will start with
the plan implementation of solving the
arrears up to 31st of January 2001
(local governments)
2. Phase Conditional Assignment of the responsibilities 1. All the conditions from phase 1 are
(for the block transfers): satisfied
1. Culture 2. A proper capacity of the financial officers
2. Social welfare and child protection (also in the phase I)
(kindergartens and homes for elderly) 3. Viable results of 24 months for on time
3. Education (primary and secondary school) and regular reporting confirmed by the min
4. Healthcare (public health organizations istry of finance
and primary care) 4. There are no accounts payable than usual
ones (up to 90 days)
5. The phase commission will evaluate if all
the conditions are satisfied
6. There is a written request from the
municipalities to the proper ministry and the
Ministry of finance for granting block
transfers after all the conditions is satisfied.
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Annex 4. Comparative insolvency matrix in Macedonia, Estonia, Romania and Bulgaria
Table 24. Comparative insolvency matrix in Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria
Source: Jokey 2005. Adopted by the author.
Insolvency Initiator Method of Administration Tasks of Restrictions Support for State Exiting Unmet
Criteria Initiation/ of Proceeding Trustee for Municipa- Insolvent Guarantee Claims
Cert. lity and Municipalities Debt Relief
Creditors or reduction
Estonia No clear Court or Proclamation Appointed Manage all Lose all Funds from No guarantee After recovery NA
threshold; Creditor Filing by Board financial financial issues the state for the period is
"Failure to creditor (Oversight issues create budget may municipal maintained
demonstrate Committee: Formulate stabilization be requested debt and creditor's
financial Representatives recovery plan three to fulfill claims are
discipline." of the creditors plan in year projection portions of paid.
and the states) cooperation replaces the recovery LGU could be
with Oversight municipal plan consolidated
Committee budget into another
LGU
Macedonia Lack of NA NA NA NA NA NA No guarantee NA NA
insolvency for the
definition and municipal
procedure. debt
Only financial
crises
definition
Romania If it is unable Any creditor File with the The manager/ Develop No finance- NA NA If the state of NA
to pay the or group Court of Law administrator recovery plan involving insolvency is
matured debts of creditors in the territory will attributions found to have
exceeding the unit is administrate whatsoever ended, the
50% of its located, an the insolvency may be official
budget for a application recovering exercised by receiver will,
period of 120 for opening procedure of the primary at manager's
consecutive the the adminis- spending proposal,
days or proceedings trative- authority and issue an order
salary of insolvency territorial unit. deliberative to end
payments of that authority insolvency
as planned in administrati- during the proceedings
the budget are ve-territorial management for the
more than unit of the administrative
120 days insolvency unit. The
in arrear situation manager shall
notify the end
of insolvency
order to the
primary
spending
authority,
creditors and
any interested
persons.
Continue with
financial
recovery plan.
Bulgaria Municipal NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Debt Act does
not define
the
insolvency
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Annex 5: Strategic assessment of borrowing at LGU level
TABLE 25
ASSESSING THE STATUS OF LGU BORROWING AND
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT BY COUNTRY
TABLE 26
KEY LGU BORROWING AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES PURSUED
BY COUNTRY
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Overall policy Constitutional & Central govern- Local government Participation by civil
stance and policy legal framework ment  institutional institutional and society and private
effectiveness and regulatory regulatory sector
framework framework
MACEDONIA Borrowing legally Law on regional NA Solution for arrears. CEA initiative for
allowed 1st of balanced studying LGU
July 2007 development a borrowing.
priority
ROMANIA Insolvency Framework Law on Introduced NA Intensified banks
procedure defined; Decentralization insolvency participation in the
Changes in a set of adopted. managers market.
laws;
Positive political will.
BULGARIA Municipal Debt Act
adopted.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Overall policy Constitutional & Central govern- Local government Participation by civil
stance and policy legal framework ment  institutional institutional and society and private
effectiveness and regulatory regulatory sector
framework framework
MACEDONIA Uncertainty about Law on financing Body for public debt Lack of initiative for No participation of
Fast pace of the LGU debt/arrears provides provisions management solving the existing the private sector
decentralization solution; for borrowing and established; debt; Need for
process No insolvency instruments for Reporting forms for assistance. ZELS
definition and controlling; debt registry under political risk
procedure; Borrowing allowed developed but not ethnically driven.
Only financial with prior consent practiced;
instability definition. from the central Confusion on who
government based should maintain
on the opinion of the debt registry for
Ministry of Finance. LGU.
ROMANIA Major changes in LFP allows Commission for Active participation Weak participation
Slow pace of legislation and borrowing. authorization of LGU of LGU association of the private
decentralization definition and debt. Registry in law changes sector.
process introduction of defined. ensured in
insolvency. accordance with
a law.
BULGARIA Current expenditures Municipal Debt Act Central Register on NA Current
crowd out capital defines the municipal borrowing expenditures crowd
expenditures. borrowing rules. is being created at out capital
Low level of LGU the Ministry of expenditures.
borrowing. Finance Low level of LGU
borrowing.
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TABLE 27
REFORM PRIORITIES FOR LGU BORROWING AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
BY COUNTRY
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Overall policy Constitutional & Central govern- Local government Participation by civil
stance and policy legal framework ment  institutional institutional and society and private
effectiveness and regulatory regulatory sector
framework framework
MACEDONIA Development of a Law on insolvency Debt management Capacity building for Securities
viable solution for development; body of the ministry the financial commission, banks,
the arrears; Law on balanced of finance to build management; credit ratings
Development of regional capacity to manage Develop credit rating agencies etc.
insolvency law. development LGU debt in the procedures. intensify their
developed future; Developing a activities.
Commission for capacity for asset Independent/private
financing of management. consulting
decentralization companies to start
should consider contracting with
more in depth sub-national
monitoring. governments to
provide TA.
ROMANIA Separate insolvency Working groups for Further developing Further developing Further developing
law. the decentralization in accordance with in accordance with in accordance with
of competences are best practices best practices best practices
set up within
ministries and other
specialized central
government bodies
BULGARIA To find co-financing
for borrowing on
infrastructure
financed by the
EU funds.
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Annex 6. The EU perspectives 
Table 28. The EU perspectives in Macedonia, Romania and Bulgaria
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Overall policy Administrative Institutions Financial capacity NUTS II
stance Capacity
MACEDONIA National Low administrative EAR closure and To the extent that Draft Law on
Fast pace of development capacity. Problems transfer of functions local governments balanced regional
decentralization strategy developed. in recruiting and to the Ministry of are not able to development in
process. Initial retaining qualified finance. Weak generate the needed procedure. Possible
momentum from staff. Relatively lower statistical additional resources political dispute
1999 boosted with wages in the public information system. to execute the EU related to NUTS 3
the Ohrid sector and low funds programs, level definition.
Framework morale lead to high the opportunity
agreement turnover and quit could be lost. No
rates. Without PPP rules.
changing these
conditions, training
of existing
employees is not a
solution because
once the public
employees have
received skills that
will gain them more
lucrative employment
they transition to a
different job in the
private sector.
Private consulting
companies not yet
begun contracting
with sub-national
governments to
provide TA.
ROMANIA National Low administrative The Ministry of To the extent that 8 regional
Slow pace of Development Plan capacity. Administration and local governments development
decentralization prepared for the Ministry of European Interior endorses, are not able to agencies
process. Lack of period 2007-2013. Integration has also according to the law, generate the needed corresponding to
political It provides the drawn up an action the initiatives and additional resources the NUTS II 8
commitment foundation for plan to address the draft normative acts to execute the EU development
and possibly prioritizing the use weak administrative regarding the funds programs, regions
vision for the of scarce capacity of sub- administrative and the opportunity
process. government funds in national governments financial could be lost.
helping sub-national with these main decentralization Large fraction of the
governments with elements: developed by funding is expected
the counterpart A project for Euros ministries or other to come from
financing for 3.8 million to prepare specialized central contributions of the
accessing EU funds. the private sector government bodies sub-national
Ministry of European and SMIs to deliver (Law 339). governments, and at
Integration has been coaching for EU Important as this time there is no
in charge of funds and also determinant of clear plan on how
preparing the targeting staff of absorption capacity. this will be done.
National regional development Requirement for The effectiveness of
Development Plan agencies strong fight against the regional
as well as the New training corruption and Operational Program
regional development programs for local promoting rule of law and other elements
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Source: Adopted from Martinez 2005
EU 8 experiences:
(B) Administrative Capacity:
Member nations and candidate countries alike appear to have problems in recruiting and retaining
qualified staff. Relatively lower wages in the public sector and low morale lead to high turnover and
quit rates. This means that without changing these conditions, training of existing employees is not a
solution because once the public employees have received skills that will gain them more lucrative
employment they transition to a different job in the private sector.
plans, and is the and judet councils of the National
management in programming development Plan
authority for the execution and will depend crucially
implementation of monitoring on their integration
the regional ERD Fund to train in the medium term
development local and judet expenditure
programs. officials with a framework of the
strong component local governments.
on infrastructure,
although sub-national
governments are
expected to contract
with the private sector.
Proposal for the
creation of the
Infrastructure
Development
Company by the
Romanian Academic
Society and the
Group of Applied
Economics following
the success of the
Estonian PPF. 
Administrative
capacity shall be
assessed and
established by law
(in accordance with
the Framework law
on decentralization
339).
BULGARIA National Limited Two institutions Local governments Six planning regions
Development Plan administrative responsible for EU are not able to (NUTS II) were
for 2007-2013 has capacity. issues: Ministry of generate funds for established in 2000
been prepared. Finance and Ministry co-financing. in order to meet the
All regulations of Regional Therefore there is accession
concerning planning Development and an idea to create requirements.
in place. Public Works. Local Development
Fund in December
2006 to provide
loans for
co-financing.
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Estonia supported the creation of a project preparation facility (PPF) in 2001, outside the public
sector. Administratively the financial resources available through the PPF have been useful in hiring
professional consultants to help draft the documents required by the EU. In 2001, the Estonian PPF
produced more applications that were acceptable to the EU than in all the years from 1994-1998.
Poland: numerous private consulting companies have begun contracting with sub-national govern-
ments to provide all the necessary documents and with the quality required by the EU for access to
the transfer funds.  
(D) Financial capacity:
Special legislation considered in a number of EU8 countries to relax existing borrowing limits for
sub-national governments.
Latvia: consolidation of smaller LGU.
Romania so far has not made a concerted effort to promote PPP One explanation, which Romania
shares with many EU8 countries, is the general mistrust of private businessmen in Eastern Europe.
Czech Republic: the Ministry of Finance developed budget rules to account for PPP projects with
transparency, even if they do not formally constitute debt, and ensure that EUROSTAT accounting reg-
ulations are followed. Also, World Bank also assisted in developing "PPP Centrum" (a joint stock com-
pany, fully state-owned), which is a small-scale resource center for technical assistance for ministries,
regional governments, and municipalities designed to be a focal point for procuring additional techni-
cal resources for these agencies when needed for particular projects.
(E) NUTS II: 
Hungary is proposing the creation of a special 'equalization fund' to be used to help regions with
fewer resources to meeting the EU requirements (Davey, 2003 in Martinez 2005).
Annex 7. Illustrative credit rating analyses for Macedonian LGU
1. Fiscal performance indicators:
a. % of revenues of GDP;
b. LGU revenues of LGU average;
c. % of own revenues over transfers (revenue autonomy); 
d. % of CAPEX over operational expenditures (expenditure rigidity).
2. Composition and trends in expenditure indicators:
a. % of expenditures of GDP; 
b. LGU expenditures of LGU average; 
c. Operating balance to operating revenues (operating performance); 
d. Balance after CAPEX to total revenues (overall performance).
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3. Financial position indicators: 
a. % of investment from total expenditures; 
b. LGU investment of LGU average; 
c. Debt to operating revenues (debt stock); 
d. Debt service to total revenues (debt service).
Table 29. Illustration of credit rating comparison of Macedonian LGU (2006) 
LGU % of revenues LGU revenues over % of own revenues % of CAPEX over
Fiscal performance indicators of GDP* LGU average=1; over transfers operational
under LGU average=0 expenditures
ARACINOVO 0.00% 0 55.08% 26.99%
BEROVO 0.05% 1 9.85% 308.09%
BITOLA 0.15% 1 149.56% 39.48%
BOGDANCI 0.01% 0 44.45% 85.78%
BOGOVINJE 0.03% 0 37.55% 172.43%
BOSILOVO 0.02% 0 27.31% 167.33%
BRVENICA 0.01% 0 53.75% 52.90%
VALANDOVO 0.02% 0 54.42% 29.47%
VASILEVO 0.01% 0 30.90% 82.33%
VEVCANI 0.00% 0 43.14% 87.51%
VELES 0.07% 1 115.94% 39.17%
VINICA 0.04% 0 26.41% 105.80%
VRANETICA 0.00% 0 89.91% 28.23%
VRAPCISTE 0.02% 0 285.40% 59.78%
GEVGELIJA 0.07% 1 57.76% 137.58%
GOSTIVAR 0.09% 1 81.45% 77.87%
GRADSKO 0.01% 0 33.93% 128.23%
DEBAR 0.04% 0 93.99% 117.32%
DEBARCA 0.01% 0 23.18% 63.00%
DELCEVO 0.03% 0 60.85% 51.20%
DEMIR KAPIJA 0.01% 0 28.55% 132.96%
DEMIR HISAR 0.02% 0 21.81% 81.25%
DOJRAN 0.01% 0 107.04% 65.72%
DOLNENI 0.01% 0 32.16% 26.71%
DRUGOVO 0.01% 0 38.94% 25.23%
ZELINO 0.02% 0 48.54% 88.22%
ZAJAS 0.01% 0 35.50% 40.15%
ZELENIKOVO 0.01% 0 149.47% 40.52%
ZRNOVCI 0.00% 0 29.93% 101.18%
ILINDEN 0.02% 0 140.58% 41.59%
JEGUNOVCE 0.01% 0 51.80% 29.93%
KAVADARCI 0.07% 1 224.48% 96.79%
KARBINCI 0.01% 0 11.40% 85.77%
KICEVO 0.04% 0 137.13% 41.64%
KONCE 0.01% 0 38.10% 81.61%
KOCANI 0.04% 0 77.06% 41.03%
KRATOVO 0.01% 0 35.82% 100.30%
KRIVA PALANKA 0.04% 0 32.03% 18.38%
KRIVOGASTANI 0.00% 0 69.34% 22.20%
KRUSEVO 0.01% 0 43.99% 58.66%
KUMANOVO 0.12% 1 92.11% 25.10%
LIPKOVO 0.01% 0 30.12% 302.05%
LOZOVO 0.01% 0 14.38% 10.10%
MAVROVO I ROSTUSE 0.01% 0 29.44% 25.91%
* GDP projected for the whole 2006
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The credit rating agencies and investors sometimes look at other comparative data and indicators
to assess the credit worthiness of LGU. Here are examples of some indices at NUTS III level (see more
www.lsg-data.org.mk developed by CEA and sponsored by USAID through World Learning) for
Macedonia. 
MAKEDONSKI BROD 0.01% 0 33.93% 114.34%
MAKEDONSKA KAMENICA 0.01% 0 46.16% 62.83%
MOGILA 0.01% 0 61.67% 65.16%
NEGOTINO 0.03% 0 111.20% 37.61%
NOVACI 0.01% 0 40.79% 110.30%
NOVO SELO 0.02% 0 22.06% 26.51%
OSLOMEJ 0.01% 0 19.99% 108.11%
OHRID 0.12% 1 374.38% 38.27%
PETROVEC 0.01% 0 60.70% 140.87%
PEHCEVO 0.01% 0 18.63% 186.67%
PLASNICA 0.01% 0 11.81% 42.02%
PRILEP 0.10% 1 167.96% 127.95%
PROBISTIP 0.04% 0 48.30% 168.00%
RADOVIS 0.06% 1 170.29% 90.86%
RANKOVCE 0.01% 0 14.91% 36.49%
RESEN 0.03% 0 62.82% 125.09%
ROSOMAN 0.01% 0 59.44% 91.78%
STARO NAGORICANE 0.01% 0 31.73% 124.35%
SVETI NIKOLE 0.05% 1 64.02% 52.49%
SOPISTE 0.01% 0 179.65% 48.48%
STRUGA 0.14% 1 234.63% 52.83%
STRUMICA 0.08% 1 149.60% 14.42%
STUDENICANI 0.01% 0 117.15% 51.23%
TEARCE 0.02% 0 76.53% 37.24%
TETOVO 0.09% 1 172.90% 19.79%
CENTAR ZUPA 0.01% 0 97.78% 23.29%
CAJKA 0.01% 0 18.47% 80.35%
ZESINOVO I OBLESVO 0.01% 0 141.68% 102.43%
CUCER SANDEVO 0.03% 0 228.39% 27.86%
STIP 0.05% 1 130.32% 116.47%
AERODROM 0.17% 1 349.64% 78.08%
BUTEL 0.05% 1 167.77% 55.19%
GAZI BABA 0.10% 1 109.93% 50.76%
GORCE PETROV 0.05% 1 236.50% 89.11%
KARPOS 0.13% 1 280.09% 56.98%
KISELA VODA 0.10% 1 269.96% 47.08%
SARAJ 0.02% 0 91.32% 104.44%
CENTAR 0.17% 1 477.38% 33.36%
CAIR 0.07% 1 146.15% 28.23%
SUTO ORIZARI 0.01% 0 127.30% 120.37%
CITY OF SKOPJE 0.87% 1 657.50% 26.99%
TOTAL: 3.93% 351.01% 79.79 %
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Table 30. Composite index of economic development 
Note: The more negative the number the better the situation.
Table 31.
Statistics available for the variable 
The CEA MCI Index is giving overall base for comparison among Macedonian LGU. It facilitates tar-
geting for decision makers not only for the central government but for the donor community as well.
CEA believes that the CEA MCI Index will be useful for the local governments and officials in making
strategy and development plans as well as making comparisons among themselves and boosting
competition among them in Macedonia. The ranking system is aimed at assessing the socio-econom-
ic performance of Macedonian LGU.
Table 32. CEA MCI Index based on 28 variables 
Source: www.lsg-data.org.mk. 
Region Composite index of economic development Ranking
Republic of Macedonia -0,80 1,00
Pelagoniski -0,40 2,00
Vardarski 0,00 3,00
Severoistocen 0,90 4,00
Jugozapaden 0,30 3,00
Skopski -1,30 1,00
Jugoistocen -0,40 2,00
Poloski 1,00 4,00
Istocen -0,10 3,00
Avg 0,00 2,75
Max 1,00 4,00
Min -1,30 1,00
Composite Composite index of Composite index of social infrastructure Composite index of communal
population index economic development infrastructure
1. Aging index 5. VA of non-financial 8. Education 14. Roads
2. Annual sector - Illiteracy rate 15. Telephone subscribers
population growth 6. Growth rate of VA in - Number of students in tertiary
3. Total birth rate non-financial sector education
4. Migration net 7. Unemployment rate 9. Health
- Physicians
- Infant mortality
- Deaths by tuberculosis
10. Culture
- Cinema performances
- Public cultural objects
11. Youth at risk
- Youth unemployed
- Convicted juveniles
12. Democracy
- Candidates for LSG per elected
counselor in LSG
- Number of NGO
13. Gender equality
- Female activity rate
- Elected female in LSG as a share in
total elected
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Thus, one can choose to see the scores among the separate indices and/or the composite MCI:
1. Composite population index
2. Composite index of economic development
3. Composite index of social infrastructure
4. Composite index of communal infrastructure
5. CEA Municipality Composite Indicator MCI
Table 33. Number of classes according the Sturges' rule
Number one rank illustrates best performance thus, the higher the rank the worse the performance.  
NUTS NUTS 3 NUTS 4 NUTS 5
Units 8 34 123
Number of classes 
(in accordance with Sturges' rule) 4 6 8
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